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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the cost of developing affordable housing in Boston, emphasizing the
opportunity to reduce development costs with the use of modular construction. To analyze the cost
of providing attached housing, quantitative and qualitative data were collected for seven developments
in Boston. The qualitative data is used to explain the interrelationships that determine the cost of
development.
A framework for disaggregating housing production costs is established. This framework is
used to compare the costs of the seven Boston cases studies. The data collected for the case studies is
also compared to two previous studies, focusing on the potential to reduce cost by using modular
construction. The eight cost components in the framework are land, predevelopment fees, financing,
marketing, project management, site work/foundations, off-site construction, and on-site construction.
The profits (losses) to the developer and general contractor are separated from the cost data and are
not included when comparing the cases, so the actual costs of production are not misrepresented..
The cost data for the seven Boston case studies indicates that modular construction does not
reduce the cost of construction (the hard costs). It does, however, have the potential to reduce soft
costs through a decrease in the construction period. The cost components affected are finance costs,
project management, overhead, and general conditions. In the seven case studies, the soft costs (not
including land or profits) ranged from 20% to 39% of the total development cost. This data
emphasizes the relative importance of soft costs, and shows the soft cost estimates in other studies to
be unrealistically low.
The development process is divided into three periods: predevelopment, construction, and
post construction (marketing). Modular construction can only decrease the construction period. The
data collected shows the construction period to be shortest in those developments using modular
construction with experienced construction management. The cases also highlight the effect of some
factors which are independent of the type of construction. Among these, the most important are the
experience of the construction manager, restrictions on marketing, changes in underwriting guidelines,
and community acceptance. Each of these factors has the potential to extend the development period,
resulting in increased costs.
Thesis Supervisor: Donald A. Schon
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Studies and Education
Thesis Supervisor: John Crowley
Title: Research Associate, Department of Architecture
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Most housing problems in Boston and throughout the nation are ultimately the result of the
squeeze between inadequate household incomes, on the one hand, and the cost of profitably providing
housing on the other. -- Michael E. Stone
In the past, premanufactured construction has been sought as a solution to providing affordable
housing. Many government programs have been created over the years, encouraging the use of
premanufactured construction to quickly and inexpensively provide needed housing. Most of the
government programs have been at the federal level, programs such as the Veterans Emergency
Housing Program in 1946 and Operation Breakthrough in 1969.
The federal programs encouraging premanufactured housing have ended. In fact, federal support
for new low income housing, whether stick built or premanufactured, has almost stopped. In 1979,
the federal government budgeted $32 billion for low-income housing programs; by 1988, the amount
was less than $8 billion. The number of government sponsored housing starts declined even more
dramatically. In 1970 the government sponsored over 400,000 units, in 1982 less than 100,000 units
and in 1988 less than 10,000 units.
The burden of providing new affordable housing has shifted from the federal government to the
local level. The non-profit developers and community development agencies (the thousand points of
light) have increased their role in providing housing over the years, yet they have not offset the
withdrawal of the federal government support.
"As indefatigable and creative as the nonprofits have been, their combined efforts
have created fewer housing units in the past decade than were built by the federal
government in any one year in the 1970s." 1
The low cost housing stock has declined over the years even as the need for it has grown. In
Boston, the average price of a home has increased at a faster rate than the average family income,
resulting in a gap between "ability to pay" (defined as 28% of income) and the cost of housing.
1 Andy Zipser, "Broken Promises", Wall Street Journal 5/19/89
The traditional "rule of thumb" for housing affordability has been linked to a family's income.
A family should "afford" a house if they spend 25% to 30% of their income on housing. Michael
Stone gives an alternative method of measuring affordability. He argues
"how much a family can afford for shelter is the difference between disposable
income (i.e. income after taxes) and the cost of meeting non housing needs at a basic
level of adequacy. People paying more than they can afford on this basis are 'shelter
poor' -- the squeeze between inadequate incomes and excessive housing costs leaves
them with not enough money to meet their non-housing needs at a minimum level."2
When Stone's definition of affordability is employed, the gap between the "ability to pay" and the cost
of housing is even larger than estimates based on a fixed percentage (i.e. 28%) of income. Stone
estimates:
"one-third of the people of Massachusetts, about 700,000 households, are shelter
pool. While homelessness is but the most visible and most extreme form of shelter
poverty ... others have places to live, but have inadequate nutrition or medical care or
dental care or clothing because of the squeeze between their incomes and housing
costs."3
Many items contribute to the total cost of housing. Among these are rent or mortgage
payments, taxes, insurance, utilities, and condominium fees. Many programs have been created to
close the gap between these costs and the amount families are able to pay. These include rent
supplement vouchers, subsidized interest rates to lower mortgage payments, and grants which reduce
the sales price. The sales price is determined by the cost to produce housing plus profit and minus
subsidies. One possible way to alleviate the "shelter poverty" described by Stone is to provide
housing at a lower sales price.
The city of Boston has created housing programs over the past six years which support the use of
modular construction. There are several reasons the city of Boston advocates the use of
2 Michael Stone, Housing Issues of the 1990s, draft copy.
3 Ibid
premanufactured housing in an urban setting. One is a reduction of construction cost, another is a
reduction in construction time. Decreased construction time reduces soft costs such as management
and overhead costs, financing fees, and also security costs (a significant cost component when
developing in a city).
This thesis analyzes the cost of producing housing for lower and middle income families in an
urban area, focusing on the opportunity to reduce total development cost by using premanufactured
housing. The total development cost of housing is determined by the interrelationship of numerous
factors. These factors include soft costs:
land,
predevelopment costs,
project management,
marketing,
financing
and hard costs:
off site construction,
on site construction,
site work/foundations.
Other factors such as direct subsidies and reduced interest rates for permanent financing affect the
total development cost indirectly, though the primary effect is a reduced carrying cost to the buyer.
Previous studies calculating the savings achievable through the use of manufactured housing used
estimates rather than field data as the basis for their analysis. For this thesis, projected and actual
development costs were collected for seven multifamily developments in Boston. The cases were
chosen with the intent to show how manufactured construction, in particular modular construction,
can be used to decrease construction as well as total development costs
The components of cost and the interrelationships between the factors of cost were determined
primarily through interviews with the developers, contractors, and representatives of government
agencies involved in the projects. The qualitative information is used to explain the cost data and
model the interrelationships determining costs. The objective is to identify the key factors affecting
the cost of housing development.
Summary of Contents
Chapter 2 is an overview of the past developments in the manufactured housing industry. It
includes definitions of manufactured housing terms, a brief summary of past federal programs hoping
to utilize manufactured housing as a solution to housing shortages, data on market penetration as
well as a discussion of the barriers the industry faces.
In chapter 3, the methodologies used in two previous studies analyzing the cost advantages of
manufactured housing:
1) The Kaiser report for the President's Commission on Housing, 1968
2) Manufactured Housing Report for the City of Chicago prepared by ON-SITE
IN-SITE in 1985
are presented. The methodology used in this thesis (including the basis of case selection and methods
of normalizing the data for comparison)to ascertain the cost of developing housing in Boston is also
explained in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 4 each of the seven case studies is described, including a project narrative, projected
and actual cost data, and the causal relationships that determined the cost of production.
The results obtained from the seven Boston case studies are compared to the two previous studies
in Chapter 5. The construction costs as well as total development costs are analyzed by construction
type. The differences among the three studies for each of the eight components are explained.
Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of the duration of development on the different component of
cost. The interest cost is modeled by separating the interest payments into three periods of
development: predevelopment, construction, and sales. The model is applied to each of the seven case
studies to disaggregate the cost of interest payments. The influence of the duration of development is
also applied to the management cost component.
The results, including a proforma for the development costs using modular and stick built
construction, are summarized in Chapter 7. Policy and practicing recommendations as well as future
work are also presented in this chapter..
MANUFACTURED HOUSING: PRECEDENTS
Providing adequate and affordable housing for all people has been a challenge to architects,
builders, and government officials for many decades in many parts of the world. Prefabricated
housing has been seen as a solution to housing problems in the past, initially as a method to provide
immediate shelter in remote places, and subsequently as a method to quickly and inexpensively
produce large quantities of housing for a mass market. The potential to reduce cost through economies
of scale has made manufactured housing appear as a technological fix to provide affordable housing.
This thesis extends the analysis of these cost advantages by including the cost of modular construction
in the broader framework of total development cost.
The terminology as used in this thesis is defined in this chapter. Also, the programs sponsored
by the United States government as well as recent trends in the manufactured housing industry are
summarized.
Definitions
The terms manufactured and premanufactured refer to the housing that is partially built at a
factory. There are three general categories of manufactured housing: modular, panelized, and pre-cut.
Modular houses are 80% to 90% percent fabricated at a factory and moved to the site with three
dimensional volumetric components. The roof is usually folded or placed on the house at the site in
order to conform with highway regulations of height restrictions. Most of the structural
components, mechanical and electrical systems are installed Lofore the house leaves the factory. Most
finishes such as baseboards, wallpaper, and appliances are also installed before the unit leaves the
factory. The most common type is a wood frame modular. The HUD-code (otherwise referred to as
"manufactured" or mobile) homes are another form of modular unit. There are also a minimal
number of concrete modular units produced in the United States.
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Modular units are 'set' at the site. This involves a crane to lift the modules from the truck and
'set' it on the foundations. The construction at the site after the modules are set is called "button-up".
Panelized houses are 20% to 60% fabricated at the factory. They arrive at the site with the
walls, floor and ceiling components that must be joined at the site. "Closed panels" are more finished
than "open panels". Closed panels have windows, insulation, electrical and plumbing work installed
at the plant within the panels. The majority of the interior and exterior finish is completed. Closed
panels systems usually include a three dimensional bath and kitchen core module. Open panels are
delivered to the site without windows, insulation, plumbing and electrical work or interior and
exterior finishes. Floors are usually precut. Roof trusses, windows, doors and loose material are
shipped with the wall panels to be assembled at the construction site.
Pre-cut houses have the least amount of preassembled parts. The components are shipped to the
site with directions for assembly. Few components, with the exception of stairs and windows, are
assembled at the plant.
Manufactured Housing History
Prefabrication can be dated to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century
prefabrication was primarily an instrument of new settlement. For example,
"the Portable Colonial Cottage was an essential ingredient in the settlement of South
Australia in the 1830s, and wooden prefabs played a significant role in the settlement and
development of the American Midwest"4
By World War I, the factory-made housing industry was extensive but highly variable.
Fluctuations in the market were violent, because the market itself was linked to the accidents of
4 Gilbert Herbert, The Dream of a Factory Made House,
events -- uncertain colonization, wars, and natural disasters -- all sporadic and unpredictable. For
most of this period prefabrication was seen as a solution to crisis conditions rather than normal
development. It was not utilized to alleviate the growing housing shortages in cities.
After WWI, most highly industrialized countries in Europe, Great Britain and Germany, faced a
housing shortage beyond what they had seen before. The shortage created by the rapidly expanding
cities was intensified due to the five years' cessation on routine construction. Britain quickly
responded with industrialized building. In Germany the thought given to mass housing brought
together administrators, industrialists and architects. The work of Walter Gropius and his colleagues
is acclaimed as pioneering, propelling application of mass production to the expanding market of mass
housing. During WWII Gropius came to the U.S. to continue his work.
Prefabrication and Mass Housing in the United States
In the U.S. prefabricated building technologies received widespread attention in the 1930s as a
solution to the shortage of affordable housing. Hoping to duplicate the success of the automobile
industry, industrial giants began investing in home manufacturing operations for a mass-market One
housing analyst sited several reasons for the lack of success of these early endeavors:
"the price of the prefabricated house was not competitive, public interest stopped
short of purchase, and promised capital backing proved elusive. Inconsistent local
codes and management errors also contributed to the problem." 5
Following WWII, in response to a critical shortage of homes, President Truman appointed
Wilson Wyatt as Housing Expeditor. Wyatt presented the Veteran's Emergency Housing Program in
February of 1946, calling for strong reliance on prefabricated housing. Two years later the program
was cancelled, having cost the government $200 million, or about $27,000 per house (1948 dollars).
5 Office of Technology Assessment, "Technology, Trade and the U.S. Residential Construction
Market."
75,000 units were built, less than 10% of the original target. Many housing producers, including
those with technically sound products, went bankrupt upon the withdrawal of Federal funding.
In 1967 President Johnson charged a committee headed by Edgar Kaiser to assess how private
enterprise can build housing for the urban poor. The committee concluded that barring reductions in
housing standards, only technological advances could slow expected cost increases in housing.
"There are two approaches to reducing the construction costs of housing. One is to
reduce the minimum housing standards by increasing densities, cutting down on room
sizes and paring the quality features and amenities with the dwelling units
themselves. The second and more difficult course is to pare down costs or hold
down expected cost increases through technological advances while keeping quality
constant."6
The technical reports written for the Kaiser committee found that only savings achievable
through manufactured construction were in soft costs. The studies concluded that above ground
construction cost would be even greater than for a conventionally built house. The methodology and
results of the Kaiser report are discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.
Following the report, in 1969, George Romney, Secretary of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, announced Operation Breakthrough. The goal of Operation Breakthrough was to
change the existing housing delivery system in two ways: decreasing the actual cost of construction
and overcoming the institutional barriers to mass marketing of factory produced housing -- building
codes and zoning regulations. Five mechanisms were anticipated to lower cost:
1) lower per unit cost due to volume production
2) use of new, cheaper materials
3) lower costs in bulk pelrchase of material
4) substitution of lower paid factory labor for higher paid on-site labor
5) shorter term construction loans and site financing
6 Edgar Kaiser, A Decent Home-- U.S. President's Committee on Urban Housing, p 35.
Only 22 firms were selected from 236 applicants, and only 14 of the 22 got beyond design,
development, and prototype completion to actual volume production (Phase III). Some producers
cited "cost and other production problems, corporate marketing policies, and bankruptcy" 7 as reasons
for avoiding Phase III. Other housing producers did not participate in Phase III due to code
compliance.
The project was terminated in 1973, after completion of 26,500 units at an average cost of $2,700
each (1973 dollars). While the goal of reducing housing cost through technological innovation was
not achieved, the program had some positive effects:
"While Operation Breakthrough is now looked on as a mismanaged Federal housing
program, the effort did expose builders to new housing construction technologies.
Furthermore, it led many States to reevaluate their building code systems,
encouraged uniformity between State standards, fostering new methods for
evaluating housing construction, tested new labor arrangements for structure
assembly operations, and introduced American builders to innovative European
practices." 8
Discontinuity of Market
The discontinuity of market cannot be overstated in the failure of housing producers to be able to
sustain themselves in the market over the long term. Ezra Ehrenkranzt emphasized this in the keynote
address to the 1984 Hennessy Symposium, devoted to "discuss the impact of economic cycles on
productivity, efficiency, and innovation in the building industry."
"We are told: 'Innovate, develop new housing technology: we will set up markets for
this, we will organize because we need innovation...Clearly we are not provided with
the proper framework for innovation. There is no question that you need continuity
of market for technical development, and anything which disrupts that continuity has
a negative implication on opportunities. "9
7 Operation Breakthrough -- Lessons Learned, 1976.
8 Office of Technology Assessment.
9 Erza Ehrenkranzt, Hennessey Symposium.
Mr. Ehrenkrantz further recognized the danger of not following a well laid out research and
development program:
"We have tended rather to move very quickly to large scale implementation because
Congress doesn't do anything until they want it to happen yesterday -- and when that
happens, you don't go through an ordered process and have reasonable conditions for
success." 10
The inability to be self-sustaining during a market downturn has forced many small firms to
either close shop or sell out to larger competitors. Exhibit 2-1 shows that the number of plants in
the modular industry was reduced by more than 60% from 1983 to 1984.
Exhibit 2-1: Number of Modular Housing Plants in the United States
Year Number of Plants
1981 188
1982 201
1983 348
1984 135
1985 148
1986 159
1987 159
Source: "Where the Action Is" LSI/Dodge
-------------------------------------------------------------
Only firms which can mitigate the effect of a downturn are able to survive. Selling to larger
competitors leads to increased industry concentration. Larger companies can mitigate regional
economic downturns through geographic diversification. Another method of mitigating a downturn is
by increasing prices during the upturn.
10 Ibid.
Market Share
Although manufactured housing has been available in the United States for over 50 years, most
forms have not established increasing market share of new construction. Exhibits 2-2 and 2-3 show
the number of units housing units produced for each construction type, and the percentage of total
units for the years 1972 to 1987, respectively. There are four primary categories of data: 1) units
produced at a factory and sold to the dealer, developer, and builder, 2) major industrial home builder,
3) other home builders, and 4) builders of structures with more than five units.
The modular segment (excluding HUD-code units) has accounted for 1.5% to 3.5% of the new
construction market share. The panelized units accounted for 6% of new construction in the early and
mid 1970s but declined to 4.4% in 1987. The precut units have not achieved more than 2% of the new
construction market share.
The most widespread, is the HUD-code or mobile home. Mobile homes accounted for 20% of
the new housing starts in the early seventies. Their market share has decreased to 12.5% in 1987.
Mobile homes have primarily been used for single family detached homes in suburban or rural areas.
However, a developer in Los Angeles has recently attempted to cluster mobile homes in an urban
setting.
EXHIBIT 2-2: HOUSING PRODUCTION 1972 TO 1977
Produced in Factorv and Sold to
Year Dealer, Developer, Builder MaJor
Ind.
Other
Home Builders 5+ Family Units
Home Use No 5+ 5+
Precut Panel Modular Mobile Builders Components Blda Comp. Prefab Conv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
26,000
27,000
29,000
28,000
20,000
17,560
20,000
17,000
27,000
30,100
31,730
30,371
178,000
151,000
127,000
117,000
111.000
137.000
139.000
127,000
100,000
52.020
60,000
69,000
72,850
76,860
81,990
81,518
43,000
56,000
20,000
23,000
34.000
39.000
49,000
45,000
38.000
37,520
40,920
53,000
52,640
56,000
58,025
50,737
576.000
567,000
329,000
213,000
246,000
277.000
276,000
277,000
216,000
235,109
239,000
292,210
295,000
284,000
245,000
240,000
162,000
149,500
126,000
107,000
159,000
211,000
234,000
200,000
150,000
128,000
164,000
262,000
298,776
283,616
245,527
232,823
806,500
680,500
513,000
566,000
744,000
955,000
920,000
768.000
556,000
464,000
381,000
588,000
576,000
550,000
642,000
659,000
261,000
213,000
150,000
143,000
175,000
204,000
187,000
152,000
105,000
87,000
90,000
190,000
190,000
182,000
162,000
160,000
24,100
21,200
10,200
5,400
7,700
11,000
12,000
15,000
12,000
5,000
7.000
15,000
16,000
20,000
38,000
29,000
881,900
773,800
371,800
198,600
281,300
403,000
450,000
414,000
329,000
281,000
311,000
525,000
528,000
541,000
473,000
331,000
EXHIBIT 2-3: HOUSING PRODUCTION 1972 TO 1977 -- PERCENTAGE OF NEW CONSTRUCTION
Produced in Factory and Sold to
Year Dealer, Developer, Builder
Other
MaJor Home Builders 5+ Family Units
Ind.
Home Use No 5+ 5+
Precut Panel Modular Mobile Builders Components Bldq Como. Prefab Conv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1.5%
1.2%
1.3%
1.4%
1.3%
1.3%
1.5%
0.8%
1.3%
1.5%
1.6%
1.7%
6.1%
5.8%
7.7%
8.5%
6.2%
6.1%
6.1%
6.3%
6.6%
4.0%
4.6%
3.4%
3.5%
3.8%
4.1%
4.5%
1.5%
2.1%
1.2%
1.7%
1.9%
1.7%
2.1%
2.2%
2.5%
2.9%
3.1%
2.6%
2.6%
2.8%
2.9%
2.8%
19.6%
21.7%
20.0%
15.5%
13.8%
12.2%
12.0%
13.7%
14.2%
18.0%
18.2%
14.5%
14.3%
14.0%
12.4%
13.2%
5.5%
5.7%
7.7%
7.8%
8.9%
9.3%
10.2%
9.9%
9.8%
9.8%
12.5%
13.0%
14.5%
14.0%
12.4%
12.8%
27.5%
26.1%
31.1%
41.2%
41.7%
42.2%
40.1%
37.9%
36.4%
35.5%
29.0%
29.2%
28.0%
27.2%
32.5%
36.3%
8.9%
8.2%
9.1%
10.4%
9.8%
9.0%
8.1%
7.5%
6.9%
6.7%
6.9%
9.4%
9.2%
9.0%
8.2%
8.8%
0.8%
0.8%
0.6%
0.4%
0.4%
0.5%
0.5%
0.7%
0.8%
0.4%
0.5%
0.7%
0.8%
1.0%
1.9%.
1.6%.
30.1%
29.6%
22.6%
14.5%
15.8%
17.8%
19.6%
20.4%
21.6%
21.5%
23.7%
26.1%
25.7%
26.7%
23.9%
18.2%
Source: LSI/FW Dodae. 'Where the Action Is' and 'Red Book of Housinq Manufacturers'
Total
2,932,500
2,612,000
1,647,000
1,373,000
1,784,000
2,264,000
2,296,000
2,026,000
1,526,000
1,307,209
1,312,920
2,011,210
2,056,266
2,023,576
1,977,272
1,814,449
TOTAL
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
Summary
In the past thirty years there was a limited increase in production of manufactured houses though
fluctuations in the market and discontinuous government programs have put many smaller producers
out of business. The fluctuation in demand is perhaps the biggest barrier to success for the industry.
Other barriers, such as inconsistent codes between localities and lack of public acceptance also
contribute to the limited growth in market share of manufactured housing.
Although Operation Breakthrough, did not provide a method of reducing costs it did open the
doors for mass producing housing on a large scale. This trend has continued; large companies are
buying factories unable to sustain the fluctuations in market. These companies are creating an
economies of scale that can reduce the cost of producing a house for the long term.
Manufactured housing has been tried as a solution to providing affordable housing in the past.
The city of Boston is now advocating the use of modular construction. To determine if this approach
makes sense, it is necessary to find the cause of past failures to achieve lower development cost
through modular construction. To do this, it is necessary to include the cost of modular construction
in the broader framework of total development cost. Such an analysis will clarify the
interrelationship between modular construction and other development costs, and ultimately shed
light on the potential for success of programs advocating the use of modular construction.
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY OF ACCOUNTING
FOR THE COST OF HOUSING PRODUCTION
The challenge to provide sufficient low cost housing has been studied for many years in the
United States. Some of the studies have addressed the question: What can premanufactured housing
provide as a solution to reducing housing cost? The data obtained in this thesis will be compared with
the results from two other studies:
1) The Technical Studies of the Report of the President's Committee on Urban
Housing, 1968
2) Manufactured Housing for Chicago, a study comparing six different modes of
construction, 1985.
Both of these studies supplemented their primary data for construction costs with secondary sources
and assumptions for soft costs. The soft cost estimates for both studies did not sufficiently account
for the costs incurred due to numerous factors inherent in affordable housing development. In the
present day of community power, design guidelines, secondary mortgage markets, community
development organizations, and government programs, the dynamics of cost become more complicated
than a simple multiple of construction costs. A certain portion of soft cost is dependant upon hard
costs but soft costs are also dependant upon other variables such as community support, management
expertise, and restrictions on marketing.
For this study, the actual cost of housing production are determined by collecting disaggregated
cost data as well as qualitative data to explain the cost data. The methodology of the two previous
studies, as well as the methodology of this study are explained in more detail in this chapter.
Kaiser Report on Housing, 1968
One part of the report to the president concentrated on housing costs. The Marketing and
Research Department of McGraw Hill Information Systems Company prepared "A Study of
Comparative Time and Cost for Building Five Selected Types of Low-Cost Housing". Their five types
were:
1. the detached single-family unit;
2. the detached "manufactured" single-family unit;
3. the unit in a multi-family medium-rise building;
4. the unit in a rehabilitated multi-family walk-up structure;
5. the mobile home.
Each of these units had a size of 1000 square feet with three bedrooms. Both the manufactured
and the single-family units included basements. Cost and time values were based on personal
interviews with "key individuals" and then compared with available secondary data.
"The cost and time values are based on actual observations of recent projects,
supplemented by secondary source data. The units were chosen according to
specifications set by The President's Committee on Urban Housing (i.e. low cost,
privately-built, three bedroom accommodations for occupancy by low-income
families.)" 11
The study did however warn of components that were difficult to measure and that varied widely
-- among them they include land cost and site construction.
"Land cost differs widely from place to place, particularly between central city to
suburban locations. The site costs shown in this study reflect actual cost for specific
locations. Other sites may show significantly different costs." 12
The single family detached and the single family manufactured units are compared to the data
collected in this thesis. There are, however, differences between the two studies that are important to
note.
11 McGraw Hill, Kaiser Report Technical Studies p.7
12 Ibid.
One important difference is that the Kaiser report focused on single family detached dwellings
rather than attached dwellings. The costs in the Kaiser report are not adjusted to account for this
difference. A second difference is that the units in Boston have roads, curbs and sidewalks in place
whereas the units studies in the Kaiser study were part of a new development where the roads, curbs
and sidewalks were included in the cost of development. The cost of roads, curbs, and sidewalks in
the Kaiser study were excluded for consistency of comparison. The estimates from the Kaiser study
are adjusted for inflation (from 1967 to 1989) and location (from Washington to Boston) and
compared to the cost data from this study in the following chapter.
Manufactured Housing for Chicago
In 1985, the city of Chicago commissioned ON-SITE IN-SITE to determine the feasibility of
using manufactured housing to reduce housing production cost in Chicago. The study, "Manufactured
Housing for Chicago", set out as one of its goals to "assess the costs to construct and to place on the
Chicago market various forms of manufactured housing." 13 They investigated six construction
alternatives: wood modular, panelized (open and closed panel), pre-cut, concrete modular, and
conventional stick-built.
For each construction alternative they evaluated the cost for three prototypical units: the single
family detached, the single family attached and a six unit flat apartment. Each unit was to be 1064
square feet; however, some units varied from the predetermined size to match manufacturers' existing
prototypes.
ON-SITE IN-SITE calculated the construction cost as well as the "total replacement cost" for
each construction type. To calculate the construction costs they received estimates from
13 ON-SITE IN-SITE, Manufactured Housing For Chicago. p. 2.
manufacturers for off-site construction costs. The on-site construction costs were estimated using
R.S. Means data, adjusted for Chicago with the "local adjustment factor". The "total replacement
cost" estimates in the study included hard costs, overhead, profit, fees and interest. The following
assumptions were made to calculate the "total replacement cost".
"General contractor's overhead and profit are estimated as fifteen percent (15%) of
hard construction costs. The mark up is made only on the site components of the
construction, not on the manufactured part of the construction. The manufacturer
supervises the delivery and erection of their components which means that the general
contractor does not expect a mark up on that portion of the costs. The permits,
utility hookup licenses and other fees are assumed to cost two percent (2%) of the
total construction costs, per criteria of the Chicago Department of Inspectional
Services. Non-profit sponsors are assumed to be involved in this type of project. As
such, their fees are estimated to be another two percent (2%) of the construction
costs. Other professional fees for architectural and legal work are estimated at five
percent (5%) of the hard costs. A contingency equal to five (5%) of the hard cost is
included."14
The construction cost and the soft cost estimates for the Chicago study are adjusted for location
(from Chicago to Boston) and inflati6n (from 1985 and 1989) using Marshall and Swift construction
indices. The data are compared in the following chapter on an absolute and a percentage basis to the
Kaiser report and the data collected in Boston.
Methodology of Present Study
The purpose of this study was to determine the cost savings provided by manufactured
construction for affordable housing in an urban area. It was also important to capture the many
different factors potentially affecting the final cost of a development, including management
experience, community support, and marketing restrictions. The cases selected had varying
management experience, dependance upon community support, and subsidy programs which provided
marketing restrictions. It was important to obtain actual costs and then compare them across cases.
Therefore, it was necessary to establish comparable cost categories.
14 Ibid.
Projected and actual cost data were collected from developers, general contractors, and
representatives of government organizations involved in seven housing developments in Boston. The
data collected were disaggregated by line item and then grouped into eight categories which
compriseed the total development cost.. The profit or loss of the developer and the general contractor
was itemized and separated from the total cost of development. Other profits (i.e. subcontractors',
architects', lawyers', manufacturers') were included in the cost.
Some of the developments had better cost accounting than others. For some developments, the
project managers precisely accounted for the costs itemizing the differences between projected cost and
actual cost. In other cases the managers did not maintain an accurate account of the project costs. In
these cases, the actual costs were reconstructed from bank requisitions and project files.
This thesis restricts the study sample to the city of Boston. In addition, the cases include only
attached housing built for homeownership or sale. These restrictions allow several factors to be
standard throughout the developments. The approval process, the opportunity for subsidy programs,
and risks associated with home sales were similar for all developments. In addition, cost of labor
adjustments were not necessary since all the case studies were from one city.
The cases have different forms of construction, stressing modular construction. Five cases are
modular, one case open panel and one case stick built. The cases vary in subsidy type, management
expertise, design, zoning compliance, and marketing restrictions. The basis for case selection, case
characteristics, the eight category framework used to aggregate cost data, and the data adjustments
necessary for comparison are described in the following sections. A summary of case characteristics is
in Exhibit 3-1 and project schedules are in Exhibit 3-2.
EXHIBIT 3-1: CHARACTERISTICS OF CASE STUDIES
Urban Champlain
Edge Circle
1. Basic Characteristics
Number of units
Number of Buildings
Gross Square Feet
Net Square Feet
Average Usable Sgft Per Unit
Type of Construction
Zoning Variance Required?
Basement
2. Time Frame
Started/RFP Issued
Obtained Land
Groundbreaking
Certificate of Occupancy
Final Sale
3. Previous Experience of Devel
Developer
Developed New Construction?
Developed to that scale?
Developed with constr. type?
Contractor
Built new Construction?
Built to the scale?
Built with type of const.?
4. Construction Financing
5. Subsidy
CDBG
MAP/TAP
Other/Donation
6. Sales/End Loan Financing
MHFA -- (8% - 8.5%)
HOP -- (5 - 5.5%)
Market
Boston Housing Authority
161 21: 10
4 7 5
22,880 1 28,350 | 12,500
15,332 1 18,900 i 12,150
958 1 900 1 1,215
Modular 1 Modular 1 Open Panel
No 1 Yes I Yes
Yes 1 Yes I No
Dec. 1983 1 Dec. 1983 | Dec. 1984
Apr. 1984 1 Feb. 1984 1 May 1985
Sept. 1984 | Sept 1984 1 Apr. 1986
Feb 1985 1 Jan 1985 Oct. 1986
Oct. 1995 1 Mar. 1985 May 1988
Feb. 1987 | 1 Aug 1988
June 1987 1 :May 1989 (2)
Apr 1985 to :Jan 1985 to: Jan 1987 to
aft. June 19891 Oct. 1985 : Aug 1989
opeent Teas
No I No No
Yes No No
No No No
2 Yes/ 2 No | Yes No
Yes I Yes No
No 1 No | No
Prime +2 1 Prime +1 1 Prime +1
$232,032 | $315,000 | $180,000
$127,000 | $20,000 I $52,000
$37.000 1 $53,000 1 $130,000
12 21 6
0: 0| 0
41 01 0
0 0 4
19| 24
31 3
1 26,352 | 40,944
1 22.680 1 32,040
1 1,194 | 1,335
I Stick I Modular
1 No | Yes
,Yes (15 of 19), Yes
1 Apr. 1987 1 June 1985
1 July 1987 | Apr. 1987
i Mar. 1988 | Aug. 1987
1 Jan. 1989 to Apr. 1988
.Apr. 1989 July 1988
Nov. 1988
Jan 1989 to |Apr 1988 to
!Aft. June 19891 June 1989
No Yes
No Yes
No No
Yes Yes
No No
Yes Yes
| Prime +1.5 Prime +2
$0 1 $476,667
$01 $0
$01 $0
01 4
0| 16
19 0
0 4
31 15
1 | 5
1 3,300 | 21,870
2,930 17,370
977 1,158
Modular Modular
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
!Sept 1988 1 Sept 1987
!Oct 1988 - Jan 1988
!Oct 1988 Oct 1988
!Mar. 1989 |Apr. 1989 (2)
|May 1989 (3)
After | After
1 June 1989 1 June 1989
No No
No No
No No
Yes Yes
| Yes | Yes
Yes | Yes
| Prime + 2 Prime +2
o$0 $150,000
$01 $0
$0 $0
0 4
0 9
0 2
31 0
7. Income/Costs (Current Dollars) Cost = Sales + Subsidy - Profit
Average Cost Per Unit
Average Sales Price
Average Subsidy per unit
Average Profit (Loss)
Nuestra
Comunidad
Franklin
Homes
Bradford
Estates
Wayland
Street
Boston
Modular
$85,191
$62,406
$24,660
$1,875
$62,678 I
$43,939 I
$18,476 '
($263)|
$110,232
$93,200
$33,005
$15,973
$120,488
$126,795
$0
$6,307
$111,807
$96,750
$19,861
$4,804
$77,054
$115,000
$0
$37,946
$85,163
$80,000
$14,333
$9,170
Urban Edge
Land Acqusition
Predevelopment
Const. Structure 1
Const. Structure 2
Const. Structure 3
Const. Structure 4
Sales
Champlain Circle
Land Acquisition
Predevelopment
Construction
Sales
Nuestra
Comunidad
Land Acquisition
Predevelopment
Cons. Duplex 1
Cons. Duplex 2
Cons. Duplex 3
Cons. Duplex 4 & 5
Sales
Franklin Homes
Land Acquisition
Predevelopment
Const. Phase 1
Const. Phase 2
Sales
Bradford Estates
Land Acquisition
Predevelopment
Construction
Sales
Wayland Street
Land Acquisition
Predevelopment
Construction
Sales
Boston Modular
Land Acquisition
Predevelopment
Construction
Sales
Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June
1983 1984 1984 1985 1985 1986
- ~ I
- -
I J L I- I I I-- I 1 1 7
Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June
1986 1987 1987 1988 1988 1989
Exhibit 3-2: Project Schedules
I I I I I
-1-1--mi-I- I I
-______I_
1. Selection of Cases and Cases Characteristics
The first city program promoting manufactured housing began in December of 1983. Three of
the cases (Urban Edge, Champlain Circle and Nuestra Comunidad) were part of the Neighborhood
Development and Employment Agency's New Construction Initiative. Through this program the
land price was reduced and grant subsidies were awarded. The other two cases with subsidies were
Bradford Estates and the Boston Modular Buildable Lots project. Subsidy types included land
writedowns, Community Block Grant Money, MAP/TAP, and LEND. All the government programs
are explained in Appendix A. Two of the cases had no subsidies (Franklin Homes and Wayland
Street).
Another strategy to make housing affordable is to subsidize the market interest rate for the
mortgage. The subsidies, however come with marketing restrictions for the project. All five of the
cases with subsidies had marketing restrictions. Franklin Homes had no subsidies and therefore had no
marketing restrictions. Wayland Street presold all three of the units to the Boston Housing
Authority, incurring no expense for marketing.
The cases varied in management expertise. Three of the cases had experienced construction
managers (Champlain Circle, Wayland Street and Boston Modular). The other four cases had
construction managers that had no experience with projects at the scale of the case developments.
The learning curve of the construction manager can be evaluated in the following three cases:
Bradford Estates, Wayland Street and Boston Modular. All three were built by the same contractor,
Boston Modular Homes. Bradford Estates was the first of the three developments, the contractor had
not previously built a 24 unit development. In addition, the design was new to the manufacturer.
Wayland Street was constructed after Bradford Estates was completed using a similar but simplified
design. The management learning as well as simplified design result in a lower cost for Wayland
Street compared to Bradford Estates.
The Buildable Lots Program allowed Boston Modular to assume the role of developer as well as
contractor. Again design played a role in the cost of construction. These structures are three stories
and comply with the Public Facilities Department design guidelines. Both the structural requirements
for the three stories as well as the characteristics used to conform to the design guidelines (such as
bay windows) increased the cost of these units compared to the Wayland Street units.
Zoning variances can cause large cost overruns if time is not factored into the project schedule.
The Urban Edge case is particularly telling in this respect. The project consisted of four
quadruplexes. The first two did not require zoning variances. The second two required zoning
variances, resulting in construction delay of over one year. This in turn resulted in substantially
increased costs. The only other development that did not require a zoning variance was Franklin
Homes.
2. Framework for Comparison: Components of Cost
The cost line items for each development differed depending on the accounting conventions used
by the developers or contractors. Some developers aggregated by soft and hard costs, others had
categories of cost subdivided by their subcontracts. The costs obtained for each development are
aggregated into eight categories for an overall comparison among cases. The eight categories are land,
predevelopment fees, financing, marketing, management/overhead/general conditions, site
work/foundation, modules/panels, and construction at site. Profits/losses, subsides, donated services,
and sales revenue are also collected for each case "Total development cost" includes all the categories
with the exception of land and profits. The following is a brief description of each of the eight
categories.
1. Land: In most cases the land was donated by the city, implying a zero cost entry in the land
category. In the private projects, the land was bought from a private individual or organization. The
price paid was recorded.
2. Predevelopment Fees: Predevelopment fees include costs incurred before groundbreaking. Among
them are design, engineering, survey, legal fees, accounting, insurance for the land, real estate taxes,
and appraisal of the property. This category does not include the project management cost associated
with obtaining permits.
3. Financing: The financing costs include all payments to banks during the development period
4. Marketing: This category includes costs to the developer such as brochures and newspaper
advertisements as well as sales commissions or sales fees if applicable.
5. Management/General Conditions/Overhead: This category includes the cost of project management
for the developer as well as the contractor. It includes liability insurance, contingency, overhead, and
general conditions such as security and storage.
6. Site Work/Foundation: This category includes all work that is done at or below the ground level.
The costs are often site specific and vary from project to project depending upon underground
conditions. Items include demolition, site clearance, excavation, footings, foundation, backfill,
grading, utilities, and landscaping.
7. Off Site Construction: This category includes the cost of the structures or panels that are
manufactured off site. This category also includes the cost of transportation, the set crew and the
crane fees.
8. On Site Construction: All building costs that are above ground and are not manufactured off site
are in this category.
The profits/losses taken by the developer and the general contractor are separated from the other
data. They depend on type of subsidy, sales price, cost of development, and type of contract agreement
between the developer and the contractor.
3. Assumptions for Analysis
To systemically compare the actual cost of development it is necessary to exclude land costs and
profits/losses. This is not to imply that neither of these components are important in the final price
of the house. Land has dramatically increased as a percentage of total cost from 11% in 1949 to 24%
in 1982. Please see Exhibit 3-3 for an approximate cost breakdown for new single-family homes.
Although ultimately concerned with the affordability of a house to the family, this study is
concerned with the costs of providing housing. By including profits or losses the cost to provide
housing will be overestimated or underestimated. Therefore profits or losses are excluded in
compansons.
Table 3-3: Cost Components of a Typical Single-Family Home
1949 1969 1985
Land 11% 21% 24%
Financing 5% 7% 15%
Overhead and Profits 15% 17% 16%
Labor and Materials 69% 55% 45%
Sales Price $9,500 $26,000 $70,000
Source: NAHB Economics Division
a. Accounting for the Cost of Construction
The construction cost to the developer as well as the developer's profit depend in part upon the
structure of the relationship between the developer and the general contractor. They may have a fixed
contract agreement, a time and materials contract, or the developer may choose to be his own general
contractor. The risk of cost overruns can be mitigated to the developer only through a fixed price
contract with the general contractor. To capture the actual cost of construction if there is a fixed
price contr"ct, the cost to the general contractor is also collected.
If the developer has a fixed price contract with the contractor, the cost of construction to the
developer is the cost of construction plus the contractors profit. In this way the contractor assumes
the risk of cost overruns. In case where the cost of construction is greater than the fixed price, the
contractor assumes a negative profit (or loss). For example, Franklin Homes hired a general
contractor for a fixed price. The contractor's estimated profit and contingency were diminished due to
cost overruns. In fact, the cost overruns resulted in the contractor assuming a loss for the project.
Most contractors include a buffer for cost overruns (ranging from 3% to 12% of the
construction costs) in the general conditions, contingency, overhead, and profit categories. The
analysis will include the cost to the general contractor with a fixed price contract, in the sense that
any cost overruns in excess of the contingency budget are taken out of the contractors profit in the
"actual cost" column.
If the developer has a fixed price contract with the contractor, but the losses to the contractor
are so great that he leaves the job, the developer is faced with additional cost. If the contractor
continues with the job, he assumes the loss. If the contractor leaves, then the developer assumes the
loss, as she needs to hire a new contractor to finish the project. Changing contractors invariably
increases costs to the developer from the original projections.
Some developers choose to be their own general contractors. In this way they are able to capture
the profit the general contractor takes, yet at the same time they expose themselves to risks of cost
overruns.
b. Accounting for the Cost of Subsidies
In the case of land, the actual cost to the developer is recorded. If the city charged one dollar to
the developer, this is the cost recorded. If the developer acquired some or all the land privately, the
price paid is recorded. Land, due to its variability, is not included in the total development cost used
to compare one case to another.
Although the actual subsidy is not considered in the cost breakdown, the secondary effects of
subsidies are embedded within the cost of particular line items. For example, the city subsidizes
developments with direct subsidies between $10,000 to $20,000 per unit. This subsidy has impacts on
other costs. The construction loan required may be reduced, resulting in finance cost reductions. On
the other hand, all subsidies require that the units are marketed to a certain income group. A limited
target population may increase the marketing effort required to sell the units. Increased marketing
time means increased cost of financing because the term of the loan is extended.
Some projects have overruns requiring additional project management. The nonprofit developers
are able to get subsidized for project management expenses through city Management Assistance
Program and Technical Assistance Program (MAP/TAP). This program is explained in more detail in
Appendix A. The private developers cover cost overruns out of contingency first and then their
profit. In both cases, the cost of project management recorded does not include subsidies toward
project management.
4. Standardization of Costs for Comparison
There are two types of adjustments to the raw data. One is an adjustment for inflation and the
other is a standardization by net square feet based on center of the wall calculations.
a. Inflation Adjustment
Since the developments were constructed between 1984 and 1989, the data needs to be adjusted
for inflation. All projected which completed construction before April 1989, Urban Edge,
Champlain Circle, Nuestra Comunidad, and Bradford Estates, were adjusted for inflation using
Marshall and Swift construction cost indices. All were adjusted from the date of their certificate of
occupancy to April 1989.
Several firms construct cost indices to measure the change in costs of construction. R.S. Means
as well as the Dodge and Sweet cost indices are based primarily on commercial construction.
Marshall and Swift indices are disaggregated by city as well as five building types. Their class D,
wood frame construction, cost indices were used to adjust the cost of producing housing.
Each line item is multiplied by the inflation factor. This assumes that all costs are inflated as a
multiple of construction cost since the Marshall Swift indices give an inflation factor for
construction costs.
b. Net Square Feet Calculation
All costs except above ground construction costs are compared on a unit cost basis. Above
ground construction costs are compared on a square foot basis. Finished net square feet based on the
center of the wall for calculations are used to compare above ground construction costs.
CHAPTER IV: SEVEN CASE STUDIES
This chapter describes the qualitative and quantitative data for each of the seven case studies.
For each case the important predevelopment, construction, financing, and marketing issues are
described in the project description. The cost data for each case are presented in three forms: a flow
chart identifying the causal relationships determining increases or savings in cost, a table of
disaggregated projected and actual costs and revenues, and a bar chart showing the predicted and actual
costs of the eight components.
A basic flow chart structure is in Exhibit 4-1. Reading from left to right, the determinants of
housing cost are grouped into five categories. The first category includes previous experience of the
development team as well as factors such as community support and marketing restrictions. These
factors influence predevelopment, financing, marketing, management, site work, off site construction
and on site construction cost components. These in turn determine the total development cost. The
'total development cost' plus the profits (or minus the losses) plus the land and minus subsidies
determines the cost of the house to the buyer. The monthly carrying cost is comprised of the
principal, the condo fees, the taxes and the interest paid on the mortgage. In some developments, the
mortgage interest payments are subsidized through the MHFA or HOP programs.
Although the emphasis of this thesis the cost of production, it is important that the
determinants affecting the monthly carrying cost to the buyer are included in an analysis of cost since
some factors such as endloan interest subsidies also impose marketing restrictions which in turn effect
housing production costs.
Exhibit 4-1: Determinants of Housing Costs
URBAN EDGE
1. Project Description
Predevelopment
Urban Edge, a community development corporation, responded to a request for proposals issued
in November of 1983 by the Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency (NDEA) for their
New Construction Initiative (NCI). Urban Edge proposed to build sixteen units using modular
construction on four city lots. In April 1984 Urban Edge was designated for four city lots. The
original schedule in the proposal estimated that the construction would be complete June 1984 and the
sales August 1984. The total development cost was proposed to be $852,860 for the sixteen units. A
subsidy of $195,200 was awarded to Urban Edge in the form of a Community Development Block
Grant to reduce the final sales prices of the house to the buyer.
Neither the original schedule or budget were realized. None of the originally proposed sites
have yet been developed. Urban Edge proposed to develop one structure at 490 and 498 Center Street
each and two at Hyde Park. By July 1984, it was clear that the Center Street sites would not receive
community acceptance, therefore two different sites (105 Forest Hills Street and 35 Glen Road) were
issued to Urban Edge. A construction contract signed July 15, 1984 to end July 15, 1986 was for 105
Forest Street, 35 Glen Street and Hyde Park. The sites at Hyde Park, however, were not developed
due to an abutter's appeal to the variance. The appeal trial was pending as of June 1989.
The opposition by the community groups to the development at various sites was unexpected.
Although Urban Edge had been praised by the community in the past for renovating boarded buildings,
new construction on vacant lots was not as readily accepted by the community. This was the first
time Urban Edge was to build new construction in the neighborhood. Vacant land was viewed as
having a different purpose to different people. Some wanted to park their cars on the vacant lots and
others wanted the lots as open space. Many did not want affordable housing on the land. The
community successfully blocked the development on Center Street. It remains to be seen if they
block the development at Hyde Park.
Urban Edge responded to the second Request for Proposals issued in December of 1984 for the
New Construction Initiative. They were designated for six sites (two site to replace the Hyde Park
sites from the previous round and four new sites). They were designated for $240,000 more in CDBG
funds for the four new sites. Since none of the new Round II sites were developed and none of the
$240,000 was released.
Construction
The first two building constructed were at Forest Hills Street and Glen Road. Neither
required a zoning variance. These were the only two buildings constructed under Round I of the NCI.
Construction at Forest Hills Street began in September of 1984 and was completed at the end of
February, 1985. Construction at Glen Road began in February 1985 and was completed by October
1985.
Urban Edge, the developer, was also the general contractor for the project. This allowed them
to capture the profit the general contractor usually makes but it also exposed them to risk of cost
overruns. This risk was high since Urban Edge had neither built new construction or used modular
construction previously.
As project managers during construction Urban Edge also exposed themselves to another risk.
They ordered the manufactured units before they had secured building permits. Urban Edge received a
discount of $4,432 (from $132,068 to $127,636) if they ordered the units to be built from the
manufacturer at the beginning of 1985. Due to the success of the Forest Hills Street building, Urban
Edge ordered the modules for the remaining three projects. The development at Glen Road did not
require a zoning variance, the Hyde Park sites did. Although the variance at Hyde Park was granted,
it was appealed by an abutter. In the meantime, the units had to be stored. The manufacturer was
paid when the units were completed, therefore construction interest accrued during the approval
negotiating time. Since Urban Edge was the general contractor, they also assumed all responsibility
for paying storage and damage charges.
Financing
To reduce the price of the units, Urban Edge received subsidies from the City of Boston. They
received 90% of the CDBG subsidy to offset costs during construction and 10% at time of sale. They
obtained a loan at prime plus 2% for the balance of the construction costs.
In 1983 Urban Edge projected the development to cost $852,860. The projected sales price for
the sixteen units was $568,500 -- varying from $27,000 for the one bedroom unit to $45,000 for the
four bedroom unit. The "gap" of $284,360 was expected to be filled with a Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) subsidy of $195,200 and $89,160 from various grant sources.
The actual cost of the development was $1,363,059. To fill this difference, the sales price was
increased by $360,500 to $929,000, the CDBG subsidy was increased by $36,832, MAP/TAP money
was awarded for $127,000, and other grant money was obtained for $35,527.
As of June 1989, two of the units were not sold: the one unit condominium at Granada Park and
the two unit condominium at Boylston Street. The revenue is based on them being sold at $52,000 and
$64,000 respectively. Any excess revenues will be used to pay back the MAP/TAP loan. The
MAP/TAP is designated as a loan but if due to project overruns it cannot be repaid, then it is forgiven
by the city. Of the $127,000 MAP/TAP loan, $52,000 was forgiven. The repayment of the $75,000
will be determined after the Hyde Park units are also complete since the money was allocated for
expenses incurred due to the delays at Hyde Park.
Marketing
Urban Edge did all the marketing for their units. They encountered many problems selling the
units. One problem was losing people after delays in providing the home. Urban Edge had buyers for
the original units at Hyde Park but due to the delays in delivering the product, buyers backed out.
Another problem they encountered was a change in the underwriting guidelines for permanent
mortgages. All the units were eligible for MHFA 8.5% financing. In October 1986 the MHFA
underwriting guidelines changed. This was largely due to the change in underwriting guidelines from
the secondary mortgage market. A family originally allowed to spend 31% of their income on
housing was allowed to spend only 28% after the guidelines changes. This meant that Urban Edge had
to target slightly more wealthy families. It also meant that many qualified families were now
disqualified. Urban Edge estimated that it costs them approximately $1,000 for each buyer they took
to the bank in marketing costs.
The projected sales prices were $27,000, $31,125, $34,000 and $45,000 for each of the one, two,
three, and four unit apartments respectively. The units were to be sold to low income families
(income below 80% of the median) and all the units were to receive MHFA endloan financing. The
difficulty in getting people to qualify as well as cost overruns during construction resulted in selling
four units at market rate and relaxing the income requirements for many of the other units.
2. Cost of Development
The determinants of cost in the Urban Edge development are in Exhibit 4-2. The three key
factors affecting cost in this project were the contractor's lack of previous relationship with
subcontractors, the ordering of boxes before receiving building permits combined with an abutter
appeal to the Hyde Park construction, and changes in underwriting guidelines. All three of these
factors increased the duration of the development period. This in turn increased interest payments,
management cost, general conditions, overhead and security costs and in some cases marketing, and on
site construction costs.
Urban Edge had to mitigate the cost overruns since they assumed the risk of cost overruns by
acting as their own general contractor. Also important to the final cost of the house to the buyer
were the CDBG subsidy, the MAP/TAP subsidy, and the MHFA endloan interest subsidy. Urban
Edge expected no profits or losses from the development. The cost overruns were mitigated with
increased subsidy and increased sales prices.
The disaggregated cost data is in Exhibit 4-3. It shows the projected and actual costs for each
structure since the costs varied widely from structure to structure. The first two structures, Forest
and Glen, were closest to the original projection of $213,215 per structure; they cost $293,000 and
$285,000 respectively. The Granada Park and Boylston Street developments cost $392,000 and
$393,000 respectively. They include costs associated with the delays at Hyde Park that may be later
recaptured in the Hyde Park development. Exhibit 4-4 shows the average per unit projected and actual
costs for each cost component.
The majority of the cost overruns were in management fees and financing costs. This was
largely a reflection of the increased time it took to build the units due to community opposition, the
management decision to order the units before the zoning approvals were in place, and the difficulty
Urban Edge had in selling the units due to time delays and changes in the underwriting guidelines.
The overruns in interest charges is the largest overrun in the entire project. Urban Edge
anticipated a financing cost of $23,800 for the four structures, the actual cost was $154,100. The
increase in management cost was primarily due to the large increase in time required to construct and
sell the units. The problems of selling the units was reflected in a financing cost increase, marketing
and management cost increase. The increase in predevelopment fees was primarily due to
unanticipated legal fees of $23,100 and architectural costs of $9,200. Other line items such as
engineering and survey were also underestimated in the proposal.
The total cost of site work and foundations was $186,600, approximately $80,800 more than
anticipated. The largest overruns were in excavations, footings/foundations, utilities and trenching.
Urban Edge projected on site construction to cost $100,200 for the four structures. The actual cost
was $151,413. The largest cost overruns were in finish work, electrical costs, and plumbing costs.
Figure 4-2: Urban Edge -- Determinants of Housing Costs
Community No Building
Resistance Permit
to New
Construction
EXHIBIT 4-3: URBAN EDGE -- DISAG6REGATED COST DATA
Projected Actual Actual Actual Actual
Actual Actual
Variance Dollars Dollars Actual
Per Forest Glen Granada Boylston Actual Projected (Actual - per per Percent
Structure Hills Road Park Street Cost Projected) Unit Soft of Total
(4 units)(4 Units)(4 Units)(4 Units) (4 Units)(16 Units)(16 Units)(16 Units) (16) (15322) Develop.
1. Land 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,000 2,000 7,000 8,000 (1,000) 438 0.46 0.51%
2. Predevelooment Fees
Design
Engineerino
Survey
Legal/Title
Accountinq
Insurance
Real Estate Taxes
Appraisal
500
200
750
1,650
220
850
0
570
2,800
120
2,600
4.845
220
1,100
0
180
2,800
758
2,400
5,345
220
1,192
0
1,450
2,800
3,391
3.616
8,366
220
1,200
0
700
2,800
4,718
1,646
11,187
220
1,200
37
700
11,200
8,987
10,262
29,743
880
4,692
37
3,030
2,000
800
3,000
6,600
880
3,400
0
2,280
9,200
8,187
7,262
23,143
0
1,292
37
750
700
562
641
1,859
55
293
2
189
0.73
0.59
0.67
1.94
0.06
0.31
0.00
0.20
0.82%
0.66%
0.75%
2.18%
0.06%
0,34%
0.00%
0.221
4,740 11,865 14.165 20,293 22,508 68,831 18,960 49,871 4,302 4.49 5.05%
Financina
Interest Payments 5.950 21.778 12,404 60,413 51.536 146.131 23,800 122,331 9,133 9.54 10.721
Financing fee 0 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 - 8,040 0 8,040 503 0.52 0.59%
Subtotal 5,950 23,788 14,414 62,423 53,546 154,171 23,800 130,371 9,636 10.06 11.31%
Marketina 4,546 10,496 10,496 10,000 10,000 40,992 18,184 22,808 2,562 2.68 3.011
Managesent/General Conditions/Fees
Project Muat. 6,650 25,104 25,104 70,349 41,365 .161,922 26,600 135,322 10,120 10.57 11.88Z
Insurance (Liab.) 0 7,444 11,130 11,232 7,753 37,559 0 37,559 2,347 2.45 2.761
Continaency 8,828 0 0 0 0 0 35,312 (35,312) 0 0.00 0.00%
Security Fences 400 2,690 1,125 4,158 6,275 14,248 1,600 12,648 891 0.93 1.05%
Storage 0 0 0 3,938 4,373 8,311 0 8,311 519 0.54 0.61%
Interim Operation 0 1,840 100 4,009 199 6,148 0 6,148 384 0.40 0.45%
15,878 37,078 37,459 93,686 59,965 228,188 63,512 164,676 14,262 14.89 16.741
Site Work/Foundations
Demolition 700 87.9 650 325 0 1,850 2,800 (950) 116 0.12 0.14%
Excavation/Found. 18,520 23.153 37,044 24,815 37,853 122,865 74,080 48,785 7,679 8.02 9.01%
Driveway 2.712 9.448 1.500 2.500 5,964 19.412 10,848 8,564 1,213 1.27 1.42%
Landscaoino 500 2,500 2,500 5,127 6.000 16,127 2,000 14,127 1,008 1.05 1.18%
Util./Trenchino 4,000 4.200 4,500 7.500 10.100 26,300 16,000 10,300 1,644 1.72 1.93%
Subtotal 26,432 40,176 46.194 40,267 59,917 186,554 105,728 80,826 11.660 12.18 13.69%
7. Off Site Constructi
Structures
Crane Fees
127.419 132,068 127,636
1,200 2,594 2,840
128.619 134,662 130,476
127,636 127,636
3,500 2,000
131,136 129,636
514,976
10,934
509,676
4,800
5,300 32,186 33.61 37.78%
6,134 683 0.71 0.80%
525,910 514,476 11,434 32,869 34.32 38.581
EXHIBIT 4-3: URBAN EDGE -- DISA6GREGATED COST DATA
Projected Actual Actual
Actual Actual
Variance Dollars Dollars ActualActual Actual
Per Forest Glen Granada Bovlston Actual Projected (Actual - Der per Percent
Structure Hills Road Park Street Cost Projected) Unit Sqft of Total
(4 units)(4 Units)(4 Units)(4 Units) (4 Units)(16 Units)(16 Units)(16 Units) (16) (15322) Develop.
8. On Site Construction
Finish Work 18.200
Fire Escapes 3,200
Plumbina 1,900
Paintina 0
Electrical 500
Appliances 1,250
25,050 32.909 29.553 33,609 55,342 151,413
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COST 213.215 292,974 284.757 392,414 392,914 1.363,059
27.000
31.125
39.000
45.000
27.500
79.000
39.500
45.500
27.000
64,000
75.000
85,000
142.125 191,500 251.000
48.800
0
22,290
52,000 52,000
72.000 64,000
67,000 54,000
85,000 110,000
276,000 280,000
58,008 58,008 58,008
26,000 26,000 37,500
0 0 17,764
58,008
37,500
17,764
158,500
279,000
235.500
325.500
100,200 51,213 9,463
852,860 510,199 85,191
108,000
124,500
156,000
180,000
50.500
154,500
79,500
145,500
9,906
17,438
14,719
20,344
998,500 568,500 430,000 62,406
232,032
127,000
35,527
195,200
0
89,160
36,832
127,000
(53,633)
14,502
7,938
2,220
71.090 84.008 84,008 113,272 113,272 394,559
0 na na na na 30,000
284,360 110,199 24,660
0 30,000 1,875
25.75 27.73%
1.96 2.11%
Profits not aonlicaole by structure.
Profits as a percent of total income
Granada Park and Boylston Street costs include at least $75,000 due to the necessity of locating new lots.
22,189
2,585
4.327
0
2,752
1,056
17,365
2,600
4,000
0
4,500
1,088
18,724
2,700
4,309
0
5,950
1,926
Subtotal
32,262
3,000
5,500
4900
5,830
3,850
90,540
10,885
18,136
4,900
19,032
7,920
72,800
12,800
7,600
0
2,000
5,000
17,740
(1,915)
10, 536
4,900
17,032
2,920
5,659
680
1,134
306
1,190
495
5,91
0.71
1.18
0.32
1.24
0.52
6.64%
0.80%
1.33%
0.36%
1.40%
0.58%
INCOME
Sales Price
1 bedroom
2 bedroom
3 bedroom
4 bedroom
Total
Subsidy
CDBG
MAP/TAP
Other
9.88 11.11%
88.96 100.00%
10.34 11.14%
18.21 19.61%
15.37 16.55%
21.24 22.87%
65.17 70.17%
15.14 16.31%
8.29 8.921
2.32 2.50%
Total
Profits (Loss)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 4-4: Urban Edge
Projected Versus Actual Costs per Unit
On Site Construction
Off Site Construction
Site Work
Management
Marketing
Financing
Predevelopment
Land
9,463
Q~lig glig|||Q32,1 55
32,869
11,660
1423,970
14,262 [Actual
I: Proposed1,37
2,562
9,636
4,302
500
'438
5 I 1 2 I 3
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CHAMPLAIN CIRCLE
1. Project Description
Predevelopment
The Codman Square Housing Development Corporation (HDC), a community non-profit
organization, also responded to the New Construction Initiative in 1983. They were designated to
build 21 units in Dorchester in February 1984. The HDC put together a team that included the Green
Company, an experienced builder/developer. The HDC and the Green Company organized the
neighborhood to back the idea of housing on this empty former school site at several public meetings.
They also organized the community to testify in favor of 121 zoning variances at the Board of
Appeals.
A lot of time was donated by different sources in the predevelopment stage of the project. The
legal counsel donated $13,000 worth of work, land planning was donated for $7,000, and engineering
was donated at $5,000. Also a "donation" was the cost of permitting. The deal was structured so
that the city would maintain control of the land until the permitting was finished. In this way no
permitting fees were paid since the city does not charge itself for permitting fees. The development
team saved $16,000 in permitting costs.
Construction
The community development corporation did not have previous experience building new
construction but they teamed up with an experienced builder, The Green Company, to build the
Champlain Circle development. The Green Company constructed the homes using New England
Modular Homes. Although Lhe Green Company had never used modular construction or built
affordable housing they had previously built many homes.
"For us, the challenge at Champlain Circle was to see if we could apply expertise we
had developed in building $400,000 homes to designing $40,000 homes. We could."
The construction began in September 1984 and was completed between January and March 1985.
The average time of construction was approximately five months with button-up time (construction
after the units were set) approximately three months. Three construction techniques helped make
these factory homes economical and attractive.
"First, the manufacturer was able to build a three unit building with only 4 boxes by
slicing each floor into fronts and rears. Each box was 54' long and 12', 13', or 14'
feet wide. The boxes stack over one another and are "stitched" together at the seams
on site. Inside carpet is down and appliances in place.
Second, while breaking up the facade with a split roof front, we still achieved a less
expensive single roof plane in the back by elongating the roof of the middle unit rear
to meet the higher ridge. The broken facade line was supported by carrying the floor
structure through from the end unit closet garrison to the middle unit garrison and
then using it to support the site applied porch roof.
Third, we were able to avoid traditional manufactured housing stacked plumbing:
kitchen under bath. We ran bath plumbing diagonally in the second floor framing to
central location over a pantry/entry closet with an 8" chase wall. Instead of a galley
kitchen facing the basement door, a full "U" kitchen faces the dining, which doubles
as a dining area and as path to the basement door. Most of the extra cost for this
charge was in the additional kitchen cabinets. The manufacturer had never built a
broken front building before and now offers this custom design as one of their
standard floor plans." 15
The emphasis in design was to keep things simple. All units are on single family lots. There
are no common areas and no common maintenance; there is a front yard with landscaping and back yard
with grass; there is a front door and back door and one or two off-street parking spaces in the front
yard.
Financing
The constructhon financing was provided by the Shawmut bank for prime plus 1%. The bank
agreed to fund the project in a large part due to the participation of an experienced builder, the Green
Company. The bank did not want to participate without equity in the project. The development team
15 The Green Company.
convinced the bank that the donated services, valued at approximately $128,000 and the CDBG loan of
$273,000 was equity in the project.
The CDBG subsidy was used to reduce the price of the construction loan. The Codman Square
HDC received a Community Development Block Grant from the city of Boston. They received 90% of
the subsidy to offset costs during construction and 10% at time of sale. The development team also
received $20,000 in MAP funds to help market the units.
Marketing and Sales
The HDC's reputation and contacts generated buyers. Over 300 families applied for the units.
The majority did not qualify to buy the units. It was a very long and personalized process to find
families that qualified. The first units were sold in January 1985 as the first structure was complete.
The last unit was sold in October 1985, five months after the last unit was completed. The units
sold for an average of $44,000. All the homebuyers were first time buyers with income below the
median, three quarters were female headed households. The MHFA subsidized the interest rate on
endloans requiring 5% down payments.
2. Cost of Development
The projected cost for the 21 units was $1,308,000, including the donated services; the actual
cost was $1,316,200. Cost overruns occurred in 4 of the 9 cost components, but were offset with the
budgeted contingency. The largest contributing factor to the controlled costs in this project was the
experience of the contractor. Exhibit 4-5 shows the important causal relationships for the Champlain
Circle dLvelopment. By using modular construction, the team was able to decrease the duration of the
construction period, therefore interest payments and management costs. The restrictions on marketing
increased the cost of development by increased security and interest payments.
The disaggregated cost data is in Exhibit 4-6. It shows the projected and actual costs and
revenues for the development. Exhibit 4-7 shows the projected and actual costs per unit for each
component. The actual predevelopment fees were $92,300, a $13,300 increase from projected costs.
Legal fees comprised $11,600 of the increase. Actual financing costs were $48,087, compared with
projected costs of $39,000. The $9,087 overrun consisted exclusively of unanticipated interest
charges. These overrun in interest charges were paid primarily during the marketing period.
The management component was under the projected amount of $181,000 by $25,500, offsetting
the majority of the increases in other components. The biggest reduction in this area was in
Contingency/General Conditions, which was $36,853 under the projected amount of $85,500. In the
case of Champlain Circle, the contractor budgeted a contingency and general conditions as one
category. The money spent was general conditions; the money not spent was the contingency that was
used to offset the cost overruns in the other categories. Security cost increased to $15,000, almost
three times the projected amount of $5,500.
Exhibit 4-5:
General Contractor
(Experienced with
New Construction)
Use of
Constr
Champlain Circle -- Determinants of Housing Costs
Established Relationships
with Architects and Lawyers
EXHIBIT 4-6: CHAMPLAIN CIPCLE -- DISA;GREGATED COST DATA
Actual Actual Actual
Variance Dollars Dollars Percent
Proipcted Actual (Actual- Per Unit Per Soft of Total
Costs Costs Proiected 21 18900 Costs
1. Land 10.000 10.000 0 476 0.53 0.761
2. Predevelooment Fpes
Enaineerina 18.000 19.642 1,642 935 1.04 1.49%
F Pereits 16.000 16.000 0 762 0.85 1.221
F Land Plannina 7,000 7,000 0 333 0.37 0.53%
F Lenal 13,000 13.000 0 619 0.69 0.99%
F Enaineerinn 5.000 5.000 0 238 0.26 0.38%
Lenal Fees 20,000 31.A51 11.651 1.507 1.67 2.40%
Subtotal 79.000 92.293 13,293 4,395 4.88 7.011
3. Financinq
Bank Fee
Interest
Subtotal
10.000 10.000 0 476 0.53 0.76%
29,000 38.087 9,087 1,814 2.02 2.89%
39,000 48,087 9,087 2,290 2.54 3.65%
4. Marketina
In House Exoenses 5.000 1.764 (3,236) 84 0.09 0.13%
Marketina Salary 20,000 20,000 0 952 1.06 1.52%
25.000 21,764 (3,236) 1,036 1.15 1.65%
5. Manaaesent/General Conditinns/Fees
F Construction Manaaer 75.000 75,000 0 3,571 3.97 5.70%
F Project Coordination 12,000 12.000 0 571 0.63 0.911
Continaency /Gen. Cond. 85.500 48,647 (36.853) 2,317 2.57 3.70%
Insurance 3,000 4.849 1,849 231 0.26 0.37%
Security 5,500 14.965 9.465 713 0.79 1.14%
181.000 155.460 (25,540) 7,403 8.23 11.81%
6. Site Work/Foundations
Site 235.000 244.722 9,722 11.653 12.95 18.59%
Foundation 53,000 51.432 (1,568) 2.449 2.72 3.91%
Landscaoina 71.000 23,079 2,079 1,099 1.22 1.75%
Subtotal 309,000 319,234 10,234 15,202 16.89 24.25%
7. Off Site Construction 563,000 561,059 (1.941) 26,717 29.69 42.63%
8. On Site Construction
Button uo 91.000 96.341 5,341 4.588 5.10 7.32%
Exterior Paint 11.000 12.000 1.000 571 0.63 0.911
102,000 108,341 6,341
Total Develooment Cost 1.308.000 1.316.239 8.239
5.159 5.73 8.23%
62,678 69.64 100.00%
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT 4-6: CHAMPLAIN CIRCLE -- DISAGGREGATED COST DATA
Actual Actual Actual
Variance Dollars Dollars Percent
Proipctd Actual (Actual- Per Unit Per Saft of Total
Costs Costs Proiected 21 18900 Costs
REVENUES
CDBS Grant 273,000 315,000 42,000 15.000 16.67 24.03%
MAP/TAP 20.000 20,000 0 952 1.06 1.53%
Donation of Service 53.000 53.000 0 2,524 2.80 4.04%
Sales 960,000 922,719 (37,281) 43,939 48.82 70.40%
1.306.000 1,310,719 4.719 62.415 69.35 100.001
PROFIT (LOSS) (2.000) (5.520) (3.520) (263) -0.29 -0.42%
F -- Donated Services
Exhibit 4-7: Champlain Circle
Projected Versus Actual Costs per Unit
On Site Construction
Off Site Construction
Site Work
Management
Marketing
Financing
Predevelopment
Land
59
26,810
26,717
-4,714
15,202
Actual
Proposed
8,619
7,403
1,190
1,036
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NUESTRA COMUNIDAD
1. Project Description
Predevelopment
Nuestra Comunidad, a community development corporation responded to Round II of the
NDEA New Construction Initiative in December 1984. The guidelines specified that the proposals
needed to be new construction preferably using the manufactured housing process of construction. A
listing of available lots was included. Nuestra Comunidad proposed 21 townhouses on four sites
using Pond Hill open panel construction.
In February 1985 NDEA designated Nuestra for ten units on four lots. They offered them
smaller and more scattered sites from the sites that Nuestra had originally chosen. The Pond Hill
panelized package needed a variance from the fire rating in the area. Between February 1985 and April
1986 Nuestra finalized their plans including site plan and contract documents. In April of 1986 they
had their zoning hearing. Construction began immediately after the zoning hearing.
Construction
Nuestra Comunidad had chosen Pond Hill, a manufacturer of panelized housing as their
manufacturer. The Pond Hill package was chosen because it was high quality on the interior, high
quality thermal capabilities, and low cost. The strategy that Nuestra took was that the houses could
be bought now and improved upon later.
Nuestra had historically worked on rehabilitation of condemned buildings. With this project
Nuestra had difficulty in getting experienced contractors for new construction, resulting in time
delays and cost overruns.
Nuestra claims that the change from 21 units to 10 units was one of the primary factors in
increasing their construction costs because the development was small they could not get larger
contractors to bid on the development. They received five bids but none of the contractors had ever
built new construction or used panelized construction. The contract with the contractor was $450,000
for the ten units not including the panels, the windows, and the doors.
The projected time for construction for the five duplexes was one year. The first contractor
started in April of 1986. Seven months later, he completed the first duplex. In January 1987 the first
contractor quit the job. He had finished one house, completed 60% of another, and the foundations for
a third. For this Nuestra paid him $147,000.
The second contractor started in April of 1987 and was fired in August of the same year. He
did the remaining two foundations and corrected one of the existing foundations. He did some of the
finish work on the house that was 60% complete and he erected the structure on a third duplex.
The third contractor began working on the partially completed duplexes in March of 1988. He
completed the second duplex in May 1988 and finished the third duplex in August 1988. In late May
1988, Nuestra ran into a critical cash flow problem. Nuestra was not able to pay the contractor
because the bank had stopped releasing funds. The contractor kept working without pay until the bank
agreed to restructure and reallocate funds for the 2nd and third duplexes in July 1988. In May of
1989, the third contractor finished the last two duplexes.
Financing
To reduce the price of the units, the Nuestra Comunidad received a grant from the city of
Boston. They received 90% of the subsidy to offset costs during construction and 10% at time of sale.
They obtained a loan at prime plus 1% for the balance of the construction costs from Shawmut bank.
In November 1987, Nuestra insured and boarded up the two started duplexes. The Shawmut
bank would not release any money because of excessive delays in project delivery. Nuestra estimated
to be complete with all ten units in April of 1987. In November 1987 they had only finished one
unit. It took until July of 1988 to renegotiate with the bank to reallocate the money from the ten
unit project to a six unit project.
In May 1988, Nuestra went back to the Public Facilities Department to request more money.
They realized they needed an increase in subsidy to offset their development cost overruns. The Public
Facilities Department had at this point determined design guidelines for projects that they sponsored.
The strategy that Nuestra used -- affordable now, improve outside character later -- was now not
acceptable to the PFD.
The Public Facilities Department looked at the project in light of its fit within the
neighborhood. They found much neighborhood opposition to the project. The neighbors were angry at
the "arrogance" of Nuestra Comunidad toward people in the area by building "ugly" housing. The PFD
made design improvement on the external appearance of the duplexes by requiring the replacement of
vertical siding with clapboard siding and by requiring front porches. In July 1988, the PFD awarded
additional public funding to complete this project.
In total, Nuestra received a subsidy of $177,600 in CDBG subsidy, $26,970 for management of
the first duplex, and $125,479 in a LEND loan. It is agreed that if Nuestra sells their market units
for above $66,000, 50% of the difference will return to the city as partial repayment of the LEND
loan.
Marketing
Two families moved into the first duplex before January of 1987. The Boston Housing
Authority bought two of the other units for $124,000 each in December 1988. The third duplex was
sold for $60,000 to two families. The fourth duplex is proposed to be sold to the BHA for $124,000
per unit in June 1989 and the fifth duplex is marketed for $85,000 in June 1989. In consonance with
their agreement with the city, $19,000 of this should be returned to the city when the units are sold.
All the affordable units sold at $60,000 have a ground lease that restricts the resale of the
property to households with incomes at or below 80% of the SMSA median. Therefore, the
appreciation of the units is tied to income/wage increases rather than land value increases.
2. Cost of Development
The important determinants of cost in the Nuestra Comunidad development are shown in
Exhibit 4-8. The inexperience of the contractors was the most important factor affecting cost
overruns.
The disaggregated cost data is in Exhibit 4-9 and the projected and actual costs for the eight
components are in Exhibit 4-10. Nuestra estimated the total cost of construction to be $735,000 for
the five duplexes. The actual costs were $165,229, $217,096, $234,564, $242,465, and $242,965 for a
total of $1,102,319. The final cost of development was 50% more than anticipated.
The management costs increased most from projected costs. Nuestra expected the management
fees to be $25,000 for the entire project. The actual cost to Nuestra was $97,200. The contractor's
overhead was also was $25,600 more than anticipated and security costs were $12,00 more than
anticipated. The construction interest payments were approximately $18,400 more than anticipated.
Of the $34,400 overrun in the predevelopment component, the arciitectural fees contributed $15,000.
The site work and foundations cost more than anticipated largely due to the lack of experience
from the first contractor. The anticipated costs were $131,900 for the five duplexes. The actual costs
were $233,600, a $101,700 increase. The largest increase occurred in Site Development/Utilities, the
costs of which exceeded the projected amount by $67,500. The on site construction was $145,200
more than the anticipated cost. The carpentry and plumbing line items had the largest overruns,
$49,100 and $36,600 over the projected amount respectively.
Exhibit 4-8: Nuestra Comunidad -- Determinants of Housing Costs
EXHIBIT 4-9: NUFESTRA U0MHNIDAD -- DISA6GRF;ATFD COST DATA
Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual
Proipcted Cost Cost Actual 41 - 43 45 - 47 Total Proiected Variance Dollars Dollars Percent
Por 42 - 44 49 - 51 Cot Harlow Harlow Five Five (Actual - Per Unit Per Saft of Tota
Duplex Harlow Howard Dean (Projected 3/89) Duplexes Duolexes Projected) 10 12150 Cost
1. Land Acquisition 1.000 1,000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1,000 5,000 5,000 0 500 0.41 0.45%
2. Predevelooment Fees
Architectural 250 250 5.000 5.000 3.000 3.000 16,250 1,250 15,000 1,625 1.34 1.47%
Survey and Ena. 1.200 1,200 2.000 2,000 2,075 2,075 9.350 6.000 3,350 935 0.77 0.85X
Leaal and Account. 800 98 1.500 1.500 2,000 2,000 7.088 4,000 3.088 709 0.58 0.64%
Insurance 600 600 1,500 1.500 2,500 2.500 8,600 3.000 5,600 860 0.71 0.781
Taxes 0 0 887 887 1.500 1,500 4,774 0 4,774 477 0.39 0.43%
Appraisal 0 0 300 100 1,000 1.000 2.600 0 2,600 260 0.21 0.24X
Subtotal 2.850 2.138 11.197 11.187 12,075 12.075 48.662 14,250 34,412 4.866 4.01 4.41Z
3. Financina
Interest 4.600 2.64 10.000 10.000 9.200 9.200 41.364 23,000 18.364 4.136 3.40 3.753
Points 1.590 530 1.530 1,530 1.250 1.250 6,090 7,950 (1,860) 609 0.50 0.55%
Subtotal 6.190 3.494 11.530 11,530 10.450 10.450. 47,454 30.950 16.504 4,745 3.91 4.30%
4. Marketina 600 600 0 600 0 500 1,700 3,000
5. Manaoement/General Conditions/Fees
Mont/Overhead
Continaency
Contr. Overhead
Trash Removal
Board Up
Vandalisa
Security
Temoorarv Poer
5.000
8.500
8.500
0
0
0
0
2,000
25,182
0
12.750
0
0
0
0
2.000
24.130
0
17,729
2,250
690
900
2,500
2.000
23.860
0
17,729
2.250
690
900
2.500
500
12.000
0
9.968
0
0
400
3,500
262
12,000
0
9,968
0
0
400
3,500
262
97,172
0
68.144
4,500
1.380
2.600
12.000
5,024
25,000
42,500
42,500
0
0
0
0
10,000
(1,300)
72,172
(42,500)
25.644
4,500
1,380
2,600
12,000
(4,976)
170 0.14 0.15Z
9,717
0
6,814
450
138
260
1,200
502
8.00
0.00
5.61
0.37
0.11
0.21
0.99
0.41
8.823
0.00%
6.18%
0.41%
0.13%
0.241
1.09%
0.461
Subtotal 24.000 39.932 50,199 48.429
6. Site Work/Foundatinns
Landscaoina 0
Site Dev./Util. 6.380
Foundation 12.200
Waterproof/Backfil 1.200
Sills and Platform F-.600
Subtotal
0
7,178
12. 200
1.200
;,600
5.000
20. 500
2.200
1.200
6,600
9.000
20.500
12.200
3,000
A. 600
26.130 26,130 190,820 120,000
7.500
25.1600
12.200
4.000
7.500
7,500
25.600
1?,200
4.000
7,500
25. 000
99,378
61.000
13.400
34,800
0
31,900
61.000
6.000
33,000
70.820 19,082
25,000
67,478
0
7,400
1,800
15.71 17.31%
2.500
9,938
6,100
1,340
3,480
2.27"
9.02%
5.53%
1.22%
3.16%
26.380 27.178 45.500 47.300 56.800 56,800 233,578 131.900 101,678 23,358 19.22 21.19%
7. Off Site Construction
Pond Hill Kit 24,900
Doors and Windows 4.460
24.900 24,900
4.460 4,460
24.900 24.900 24,900 124,500 124,500
4,460 4.460 4,460 22.300 22.300
29.360 29.360 29.360 29.360 29,360 29,360 146.800 146,800
0 12,450 10.25 11.29%
0 2,230 1.84 2.02%
0 14.680 12.08 13.32%
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal
EXHIBIT 4-9: NUESTkA F.CMIINIDAD -- ii nFauTED rOrT nATA
Actual Art1ai Actual Actual Actual Actual
Proiorted Cnst Cost Artual 41 - 43 45 - 47 Total Pro jected Variance Dollars Dollars Percent
Per 42 - 44 49 - S1 Cnt Harlow Harlow Five Five (Actual - Per Unit Per Soft of Tota
Dunlex Harlow Howard Dean (Proiected 3/89) Duolexes Duolexes Proiected) 10 12150 Cost
8. On Site Construction
Panel Erection 1.R00 1,800 1.800 1.800 2,500 2.500 10.400 9,000 1,400 1,040 0.86 0.941
Rouoh Caroentrv 3.650 3,675 3,675 15,058 22,450 22.450 67,308 18.250 49,058 6,731 5.54 6.111
Roofina 1.00 3,964 1,250 1.250 2,000 2.000 10,464 9,000 1,464 1,046 0.86 0.95Z
Doors and Windows 685 685 2,885 3,000 3,000 3.000 12,570 3,425 9,145 1,257 1.03 1.141
Exterior Trim 4,300 4.300 12.100 7.800 7.800 7.800 39,800 21.500 18,300 3,980 3.28 3.61Z
Rouoh Plumbina 2.800 2,800 10.300 12.500 12.500 12.500 50.600 14.000 36,600 5,060 4.16 4.59Z
Rouoh Electrical 4,000 5.940 2.060 5.000 5.500 5.500 24,000 20,000 4,000 2,400 1.98 2.18Z
Sheetrock 10.000 10.000 10.000 14.500 14.500 14,500 63.500 50,000 13,500 6,350 5.23 5.761
Doors and Trim 7.600 7.600 4.000 4.000 9,500 9,500 34,600 38,000 (3,400) 3,460 2.85 3.14X
Paint 3.000 4.500 5.500 5,500 7,000 7.000 29,500 15,000 14,500 2,950 2.43 2.68%
Cabinetry 2,900 2.900 2,400 2.400 2,400 2.400 12.500 14,500 (2,000) 1,250 1.03 1.13Z
Finish Plumbinn 2,000 2.000 3.250 3.250 2.000 2.000 12.500 10.000 2,500 1,250 1.03 1.131
Finish Electrical 2.000 2,000 1.900 1.900 2,000 2,000 9,800 10,000 (200) 980 0.81 0.891
Floors 4,400 4,400 3.500 3.500 7,000 7,000 25,400 22,000 3,400 2,540 2.09 2.30%
Porches 3.200 3.200 2.500 2,500 6,500 6.500 21.200 16.000 5,200 2,120 1.74 1.92%
Finish Details 2,485 1,763 1,200 1,200 0 0 4.163 12.425 (8,262) 416 0.34 0.38%
Subtotal 56,620 61.527 68,320 R5.158 106,650 106,650 428,305 283.100 145.205 42,831 35.25 38.85%
TOTAL DEVELOP. COST 147.000 165,229 217.096 234.564 242.465 242.965 1.102.319 735,000 367,319 110,232 90.73 100.00%
REVENUE
Sales Price 120.000 120.000 146,000 248.000 170.000 248.000 932,000 600,000 332,000 93,200 76.71 73.85%
CDBG Subsidv 30,000 26.251 45.094 42,395 31,930 31,930 177,600 150.000 27,600 17,760 14.62 14.071
MAP/TAP 0 26.970 0 0 0 0 26.970 0 26,970 2,697 2.22 2.14%
LEND 0 16.028 22.077 22.161 31,981 33,232 125.479 0 125,479 12,548 10.33 9.941
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
;----------
150.000 189,249 213.171 312.556 233.911 313.162 1.262,049 750,000 512,049 126,205 103.87 100.00%
PROFITS
Contractor's Foe 1,590 4.000 2.000 1.950 0 0 7,950 7,950 0 795 0.65 0.72%
Dev. Profit/(Loss) 1.410 20,020 (5,925) 76.042 (8.554) 70,197 151,780 7,050 144,730 15,178 12.49 13.77%
3.000 24.020 (3.925) 77.992 (8.554) 70.197 159.730 15,000 144,730 15,973 13.15 14.49%
Exhibit 4-10: Nuestra Comunidad
Projected Versus Actual Costs per Unit
On Site Construction
Off Site Construction
Site Work
Management
Marketing
Financing
Predevelopment
Land
28,310 '
42,831
14,680
14,680
13,190
23,358
12,000
Actual
Proposed
19,082
300
170
3,95
04,745
1 .425
54,866
500
500
10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000
10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000
FRANKLIN HOMES
Franklin Homes is an entirely "private" project. The Franklin Homes development has no land
subsidy, no Community Development Block Grant, or any endloan financing subsidy. In addition, the
development was designed so that no zoning variances were required. This enabled the developers to
build without community support. The developers built 19 townhouses on a 38,500 square foot
parcel using conventional construction methods.
1. Project Description
Predevelopment
The developers purchased two adjacent parcels from two private owners between April and July
of 1987. One parcel was bought from a non-profit group in Chicago for $13,000, well below market
rate. The other parcel was advertised in the newspaper. The developers purchased it for $102,800,
40% of the original asking price. After they acquired 38,500 square feet from private owners they
tried to get the city to give them the adjacent, landlocked 8,073 square foot parcel.
They approached the community and the city in hope of acquiring the abutting lot, allowing
them to design with more "light and air" between the units. They planned 24 units on the entire
46,573 parcel. They knew they must have neighborhood support in order for the city to convey the
land. The developers visited each of the neighbors and several community. groups to discuss their
development plans. Individually, the neighbors and community groups seemed in support of the
development.
At the end of August they held a public hearing to discuss the land parcel. Representatives
from the Public Facilities Department and the Boston Redevelopment Authority attended to obtain a
sense of the community support for the developers. In the August meeting, the neighbors showed no
support for the development. After this meeting, the developers decided to take their existing parcels
and build 19 units as of right, without any zoning variances.
The architecture fees were particularly high because the developers needed two designs, one for
the development with the city parcel and one without. Also, the architect had a time and materials
contract rather than a fixed price contract.
From August 1987 to March 1988, the developers worked at getting all the permitting needed
to break ground. These permits included sewer extension permits, curb cut approvals, a street
occupancy permit, a tree removal agreement, a temporary construction road permit, plumbing and
electrical permits, a Sunday work permit, a telephone permit and the building permit. After they
obtained the building permit in March of 1988, they began construction.
Construction
The first contractor on the development team was from Canada and proposed to build the
development using panelized construction. He had a fixed price contract for the entire project from
excavation and grading to the finish work. The developers did however keep control of some of the
detail work including the purchase of higher quality vinyl siding, light fixtures, appliances, and
providing the security gate and landscaping. After a few weeks it became clear that the contractor
was not competent to complete the project. In addition, he assured the developers and the bank that
he would have a performance bond for his work that he was never able to obtain. The bank refused to
release any money without the performance bond.
The first contractor was fired in June 1988. At the same time, the developers reached an
agreement with another general contractor. The new contractor had originally been hired as the
construction manager. Now he had to play a dual role, one of general contractor and one of
construction manager. The new contract was a fixed price contract for $637,000 for most of the above
ground construction. Although the new contractor had experience building houses, he had never
attempted a project of this size. The contractor seriously underestimated the cost of construction.
Not only did the new contractor not make his $30,000 profit but he also took a $134,000 loss from
the development.
Although the project had been designed for modular or panelized construction, the developers
decided to build the entire project at the site. They chose to have their project stick built rather than
modular because the modular contractors did not provide enough flexibility in the design alternatives.
The developers wanted high end details such as hardwood stairs, upgraded vinyl siding and upscale
light fixtures that the modular proposals could not provide.
The construction was on schedule. The major construction problem encountered was the
subsurface condition. As a result of the extensive ledge, four of the units do not have a basement.
Financing
During the predevelopment period, the developers obtained a $262,000 line of credit to finance
the land purchase as well as the up front development fees required to obtain the various permits.
They waited until they had most of their approvals acquired before they applied for the construction
financing to achieve a "good" construction loan. In March 1988 they received construction financing
for prime plus 1.5%. Part of this money was used to pay off the bridge loan.
Marketing
The developers started marketing the units as soon as they began construction. One month after
-groundbreaking they had a trailer on site with a materials board, appliances and bathroom prototypes.
They also used a professionally built, scale model of the development to ensure pre-sales.
The bank would not release the loan money for the second phase of the project (8 units) unless
the developers had 7 of the first 11 sold. By August of 1988 the developers had 7 of the 11 under a
purchase and sale agreement.
The developers tried to increase their buyer window by ensuring that their units qualify for
many endloan programs. It was important to have Fannie Mae, secondary mortgage approval. Fannie
Mae requires that 60% of the project has purchase and sale agreements before they give the final
approval. It was necessary to have Fannie Mae approval before closing on the first loan. Fannie Mae
would not give their approval for the project if some of the units have been sold. In the Franklin
Homes case, buyers were ready to close but had to wait until the developers obtained the Fannie Mae
approvals.
The developers hired two brokerage firms, one in South Dorchester and one in North Dorchester
to increase their market exposure. The marketing commission was 5.25%. The focus of the project
was to provide a "quality" project. Amenities such as a security gate, alarm, hardwood stairs and
quality light fixtures were used to increase their competitiveness in the market. As of June 1989 all
sixteen of the nineteen units were sold for prices between $107,000 and $135,000 for an average price
of $120,500.
2. Cost of Development
Exhibit 4-11 shows the key determinants of cost for the Franklin Homes development. By
attempting to acquire the adjacent city lot, the developers increased both their architecture costs as
well as their predevelopment time which increased the interest payments they made on the previously
purchased land parcels. The change in contractors increased the their construction period as well as
their legal costs. The increase in construction period resulted in increased in interest payments during
construction, general conditions, and security. The other important factor in determining the cost to
the buyer was the fixed price contract between the developer and the contractor. The contractor
assumed most of the on site construction cost overruns.
Exhibit 4-12 shows the projected and actual costs and revenues. Exhibit 4-13 shows the project
and actual cost components per unit. The final development cost was $2,289,300, $167,500 more than
anticipated. The majority of the cost increase to the buyer was mitigated with a decrease in profits for
the contractor.
The land cost was $115,800 for the entire project or $6,095 per unit. Also part of the financing
cost can be attributed to the land cost. The carrying cost of the land before construction was $1,000
per unit.
The predevelopment fees were almost 10% of the total development cost. They were $240,500
-- $33,500 more than projected. The most significant overruns were in architectural fees ($12,700
higher than the projected $50,000) and in legal fees ($12,400 higher than the projected amount of
$85,000). The increase in legal fees is largely due to the cost of changing contractors. The total
financing cost was $153,200. The $23,100 overrun from the original estimate is a result of a delay in
construction and sales. The developers spend $25,000 of their own money on marketing in addition to
the 5.25% marketing commission received by the real estate brokers. The total marketing cost was
$153,300.
The developers' costs for management, general conditions and fees was $309,600; approximately
$50,600 less than anticipated. One reason the cost was less than projected is the built-in contingency
of $51,000. Not all of the contingency was used to offset the management fees. Some was used to
offset the predevelopment fees, the facing costs, and the marketing costs. The item providing cost
savings in this category was the developer's cost of security. The developer estimated security to cost
$12,000 contractor. The final cost of site security was only $1,560 to the developer. The developers
additional cost in administration was offset by a decrease in overhead cost. The liability insurance was
increase by $7,500 because of the extended construction time.
The site work and foundation cost was $496,400, $20,500 less than projected. Again this is a
result of more than sufficient contingency to offset the increases. The increases in cost were primarily
in ledge, $14,500 and landscaping $8,800. The consistency between the proposed and actual cost of the
rest of the site work can be attributed to a separate fixed price contract for the site work. The
contractor could not be reached to obtain his actual costs but the developer estimates that they were
very close to his projections. Included in the cost to the second contractor is his overhead and profit.
The on site construction was $820,500, $180,100 more than projected. The majority of this cost
overrun did not affect the developer because of the fixed price contract he had with the general
contractor. The largest cost overruns to the contractor were the interior hardwood stairs ($47,040
higher than the projected cost of $12,960), the interior paint and finish ($23,800 higher than the
projected cost of $12,000), the framing ($16,000 higher than the projected cost of $90,000), and the
interior doors and trim ($14,000 higher than the projected cost of $20,000). The cost of above ground
construction was $43,186 per unit or $36.18 per net square foot.
Exhibit 4-11: Franklin Homes -- Determinants of Housing Costs
Attempt to Designed two i~ Architectur
* Increase
Acquire Adjacent -* Versions of Fees
City Lot Development
Interest
Payments
on Land+
-t Increased Soft Costs
Private Land Talked to Predevelopment -
Acquisition Nei hbors Time PMraagement
4 __ ---- + Total
EXHIBIT 4-12: FRANKLIN HOMES -- DISAGGREGATED COST DATA
Actual Actual Actual
Variance Cost Cost Percentag
Proposed Actual (Actual- per Unit per Sqft of Total
Costs Costs Proposed 19 22680 Cost
1. Land 115,800 115,800 0 6,095 5.11 5.061
2. Predevelopient Fees
D Treoor 9,000 9,000 0 474 0.40 0.391
0 R.E. Taxes 1,000 700 (300) 37 0.03 0.031
D Architectural 50,000 62,725 12,725 3,301 2.77 2.741
D Enqineerino/Testing 31,000 33,531 2,531 1,765 1.48 1.461
D Consultants 6,500 6,115 (385) 322 0.27 0.271
D Legal 85,000 97,438 12,438 5,128 4.30 4.26%
D Accounting 5,000 8,973 3,973 472 0.40 0.391
D Appraisal 750 750 0 39 0.03 0.031
D Permits 11,130 13,666 2,536 719 0.60 0.601
D Bank Inspections 4,000 4,000 0 211 0.18 0.17%
D Fannie Mae 3,600 3,600 0 189 0.16 0.161
206,980 240,498 33,518 12,658 10.60 10.511
3. Financing
D Preconst points 5,260 5,260 0 277 0.23 0.23%
D Interest Land 16,270 16,270 0 856 0.72 0.711
D Construction Points 21,500 21,500 0 1,132 0.95 0.941
D Interest Construction 79,441 102,537 23,096 5,397 4.52 4.481
D Closinq Costs 7,614 7,614 0 401 0.34 0.331
130,085 153,181 23,096 8,062 6.75 6.69%
4. Marketinq
D Marketina-Brochures etc. 25,000 26,857 1,857 1,414 1.18 1.17%
D Marketing (5.251) 126,478 126,478 0 6,657 5.58 5.521
151,478 153,335 1,857 8,070 6.76 6.701
5. Management/General Conditions/Fees
D General Conditions 10,000 8,252 (1,748) 434 0.36 0.361
D Insurance (liability) 12,500 20,018 7,518 1,054 0.88 0.871
C Site Security 10,000 15,000 5,000 789 0.66 0.661
C Contractor PM/Overhead/Gen. Co 41,052 41,300 248 2,174 1.82 1.801
D Administrative/Misc. 6,000 13,178 7,178 694 0.58 0.581
D Developer Salary 140,000 140,000 0 7,368 6.17 6.121
D Developers Overhead 65,000 57,685 (7,315) 3,036 2.54 2.521
D Developer's Continqency -- 15% 51,007 0 (51,007) 0 0.00 0.00%
D Security 12,000 1,560 (10,440) 82 0.07 0.071
D Construction Management 12,568 12,568 0 661 0.55 0.551
360,127 309,561 (50,566) 16,293 13.65 13.52%
EXHIBIT 4-12: FRANWliN HOMES -- DISAGGREGATED COST DATA
Actual Actual Actual
Variance Cost Cost Percentaa
Pronosed Actual (Actual- oer Unit per Soft of Total
Costs Costs Prooosed 19 22680 Cost
6. Site Work/Foundations
C2 Mobilizatinn/Fnnineerina
C2 Clearinn and Grubbinn
C2 Dphris/than Rpmoval
C2 General Site Excavation
2 Founnation Euravation/Rackfill
C2 Reinfnrred Conrrptp Foundation
C2 Cellar Slabs
C2 Water qvqtne
C? Spupr qvntnq
C2 Drain Svstem
C2 Flprtrirai Conduit
C2 Exterior Gradinn/Pavino
C2 Clean un
0 Conduit Wirinn
D Boston Edison
0 Site Linhtina
D Landscaoinn
0 Fencina
0 Entrance iatp
0 Ledoe Allowance
D Site Work Continnency -- 10%
20. 000
8.000
8.000
20.000
39.000
74.000
19.000
43.500
31,500
35.000
12.000
17.500
12.500
19,500
468
5.500
25,000
12,500
21,000
45.000
47.897
20.000
8.000
8,000
20.000
39.000
72.000
19.000
43.500
31.500
35.000
12.000
17.500
12,500
25. 240
468
5.922
33.816
12.810
20.600
59.500
0
0
0
0
0
0
(2,000)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5,740
0
422
8.816
310
(400)
14,500
(47,897)
1,053
421
421
1,053
2,053
3.789
1.000
2,289
1,658
1.842
632
921
658
1,328
25
312
1,780
674
1,084
3,132
0
516,865 496,356 (20,509) 26.124
0.88
0.35
0.35
0.88
1.72
3.17
0.84
1.92
1.39
1.54
0.53
0.77
0.55
1.11
0.02
0.26
1.49
0.56
0.91
2.62
0.00
0.87%
0.35%
0.35%
0.87%
1.70%
3.15%
0.83%
1.901
1.38%
1.53Z
0.52%
0.76%
0.55%
1.10%
0.02%
0.26%
1.48%
0.56%
0.90%
2.60%
0.00%
21.89 21.68%
7. Off Site Construction
8. On Site
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C)
C
0 0 0 0.00 0.00%
Constrtuction
Framina (17 units)
Ist Contractor Framina (4 unit
Trusens
Sheathina
Rnofina
Ext.Caro.
Sidinn.pdt. naint
Window, and doors
Finish Floorinn
Rouoh Pluabino
Finish Pluiehina
Rouh Electrical
Finish Electrical
Insulation
Sheetrork
Interior Stairs
Interior Doors and Trim
Interior Paint and Finish
Cahinetrv
Comeletp nrevious contract wor
Sheds
Channe Order
90.000
21.845
12.000
10.500
6,840
13.000
16,600
28.000
7,600
45.600
45,600
62,540
17.320
12.000
69,940
12,960
20.000
12,000
28.500
24,000
0
0
106.000
21.845
22.000
20.000
18,500
20,500
22.000
35.000
15.000
45.000
45.000
63,540
17,460
12,000
63,000
60,000
34.000
35,800
35.000
24.000
7.640
10.000
16,000
0
10,000
9,500
11,660
7,500
5,400
7, 000
7,400
(600)
(600)
1,000
140
0
(6,940)
47,040
14,000
23,800
6,500
0
7,641"
10, IAGO
5,579
1,150
1,158
1,053
974
1,079
1,158
1,842
789
2,368
2,368
3.344
919
632
3,316
3,158
1,789
1,884
1,842
1,263
402
526
4.67
0.96
0.97
0.88
0.82
0.90
0.97
1.54
0.66
1.98
1.98
2.80
0.77
0.53
2.78
2.65
1.50
1.58
1.54
1.06
0.34
0.44
4.63%
0.95%
0.96%
0.871
0.81%
0.90%
0.96%
1.53%
0.66%
1.97%
1.97%
2.78%
0.76%
0.52%
2.75%
2.62%
1.49%
1.56%
1.53%
1.05%
0.33%
0.44%
EXHIBIT 4-12: TA~kiN WIMRF -- DIRAGRFGATFD ClRT DATA
Actual Actual Actual
Variance Cost Cost Percentaq
Prooosed Actual (Actual- per Unit oer Sqft of Total
Costs Costs Prooosed 19 22680 Cost
O Aooliances 19,000 21,138 2,138 1,113 0.93 0.92%
D Alarm Prewirina 1.900 2.550 650 134 0.11 0.11%
0 Wolvorine Sidino/Trim 16.000 17,768 1,768 935 0.78 0.78%
D Basement Windows 1,870 1.870 0 98 0.08 0.08%
O Liaht Fixtures 16,000 14,254 (1,746) 750 0.63 0.621
P Caroet Inorade 13.500 17,184 3,684 904 0.76 0.75%
D Linoleum lUonrade 4.000 6,519 2,519 343 0.29 0.28%
p Bathroom Fixtures 4.500 3,708 (792) 195 0.16 0.16%
D Dec. Tile Installation 3,000 1,699 (1,301) 89 0.07 0.07%
D Dpc. Wall Boarders 2,500 564 (1.936) 30 0.02 0.02%
D Exterior Door Ioorade 850 0 (850) 0 0.00 0.001
D Telenhone Fnclosure 500 A (500) 0 0.00 0.00%
Ruhtntal 640.465 820,539 180,074 43,186 36.18 35.84%
TOTAL DEVFIOPMENT COST 2,121,800 2.289.270 167,470 120,488 100.94 100.00%
RALES 2.409,100 2,409,100 0 126,795 106.22 100.00%
PROFIT
C Contractors Profit 30.000 (134,048) (164,048) (7,055) -5.91 -5.86%
0 Develoner Profit 257,300 253,878 (3,422) 13,362 11.19 11.09%
287.300 119,830 (167,470) 6,307 5.28 5.23%
C -- Cost to Contractor (Above Ground Construction) -- Fixed Price
C2 -- Cost to Develooer from Site Contractor
D -- Develoner Costs
Exhibit 4-13: Franklin Homes
Projected Versus Actual Costs per Unit
On Site Construction
Off Site Construction
Site Work
Management
Marketing
Financing
Predevelopment
Land
33,709
43,186
27,203
26,124
18,954
16,293
7,973
8,070
8,062
10,894
12,658
6,095
6,095
Actual
sProposed
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BRADFORD ESTATES
1. Project Description
Predevelopment
The City of Boston issued an RFP in June 1985 for a 42,000 square foot site. It took the city
almost two years to designate a developer for the site. Taylor Properties, the developer, was not
designated until April 1987. This was due primarily to the difficulty the city had in obtaining
clearance for the land.
The developer initiated an extensive community approval process for this development. Once
designated, the developer, Taylor Properties, and the contractor, Boston Modular Homes, obtained the
necessary permits in less than six months.
Construction
The developer had a fixed price contract with the contractor. Although the developer had built
new construction at that scale of this development, he had not used modular construction before. The
estimates for conventionally built construction were 30% higher than the estimate received by Boston
Modular Homes. The contractor agreed to provide the units for $83,317 per unit. Each unit has a
basement and two and a half stories above ground, which includes an unfinished attic space. The top
floor (attic space) cannot be used as a living space for three years after purchase due to zoning
restrictions. After three years the homeowner can finish the space.
This was the largest project the contractor had undertaken. The contractor underestimated the
coordination necessary for the button-up activities, therefore he did not hire a superintendent at the
site. The developer, however, did have a clerk of the works for the project. The lack of coordination
of subcontractors at the site contributed to the costs to the contractor. The button up work involved
all the same activities as building a house at the site from the beginning yet in smaller quantities. The
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contractor had not formed relationships with small subcontractors used to button-up work. The
contractor warned that it is important not to underestimate the button up work; he hired a site
superintendent for all his subsequent developments.
Construction began in August 1987 and was completed between April and November 1988. The
average time to construct each of the three structures was nine months.
Financing
To reduce the cost of the house to the buyer, Taylor Properties received $400,000 in a NDF loan
and another $76,667 in a LEND loan. Both the NDF and the LEND loans must be repaid only when a
unit is resold to family that has an income above 80% of the SMSA median. Taylor properties
received 90% of the NDF loan during the construction period to help reduce construction finance
charges. The remainder was held until the units were sold. Essentially, all the money is used to
write-down the sales price of the units for homebuyers.
The developer received a construction loan at prime plus 2% in August of 1987 to cover the
remainder of the construction costs. The period for financing the construction costs was projected to
be six months. The construction period was increased. In addition, due to difficulty in qualifying
buyers, the cost of the loan had to be carried during after construction.
Marketing and Sales
The project had HOP financing at 5.0%. It was assumed that with a combination of cost
writedown and low interest rates, the units would sell very quickly. Unfortunately this did not
happen. A combination of factors affected the slow sale of the units. The private mortgage insurance
company that had agreed to insure the mortgages went bankrupt. As a result Taylor Properties lost
the nine buyers to whom they had presold units.
The NDF subsidy was structured as a long term loan to the buyer with a 3% interest rate. The
previous mortgage company assumed counted this as equity. The new mortgage insurance company did
not recognize the NDF loan to the buyer as equity. The deal had to be restructured so that the NDF
loan was converted to a grant. The money needs to be repaid only if the units are sold to families
with above 80% of the SMSA median income.
The buyers also now had to pay a 10% downpayment rather than the previous 5%. This proved
to be a prohibitive amount to pay for many families. Another aspect that led to increased time in
selling the units was that the bank took a very long time to process the applications. They were
suspicious that the families lied, therefore the bank investigated their applications.
Sixteen of the twenty-four units were sold to first time homebuyers for $89,500 with 5.0%
financing for the first few years and 8% financing in subsequent years. Four units were sold to first
time homebuyers with 8% financing for $110,000 and four units were sold to the Boston Housing
Authority for $140,000. The first two units were sold in March 1988. The schedule of sales was as
follows:
Month of Sale Number of Units
March 1988 2
May 1
July 4
August 3
October 2
November 2
January 1989 5 (four to the BHA)
March 1
April 1
May 1
22
The remaining two units were being processed in June 1989.
2. Cost of Development
Exhibit 4-14 shows the key determinants of project costs. The inexperience of the contractor
with that scale of development led to an increase in construction period, resulting in increased interest
payments and management costs. The design was new to the manufacturer and some details had to be
worked out. For example, the first modules were damaged during transportation because they were
not fastened properly. This resulted in an increase in on site construction. The other major factor
affecting costs was the change in underwriting guidelines after the private mortgage insurance
bankrupt. The developers lost prequalified buyers and then had difficulty in qualifying new buyers
due to the strict underwriting guidelines.
Exhibit 4-15 shows the disaggregated projected and actual costs and revenues. Exhibit 4-16
shows the costs of the eight cost components per unit.
The predevelopment fees cost $213,500. Due to unexpected underground conditions, engineering
costs were increased by $37,800 (the original engineering costs were included in the architecture line
item). The legal fees were $32,589 higher than the projected $19,000.
The construction interest payments were more than two and a half times the projected cost of
$65,200. This increase in cost is primarily due to the extended time necessary to sell the units. The
developer would have saved in financing costs by using modular construction had the construction been
complete on time because of the schedule of payments. The majority of the payment to the contractor
did not need to be paid until modules arrived. The contractor's payments were structured as follows:
5% after excavation, 15% after the foundations are finished, 60% at house delivery, and 10% at
completion. The time to complete the units after they were set took longer than expected, therefore
increasing interest payments.
The subsidy from the city was $400,000 in a Community Development Block Grant and an
additional $76,667 in a LEND loan; both were later converted to a grant. $324,000 of the NDF loan
was issued during construction, thereby allowing the contractor to decrease construction interest. The
remainder of the money was not used to reduce the construction loan amount.
Due to the difficulties caused by the change in underwriting guidelines, the developer needed to
hire a broker for marketing. The broker received a marketing fee, rather than a commission for selling
the units.
The total management, general conditions and developer fees for this project were $358,400.
The contingency of $91,000 almost covered cost increases. The development administration cost more
than twice the amount anticipated (a total of $92,400) due to the extended construction and sales
time. The developer also had to pay an additional $22,300 for security during the sales period.
The off site construction cost $35,770 per unit. The contractor received a discount because of
the quantity of units as well as a 7% discount since he was distributing exclusively Huntington Home
modules. The extras such as bay window, dormer cost, disposal and
cable jack cost approximately $2,100 per unit more than the base module.
On site construction cost more than the contractor had anticipated by $100,800. The largest
overruns were in constructing the kneewall overhang ($52,800 higher than the projected $24,000), the
carpentry work ($50,000 higher than the projected $120,000) and the electrical wiring ($10,000 higher
than the projected $24,000). The total on site construction was 522,485 per unit.
Exhibit 4-14: Bradford Estates -- Determinants of Housing Costs
Contractor
New Design Assumes
Modular for Damage during Developer has Hard Cost
Construction Manufacturer Transportation Fixed Price Ovrruns
Relationshiprrun
Contract with
General Contractor
On Site
C roConstruction CBG
(Button Up) Subsidy
Relationship
with Site Work/ HadCot
Subcontractors Foundations EadCssSales Price
Increases
Contractor's C onstruction
t-jFirst weriod +1 Total
FXHIBIT 4-15: R AVINRB FSTATFS -- 5ISA66RFAATFD COST DATA
Actual Actual Actual
Variance Dollars Dollars Percent
Projected Actual (Actual- Per Unit Per Soft of Total
Costs Costs Proiected 24 32040 Costs
1. Land I 1 0 0 0.00 0.00%
2. Predevplnnpnnt Fons
1 Architprviral 79.230 88.084 9,854 3.670 2.75 3.28%
D Enoineerino 0 37,800 37.800 1,575 1.18 1.411
O Real Fqtate Taxes 7.975 1.300 (6.675) 54 0.04 0.05%
D Insurance 4.000 4,000 0 167 0.12 0.151
D Lenal Fneq 19.000 51.589 32.589 2,150 1.61 1.92%
D Arct./nst Certif 4,000 4.000 0 167 0.12 0.151
I Title and Rpenrdinn 5.975 5.975 0 249 0.19 0.22%
0 Anoraiqal 2.000 2,000 0 83 0.06 0.07%
D insnprtinn Enninppr 2.000 2,000 0 83 0.06 0.07%
C Tnturanc 7.200 7,200 0 300 0.22 0.27%
C r'noinn Sprvirps 4. 01 4. 00 0 200 0.15 0.18%
C Surveyor 4.800 4.900 0 200 0.15 0.181
Subtotal 139.980 213.548 73.568 8,898 6.67 7.96%
3. Financino
D Const. Lan(6 so 10%) 65.245 151,087 85,842 6,295 4.72 5.63%
0 Coamitment Fee (Points) 40,000 40,000 0 1.667 1.25 1.491
P Preferred Lender Fee 24.000 24,000 0 1,000 0.75 0.89%
O Credit Correction 0 3,842 3,842 160 0.12 0.14%
D Prooram Procepuinn Fee 3.200 3.200 0 133 0.10 0.12%
132.445 222.129 89.684 9,255 6.93 8.28%
4. Marketinn
D In Hnure Marketinn
D Sales Fee
10,000 13.325 3.325 555 0.42 0.50%
0 24.000 24.000 1.000 0.75 0.891
10,000 37.325 27.325 1,555 1.16 1.391
5. ManAnppnti/Rnpral rnnditinn/F0pp
n Cnnstrirtinn Mananer 35.000 35.000 0 1.458 1.09 1.30%
0 Cnntinnpnrv (Devainnpr) 91.493 0 (91.493) 0 0.00 0.00%
D riv1innAwnt Administratio 41.000 92,353 49.353 3,R48 2.88 3.44%
D guilder's Risk/Liabilitv 27.200 27.760 560 1.157 0.87 1.03%
C nvorhoad 7% 145.000 170.000 25.000 7.083 5.31 6.34%
C Tean Fence 7,200. 7.200 0 300 0.22 0.27%
D Serurity (Develoner) 0 22.245 22.245 927 0.69 0.83%
C Sociritv 3.875 3,875 0 161 0.12 0.14%
352,768 358.433 5,665 14.935 11.19 13.36%
EiHIBIT 4-15: ;;AD0ORD 71TATFS -- DflSAA;UEATED COST DATA
Artual Actual Actual
Varianre Dollars Dollars Percent
Pron ctd Artual (Artual- Per Unit Per Soft of Total
Csts Costs Proiected 24 32040 Costs
6. Site Work/Foundations
r Excavatina 312.000 312.000 0 13.000 9.74 11.63%
C Concrete 120,000 120,000 0 5,000 3.75 4,471
C Water Proofino 12.000 12.000 0 500 0.37 0.45%
C Rubbiqh Removal 9,600 9.600 0 400 0.30 0.361
D Landscanino 0 14,500 14.500 604 0.45 0.54%
C Landscaoina 8.000 8,000 0 333 0.25 0.301
Subtotal 461.600 476.100 14.500 19.838 14.86 17.741
7. Off Site Cnnstriciion
C Crane 12.000 12,000 0 500 0.37 0.45%
M transoortation 28.800 28.800 0 1,200 0.90 1.071
M Bass Unit 839.824 835.824 0 34.826 26.09 31.15%
M Bav Window 27. 120 27.120 0 1,130 0.85 1.01%
M Phon Jark 1,344 1,344 0 56 0.04 0.05%
M T.V. Jaci 1.344 1,344 0 56 0.04 0.051
M Dormer 13.200 13.200 0 550 0.41 0.49%
M Disonsal 2.520 2.520 0 105 0.08 0.091
K fnranr Winnow 5.400 5.400 0 225 0.17 0.20%
M Two-tnn 12.648 12,648 0 527 0.39 0.471
H two nnir qpearation wall 5.520 5.520 0 230 0.17 0.21%
M lnit Credit (48.000) (48.000) 0 (2.000) -1.50 -1.79%
M Discount 7% (91.536) (61.536) 0 (2,564) -1.92 -2.29%
Subtotal 836,184 836,184 0 34,841 26.10 31.16%
8. On Site Construction
C Front Stenq l0.AR0 10,0 0 0 420 0.31 0.38%
C Doors 9.600 9,600 0 400 0.30 0.36%
C Pedar Claohoard 50.400 50.400 0 2,100 1.57 1.88%
C Rear Porch 20.040 20.040 0 835 0.63 0.751
C Sills 2,400 2,400 0 100 0.07 0.09%
C Sill Sealer 1.200 1.200 0 50 0.04 0.041
C Carnnntpr 120.000 170.000 50.000 7.083 5.31 6.34%
C Electrical 24.000 34.000 10,000 1,417 1.06 1.271
C Pliimhinn 3A,000 36,000 0 1,500 1.12 1.34%
C Heatino 9.600 9.600 0 400 0.30 0.361
C carnpt 12.000 12.000 0 500 0.37 0.45%
C Kneewall Ovrhann 24,000 76.800 52,800 3,200 2.40 2.861
C Sales Tan 36,000 24.000 (12.000) 1,000 0.75 0.89%
C Baspment Bdrnom Hat 76.800 76.800 0 3.200 2.40 2.86%
r Rottprn ;.720 6.720 0 280 0.21 0.25%
anOtai 42R.840 539.640 100.800 22.485 16.84 20.11%
TOTAL DEVFiOPMENT COST 2.371.818 2.683.360 311.542 111.807 83.75 100.00%
FXHIBIT 4-15: RADFOR5 FTiATFS -- 7SAAWRSATED COST DATA
Actual Actual Actual
Variance Dollars Dollars Percent
Prniertpi Actual (Actual- Per Unit Per Soft of Total
Cnsts Costs Prniected 24 32040 Costs
9EVENUES
NDF loan 400.000 400.000 0 16.667 12.48 14.29%
LEND Inan 0 76.667 76.667 3.194 2.39 2.741
ie2.302.000 2.322.000 20.600 q6.750 72.47 82.97%
2.702.000 2.798.667 96,667 116,611 87.35 100.00%
PROFIT (1.0q)
D Develooers Profit (69%) 168.073 78.998 (89,075) 3,292 2.47 2.94%
C Contractors Profit 162.109 36.309 (125.800) 1.513 1.13 1.35%
330.182 115,307 (214.875) 4.804 3.60 4.30%
C -- Cost to Contractor -- Fixed Price of $86,317 ner unit
D -- Cost to nevelnner
M-- Cost of Mndities tn Contractor
Profit as a Percent of Total Develonment Cost
Exhibit 4-16: Bradford Estates
Projected versus Actual Costs per Unit
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WAYLAND STREET
1. Project Description
Predevelopment
The developer privately bought a 6,800 square foot site on Wayland Street for a three unit
development that was presold to the Boston Housing Authority. Beside land acquisition, the
developer was responsible for legal work, marketing, and financing. Since the manufacturer provided
the necessary architectural services, no architect was hired for the project. Boston Modular Homes,
the general contractor obtained, all the approvals necessary for the development. They secured verbal
permission from the zoning board of appeals to begin construction in December 1988. The units were
completed in March 1989 but the zoning hearing was not scheduled until May 1989. The variance was
denied due to community opposition. The developer is trying to buy an adjacent 2,000 square foot
parcel so that the zoning variance will not be necessary.
Construction
The developer joined with Boston Modular Homes to produce the units. Boston Modular
performed a turn key operation; they took responsibility for the project from approvals to the end of
construction. The contractor began construction in October 1988 and finished in March 1988. The
button-up (construction after the modules are set) took approximately two months.
There were no problems during construction. The contractor had previously built a much larger
scale development at Bradford Estates. In fact, the Wayland Street units were the prototype that was
developed at Huntington Homes for the Bradford Estates. The Wayland Street units had a simpler
design than Bradford Estates. For example, the Wayland Street units were built in one row rather
than offset as in Bradford Estates.
Marketing
All three of the units were presold to the Boston Housing Authority for their 705 project for
$115,000 per unit. The developers anticipated to sell the units after construction was complete.
Until the units have a certificate of occupancy, which will not be granted if the there is violation of
the zoning regulations, the BHA will not buy the units. The developer must buy additional land so
that the density requirement is satisfied. In the meantime, the developer must pay for the financing of
the units.
2. Cost of Development
Exhibit 4-17 shows the key determinants of the cost savings and overruns in the Wayland Street
development. The experience of the contractor way important in keeping the construction schedule
and costs. Also, by giving the contractor primary responsibility for the project, the developer did not
incur overhead and management costs. The financing costs were increased from the projected costs due
to carrying costs after construction. The units were presold to the BHA, therefore the developer
anticipated no carrying costs after construction. However, due to difficulty in obtaining community
support for the zoning variance, the units had to be financed after construction, thus increasing
security and interest payments.
The projected and actual costs for this development are in Exhibit 4-18. The total
development cost was $75,856 for each unit. The developer sold the units to the BHA for $115,000.
The developer's profit was $29,400 per unit and the contractor's profit was $8,500 per each unit.
The predevelopment cost was minimal because the contractor absorbed most of the approvals
costs in his lump sum price for delivering the three units. The financing costs increased from $4,900
to $16,300. This increase resulted from the delay in selling the units to the Boston Housing
Authority due to the time it took to receive the zoning approval. The management fees were $11,014
less than expected. The general conditions were only $2,000 instead of $13,014. The contractor's
contingency of $7,950 was used to offset an equivalent security fee.
Exhibit 4-17: Wayland Street -- Determinants of Housing Costs
-I
FXHIRIT 4-18: WAYLAND STRFFT -- PISA66RFATFD CORT DATA
Actual Actual
Variance Dollars Dollars Actual
Pro trd Actuval (Actual- Per Per Percent
Costs Costs Proietted) Unit Soft of Total
( Unitf) (3 Uinits) (3 Units) 3 2930 Cost
. ) I n 5.000 25. 000 0 8,333 8.53 10.81%
2. Predevelonment Fees
D [poal 3.000 3.000 0 1.000 1.02 1.30%
C Permits 1.470 1,470 0 490 0.50 0.64%
4.470 4.470 0 1,490 1.53 1.93%
3. Construction Financino
D Intprpqt 4.900 16.293 11.393 5.431 5.56 7.05%
4. Marketinn 0 0 0 0 0.00 0,00%
5. Manaapmpnt/8pneral Ponditions/Fpee
C Genpral Cond. 8% 13.014 2.000 (11,014) 667 0,68 0.87%
C OverheAd 7% 9.917 9,917 0 3.306 3.38 4.29%
D insurAnrp 2.500 2,500 0 833 0.85 1.08%
C Securitv 0 7.950 7,950 2.650 2.71 3.44%
C Continnencv 4% 7,950 0 (7,950) 0 0.00 0.00%
33.3R1 22,367 (11,014) 7,456 7.63 9.68%
6. Sitp Work/Fnundatinnq
r. ,miti n 1200 1-200 0 400 0.41 0.52%
C Excavatirn 4.900 400 0 0 1.500 1.54 1.95%
f. Parinmtfr 1r.in .00 681 81 227 0.23 0.29%
nncretp Formwork 5.016 5.016 0 1.672 1.71 2.17%
E F.ncrrtp Flatwori 2.76R 2.268 0 756 0.77 0.98%
C Conrretp Material 2,600 2.600 0 867 0.89 1.12%
. Wernrnnfinn 600 P.1 81 227 0.23 0.29%
C Site Utilities 10.000 10.000 0 3.333 3.41 4.33%
C tandscaoinn 3.000 3.000 0 1.000 1.02 1.30%
C Pavinn 3,000 3.000 0 1.000 1.02 1.30%
32.784 32.946 162 10.982 11.24 14.25%
7. Off .Sitep Constrirtion
M Hnise 89.499 R9,499 0 29.833 30.55 38.72%
r: Transnortainn 3.600 3.600 0 1.200 1.23 1.56%
r Crane Sprvirp 2,200 1.300 (900) 433 0.44 0.56%
C Settinq Crew 1.500 1.533 :3 511 0.52 0.66%
F. Settinn Crew OT 0 117 11? 37 0.04 0.05%
96.799 96.044 (755) 32.015 32.78 41.55%
EXHIBIT 4-18: WAYLAND STREET -- DISAGREGATED COST DATA
Actual Actual
Variance Dollars Dollars Actual
Pro iprted Actual (Actual- Per Per Percent
Costs Costs Projected) Unit Soft of Total
(3 Units) (3 units) (3 Units) 3 2930 Cost
8. On Site Construction
C Fxtprinr Carnentrv 1.000 3.000 2.000 1.000 1.02 1.30%
C Interior Rounh Cara. 6,600 7.420 820 2,473 2.53 3.21%
C Finish Carnentrv 2.000 3.000 1,000 1.000 1.02 1.30%
C Roofinn 2.000 2,000 0 667 0.68 0.87%
C Sidin, 6.000 3.000 (3.000) 1,000 1.02 1.30%
C Drvwall 1.400 2.454 1,054 818 0.84 1.06%
C lAttprs R60 800 0 267 0.27 0.35%
C Sec uritv 0 128 128 43 0.04 0.06%
C Carnet 600 600 0 200 0.20 0.26%
C Paint 600 600 0 200 0.20 0.26%
C Electrical 3.000 2.540 (460) 847 0.87 1.10%
C Front and Rear Steos 2,600 1,800 (800) 600 0.61 0.78%
C Plumbino 6,000 6.200 200 2,067 2.12 2.687.
C Final Clean 500 500 0 167 0.17 0.22%
Subtotal 33.100 34,042 942 11.347 11.62 14.73%
TOTAL DFVFIOPMFNT COST 230.434 231.162 728 77.054 78.89 100.00%
REVENUES FROM SALE 345,000 345,000 0 115,000 117.75 100.00%
PROFITS
C Contractor' Prnfit R 14.96. 25,631 10.665 8,544 8.75 11.09%
n neveinner's Profit 99.600 88.207 (11,393) 29.402 30.10 38.16%
4,566 13.838 (728) 37.946 38.85 49.25X
C -- Cost to Contractor
D -- Cost to Develoner
M -- Pavent to Manufacturer
Construction Contract Fixed Price for $70.000
Profit as a Percent of Total Develooment Cost
Exhibit 4-19: Wayand Street
Projected versus Actual Costs per Unit
On Site Construction
Off Site Construction
Site Work
Management
Marketing
Financing
Predevelopment
Land
11,033
11,347
32,266
32,015
10,928
10,982
11,127
7,456
0
0
5,431
1,490
1,490
8,333
8,333
I I I I I
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000
Actual
Proposed
BOSTON MODULAR HOMES
1. Project Description
Predevelopment
This project was one of the six projects in the Round I of the Buildable Lots Program
sponsored by the Public Facilities Department. The RFP was issued in September 1987. By January
1988 Boston Modular Homes was selected to build 5 triple deckers on 5 lots (15 units). In this
round of the Buildable Lots project, the PFD began to set up communication with the different
permitting offices in order to expedite the permitting process. All permits were secured by October
of 1988 and Boston Modular Homes began construction in November of 1988.
Construction
The contractor was also the developer for this project. He had used Huntington Modular
Homes in constructing over 60 units. The contractor took responsibility for the site
work/foundations, setting the house and organizing the button@up. The contractor, through his
experience, controlled the schedule of the construction. He started construction in November 1988
and finished two structures in April 1989 and three in May 1989.
The structural requirements for a three story building are greater than for a two story building,
increasing costs. Design items such as bay windows and clapboard siding in the front also increased
cost. In two of the sites the contractor encountered ledge which also increased costs.
Financing
Boston Modular Homes secured a construction loan for prime plus 2%. The majority of the
loan was needed as the modules arrived in January and February of 1989. The agreement with the city
was that the contractor is responsible for paying construction interest for 30 days after receiving the
certificate of occupancy. After that, Boston Modular Homes can claim reimbursement from the city
for the financing carrying costs.
The city also subsidized the units with a CDBG grant. They estimate they will spend an
average of $10,000 per unit. The PFD will use the subsidy to reduce the downpayment, the closing
costs or the cost of the house, whichever is necessary to help the family qualify. The family needs to
pay only a minimum of two and a half percent downpayment from their own money in order for the
mortgage to qualify for the secondary mortgage market. The remainder of the downpayment can come
from the CDBG grant.
Marketing
The PFD is paid a non-profit agency to market all the units for the Buildable lots program.
They paid a salary for one person as well as $1,000 of each unit at sale. In June 1989 none of the 15
units were sold. Ten applications were being processed. One was market rate, seven were HOP
financed and two were for MHFA endloan financing.
2. Cost of Development
Exhibit 4-20 shows the key relationships determining the cost of development. The experience
of the contractor as well as the use of modular construction was important in reducing the
construction period, therefore the interest payments during construction, and project management,
overhead, and security costs. In addition, the city, through the Buildable Lots Program helped
streamline the approvals process and provided marketing for the units. The city also assumes the risk
of interest payments after construction is complete.
The disaggregated projected and actual cost for the five triple decker structures is in Exhibit
4-21. The aggregated projected and actual costs are in Exhibit 4-22. The total cost of development
was $1,277,441, including the services provided by the city. The site work/foundations cost $16,760
more than anticipated. The largest overrun was in excavating extra ledge. The off site construction
cost $691,705 for the entire development. The variance of $4,710 was due to setting costs. The
contingency allowed for in hard costs covered the overruns incurred during on site construction
(approximately $34,000 in F/I rear stair and unanticipated carpentry expenses).
Boston Modular Homes -- Determinants of Housing Costs
Project Mgmnt. Soft Costs
Overhead
General Conditions .
Developer Overhead/
Project Management
Exhibit 4-20:
EXHIBIT 4-21: BOSTON MODULAR HOMES -- DISA6GREGATED COSTATA
Proiected Actual Variance Actual Actual Actual
Per Per (Actual - Dollars Dollars Percent of
Fifteen Fifteen Projected) Per Unit Per sqft Total
Units Units 15 17370 Development
1. Land I 1 0 0 0.00 0.00%
2. Predevelopment
Architecture 10.000 10,000 0 667 0.58 0.78%
Bidq permits/fees 10,500 10,500 0 700 0.60 0.82%
C Engineerinn and Survev 15.000 15,000 0 1,000 0.86 1.17%
Property tax 2,000 2,000 0 133 0.12 0.16%
Legal fees 7,500 7,500 0 500 0.43 0.59%
Title insurance 1,000 1,000 0 67 0.06 0.08%
Mortoaae recordino fee 500 500 0 33 0.03 0.04%
46,500 46.500 0 3,100 2.68 3.64%
3. Financinq
Construction Points 5,000 5,000 0 333 0.29 0.39%
Construction Interest 45,000 45,000 0 3,000 2.59 3.52%
50,000 50,000 0 3,333 2.88 3.91%
4. Marketinq
C Marketinq Salary 20,000 20,000 0 1,333 1.15 1.57%
C Incentive Payment 15,000 15,000 0 1,000 0.86 1.17%
35,000 35,000 0 2,333 2.01 2.74%
5. Management/General Conditions
General Conditions 50,000 50,000 0 3,333 2.88 3.91%
Developer's Overhead @7% 78,000 78,000 0 5,200 4.49 6.11%
C Project Manaement 15,000 15,000 0 1,000 0.86 1.17%
Continqency soft 1.040 0 (1,040) 0 0.00 0.001
Insurance 18,750 18,750 0 1,250 1.08 1.47%
Security 3,750 3,750 0 250 0.22 0.29%
166,540 165,500 (1,040) 11,033 9.53 12.96%
6. Site Work/Foundations
Excavation/Sitework 16.300 15,000 (1,300) 1,000 0.86 1.17%
Perimeter Drain 3.000 2,650 (350) 177 0.15 0.21%
Concrete 47,415 42,500 (4,915) 2,833 2.45 3.33%
Waterproofinq 3,000 2,500 (500) 167 0.14 0.201
Site Utilities 20.000 20,725 725 1,382 1.19 1.62%
Landscape 7,500 7,500 0 500 0.43 0.591
Pavina 10,200 10,200 0 680 0.59 0.80%
Extra Ledne 0 18,950 18,950 1,263 1.09 1.48%
Extra JChannel n 1,750 1,750 117 0.10 0.14%
Extra Elec Trench 0 2,400 2,400 160 0.14 0.19%
107,415 124,175 16,760 8,278 7.15 9.721
EXHIBIT 4-21: BOSTON MODULAR HOMES -- DISA6REGATED COST DATA
Projected Actual
Per Per
Fifteen Fifteen
Units Units
Variance Actual Actual
(Actual - Dollars Dollars
Projected) Per Unit Per sqft
15 17370
7. Off Site Construction
House 658,995 658,995 0 43,933 37.94 51.59%
Transportation 18.000 18,000 0 1,200 1.04 1.41%
Crane Service 7,500 10,150 2.650 677 0.58 0.79%
Setting Crew 2,500 2,500 0 167 0.14 0.20%
Aerial Lift 0 2,060 2,060 137 0.12 0.16%
5---------------------------------------------------
686,995 691,705 4,710 46.114 39.82 54.15%
8. On Site Construction
Exterior Caroentrv
Interior Carpentry
Carpet
Paint
Electrical
Plumbina
Extra Carpentry
F/I Rear Stair
Continoency hard
67,575
9,425
3,750
3,750
17.500
30.000
0
0
34,140
71,500 3,925 4,767 4.12 5.60%
9,425
1,006
5,500
17,500
26,250
12,385
21,000
0
0
(2,750)
1,750
0
(3,750)
12,385
21,000
(34,140)
628
67
367
1.167
1,750
826
1,400
0
0.54
0.06
0.32
1.01
1.51
0.71
1.21
0.00
166,140 164,560 (1,580) 10,971 9.47
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COST
REVENUE
CDB6 Subsidy
City Donation
Sales
1,258,591 1,277,441
150,000
65.000
1,200.000
150,000
65,000
1,200,000
18,850 85,163 73.54
10,000
4,333
80,000
8.64
3.74
69.08
1,415,000 1,415,000
156,409 137,559
0 94,333 81.46
(18,850) 9,171 7.92
C -- Donated Services by the City of Boston
Developer Profit as a Percent of Total Development Cost
Actual
Percent of
Total
Development
0.741
0.08%
0.431
1..37%
2.05%
0.97%
1.64%
0.00%
12.88%
100.001
10.60%
4.59%
84.81%
PROFIT
100.00%
10.77%
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 4-22: Boston Modular Homes
Projected versus Actual Costs per Unit
On Site Construction
Off Site Construction
Site Work
Management
Marketing
Financing
Predevelopment
Land
11,076
10,971
QQ ig ji ljiijjiiijjiijjjiijjiiijliijg!!!!!!!jiililiijggl45,800
46,114
8,278
11,103
11,033
2,333
2,333
3,333
3,333
31
0
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CHAPTER V: COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS OF DIFFERENT STUDIES
This chapter compares the results from the Kaiser report, the study of manufactured housing for
Chicago and the data collected for this thesis. The cost advantage of modular construction is analyzed
in two ways:
1) the potential of modular construction to reduce construction costs (hard costs),
in particular above ground construction costs, and
2) the potential of modular construction to reduce total development costs.
All costs are adjusted for inflation to April 1989 using Marshall and Swift construction
indices; the Kaiser report and the Chicago study are corrected for location (Boston). In addition, land
costs and profit/losses are excluded when comparing the data for consistency of comparison. In this
chapter, the assumptions made in analyzing the data will be explained first, followed by a comparison
of the studies.
A. Assumptions for Analysis
1. Land
The land in five of the seven case studies was bought from the city at a reduced rate, ranging
from $0 to $500 per unit. In each of these five cases, the land component accounted for less than one
percent of the development cost (excluding profits/losses). The privately purchased land cost $6,000
per unit for the Franklin Homes development, and $8,000 per unit for Wayland Street. In these two
cases the land component contributed 5% and 11% respectively to the total development cost. By
including land cost, the projects cannot be compared systematically because of the variability
exemplified by the case studies.
2. Profits
The profits and losses in the cases studies were affected by many variables such as sales price,
subsidy, anticipation of cost overrun through contingency, management of the development cost, and
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exposure to the risk of construction overruns. Exhibit 5-1 is a summary of projected versus actual
costs, sales prices, subsidies, and profits for each of the seven developments.
Urban Edge, for example, projected no profits or losses. They would have incurred a loss for
their cost overrun of $510,199, had it not been for an increase in sales prices and an increase in subsidy.
The increase in sales price and the increased subsidy were $30,000 greater than the cost overrun,
resulting in a profit for Urban Edge. The profit, however, will be used to partially repay the subsidy
or it will be used to offset further costs at the Hyde Park development.
As in the case of Urban Edge, the $367,319 cost increase for Nuestra Comunidad was mitigated
through a subsidy increase and an increase in sales price. If the last four units are sold for the
projected prices (two to the BHA for $124,000 each and two for $75,000 each) Nuestra will make a a
profit of approximately $16,000 per unit. Nuestra will use some of the profit to partially repay the
subsidies.
The cost increase in the Bradford Estates development was mitigated primarily with a decrease
in profits to the developer and the contractor but also with a subsidy increase. The increase in the cost
of development at Champlain Circle was partially offset by a loss to the contractors; an increase in
subsidy from the city was used to reduce the purchase price to the buyers. The increase in cost for
Franklin Homes and Wayland Street was mitigated with a decrease in profit to the development team;
in the case of Franklin Homes, the contractor also assumed losses. The cost overruns in the Boston
Modular Buildable Lots development resulted in a decrease in profits to the contractor.
Profits (losses) are affected by many variables. Consequently, the actual cost of developing
housing would be misrepresented if profits were included in comparing the cost of development.
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EXHIBIT 5-1: EXPECTED AND ACTUAL COSTS, REVENUES AND PROFITS
(Profit = Sales + Subsidy - Cost)
Urban Edae Proposed Actual Difference
Cost 852,86o 1,363,059 510,199
Sales 568,500 998,500 430,000
Subsidy 284,360 394,559 110,199
Profit- 0 30,000 30,000
Champlain Circle Proposed Actual Difference
Cost 1.308,000 1,316,239 8,239
Sales 960,000 922,719 (37,281)
Subsidy 346000 388,000 42,000
Profit (2,000) (5,52o) (3,520)
Nuestra Comunidad Proposed Actual Difference
Cost 735,000 1,102,319 367,319
Sales 600,000 932,000 332,000
Subsidy 150,000 330,049 180,049
Pr. fit .15,000 159,730 144,730
Franklin Homes Proposed Actual Difference
Cost 2,121,800 2,289,270 167,470
Sales 2,409,100 2,409,100 0-
Subsidy 0 0 0
Profit 287,30o 119,830 (167,470)
Bradford Estates Proposed Actual Difference
Cost 2,371,818 2,683,36) 311,542
Sales 2.302,000 2,322,000 20,000
Subsidy 400,000 476.667 76,667
Profit 330.182 115,307 (214,875)
Wayland Street Proposed Actual Difference
-------- ---------------------------------------------
Cost 230,434 231,162 728
Sales 345,000 345,000 0
Subsidy 0 0 0
Profit 114,566 113,838 (728)
Boston Modular Proposed Actual Difference
--------------------------------------
Cost 1,258,591 1,277,441 18,850
Sales 1,200,000 1,200,000 0
Subsidy 215.000 215,000 0
Profit 156,409 137,559 (18,850)
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Total Development Cost
The cost per unit , cost per net square foot, and the percentage of total development cost are in
Exhibit 5-2, Exhibit 5-3, and Exhibit 5-4 respectively. The differences in cost for the different types
of construction in the three studies are discussed in two parts: the hard costs, and the soft costs.
B. Cost of Construction
The construction cost consists of three cost components: off-site construction, on-site
construction, and site work/foundations. The on-site construction and the off-site construction are
combined to compare the the different type construction types.
1. Above Ground Construction
Two of the three studies, the Kaiser report and the Boston case studies showed above ground
construction costs to be higher for modular construction than for stick built construction. In fact,
the lowest per square foot above ground construction cost in the Boston case studies was for the case
using stick built construction. The above ground construction for Franklin Homes cost $36.65 per net
square foot, and the least expensive above ground cost for the modular construction was $41.69, a
14% increase. Please see Exhibit 5-5 for a summary of the above ground construction costs for the
different studies.
The Chicago study did find the above ground component for modular construction to be less
expensive than for stick built construction. The above ground cost for modular was $50.03 per net
square foot and for stick built it was $58.30 a net square foot, over 16% higher. However, the
Chicago study assumed union labor for on-site construction. If the labor for the on-site construction
is decreased by 25%, then above ground costs for the modular unit can be decreased by approximately
$1 for and the stick by $6. This results in a cost of $49.00 for modular and $52.00 for stick,
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EXHIBIT 5-2: COSTS PER UNIT (Adjusted to April 1989)
Urban Champlain Nuestra Franklin Bradford Wayland Boston
Edge Circle Comunidad Hoses Estates Street Modular
Open
Modular Modular Panel Stick Modular Modular Modular
Soft Costs (excluding land cost and profit)
Chicago Study Kaiser Report
Open
Stick Panel Modular Stick Prefab
Predevelopsent 4,890 5,552 5,069 12,658 9,056 1,490 3,100 5,701 5,991 4,581 2,278 2,603
Financing 11,417 2,893 4,964 8,062 9,420 5,431 3,333 2,833 805 308 1,302 1,302
Marketing 3,346 1,309 180 8,070 1,583 0 2,333 0 0 0 868 868
Management 16,114 9,351 20,213 16,293 15,201 7,456 11,033 5,169 4,731 2,465 9,720 1,931
35,767 19,105 30,425 45,083 35,261 14,377 19,800 13,703 11,527 7,354 14,168 6,704
Hard Costs
Site Work/Found. 13,407 19,203 24,341 26,124 20,191 10,982 8,278 8,792 8,792 9,998
Above Gr. Const. 48,858 40,267 59,982 43,186 58,348 43,362 57,084 62,027 67,730 52,032
62,265 59,470 84,323 69,310 78,539 54,344 65,363 70,819 76,522 62,030
Total
14,124 13,582
31,003 32,262
45,127 45,844
98,032 78,575 114,748 114,393 113,800 68,721 85,163 84,522 88,049 69,384 59,295 52,548
EXHIBIT 5-3: COSTS PER NET SQUARE FOOT (Adjusted to Boston, April 1989)
Urban Champlain Nuestra Franklin Bradford Wayland Boston
Edge Circle Comunidad Homes Estates Street Modular Chicago Study Kaiser Report
Modular Modular Panel Stick Modular Modular Modular
Soft Costs (excluding land cost and profit)
Predevelopment 5.10 6.17 4.17 10.60 6.78 1.43 2.68
Financing 11.91 3.21 4.09 6.75 7.06 5.22 2.88
Marketing 3.49 1.45 0.15 6.76 1.19 0.00 2.01
Management 16.82 10.39 16.64 13.65 11.39 7.17 9.53
37.33 21.23 25.04 37.77 26.41 13.82 17.10
Hard Costs
Site Work/Found. 13.99 21.34 20.03 21.89 15.12 10.56 7.15
Above Gr. Const. - 50.99 44.74 49.37 36.18 43.71 41.69 49.30
64.98 66.08 69.40 58.06 58.83
102.30 87.31 94.44 95.83 85.24Total
52.25 56.44
Open
Stick Panel Modular Stick Prefab.
5.36 5.63 4.40 2.28 2.60
2.66 0.76 0.30 1.30 1.30
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.87
4.86 4.45 2.37 9.72 1.93
12.88 10.83 7.07 14.17 6.70
8.26 8.26 9.61 14.12 13.58
58.30 63.66 50.03 31.00 32.26
66.56 71.92 59.64 45.13 45.84
66.08 73.54 79.44 82.75 66.72 59.30 52.55
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EXHIBIT 5-4: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COS S
Urban Champlain Nuestra
Edge Circle Comunidad
Franklin Bradford Wayland Boston
Homes Estates Street Modular Chicago Study
Modular Modular Panel Stick Modular Modular Modular Stick Panel Modular Stick Prefab
Soft Costs (excluding
Predevelopeent
Financinq
Marketing
Management
land cost and profit)
4.991 7.07% 4.421 11.07% 7.96% 2.17% 3.64% 6.741 6.80% 6.60%
11.65% 3.68% 4.33% 7.051 8.28% 7.90% 3.91% 3.35% 0.91% 0.44%
3.41% 1.67% 0.16% 7.05% 1.39% 0.00% 2.74% 0.001 0.00% 0.00%
16.44% 11.901 17.61% 14.24% 13.36% 10.85% 12.96% 6.121 5.37% 3.55%
36.491 24.31% 26.51% 39.41% 30.98% 20.92% 23.251 16.21% 13.09% 10.60%
Hard Costs
Site Work/Found. 13.681 24.441 21.21% 22.84% 17.741 15.98% 9.72%
Above Gr. Const. 49.84% 51.25% 52.27% 37.75% 51.27% 63.101 67.03%
3.84% 4.95%
2.201 2.48%
1.46% 1.65%
16.391 3.671
23.89% 12.76%
10.40% 9.99% 14.41% 23.82% 25.851
73.39% 76.92% 74.99% 52.29% 61.40%
63.51% 75.69% 73.49% 60.591 69.02% 79.081 76.75% 83.79% 86.91% 89.40% 76.11% 87.241
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.001100.00%
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Kaiser Report
Total
Exhibit 5-5: Above Ground Construction
Cost per Net Square Foot
Adjusted to Boston, April 1989
Kaiser Prefab.
Kaiser Stick
Chicago Modular
Chicago Open Panel
Chicago Stick
Boston Modular (modular)
Wayland Street (modular)
Bradford Estates (modular)
Franklin Homes (stick)
Nuestra Comunidad (open panel)
Champlain Circle (modular)
Urban Edge (modular) i
32.26
1.00
* $~4.~$&~4, :~'. ~ t.. 's3s~..
* ....4.. 50.03
//ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff)63.66
58.3
49.3
41.69
43
36.18
49.37
44.74
50.99
I-- -- I I I I I I I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
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3
a. Off Site versus On Site Costs
The cost of above ground construction consists of off-site construction and on-site construction.
It is important to note the assumptions regarding the classification of components as on-site versus
off-site construction. Please see Exhibit 5-6 for the on site versus off site components of above
ground construction cost.
The Kaiser study did not include an on-site component for the modular construction. It is not
possible to build modular units without some on site construction. The Chicago study assumed that
for modular units, 75% of the construction off site. For the Boston case studies, the off site
component for modular construction ranged from 61% to 84% of total above ground construction
costs.
The Chicago study estimated on site construction to be $12.67 per square foot. Of the Boston
case studies, the developments with lowest cost for on site construction were the modular
developments with experienced contractors: Champlain Circle, Boston Modular and Wayland Street
with costs of $7.24, $9.47 and $10.91 per net square foot respectively. Bradford Estates had highest
on-site construction cost, $17.14 per square foot. This was the first job of its size that the contractor
had done, and he had not yet established good contacts with subcontractors in the area. Also it was
the first time the manufacturer was building the particular design. The first units were not attached
properly during transportation and the contractor had to repair the damages at the on-site.
2. Site Work/Foundations
The cost of site work and foundations depends primarily on the nature of the site, for example,
whether it has ledge or other foundations. The cost also largely depends on the existence of a
basement. Please see Exhibit 5-7 for a comparison of site work and foundation costs for the different
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cases. The most expensive site work cost was for Franklin Homes at $26,100 per unit. This can be
attributed to ledge on the site. The second largest cost was $23,400 per unit at the Nuestra
Comunidad development. Although they did not have a basement, they hired a contractor that had
never set foundations before. Several of the foundations had to be taken out and poured again
The lowest cost of foundations was $8,278 per unit for the Boston Modular Homes
development. Some of the savings can be attributed to the higher floor area to footprint ratio
achieved with a triple decker. Had the development been a duplex, the cost of site work and
foundations would have been approximately 50% higher, or $12,000 per unit.
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EXHIBIT 5-6: ABOVE GROUND CONSTRUCTION -- N SITE VERSUS OFF SITE COSTS
Urban Chaeolain Nuestra Franklin Bradford Wayland Boston
Edge Circle Comunidad Homes Estates Street Modular
Open
Modular Modular Panel Stick Modular Modular Modular
Percent of
Off Site
On Site
Dollars Per
Off Site
On Site
Above Ground Construction
Chicaqo Study
Open
Kaiser Report
Stick Panel Modular Stick Prefab
781 84% 26% 0% 61% 74% 81% 0% 24% 75%
22% 16% 74% 100 39% 26% 19% 100% 76% 25%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100
Square Foot
39.71 37.50 12.67 0.00 26.56 30.78 39.82 0.00 15.17 37.36
11.28 7.24 36.70 36.18 17.14 10.91 9.47 58.30 48.49 12.67
50.99 44.74 49.37 36.18 43.71 41.69 49.30 58.30 63.66 50.03
0% 100%
100% 0%
100% 100%
0.00 32.26
31.00 0.00
31.00 32.26
Net Sqft. 15,332 18,900
Dollars Per Unit
Off Site 38,049 33,750 15,397
On Site 10,808 6,517 44,585
48,858 40,267 59,982
12,150 22,680 32,040 3,120 17,370 1064 1,064 1,040 1,000 1,000
0 35,462 32,015 46,114 0 16,140 38,854 0
43,186 22,886 11,347 10,971 62,027 51,590 13,178 31,003
32,262
0
43,186 58,348 43,362 57,084 62,027 67,730 52,032 31,003 32,262
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Exhibit 5-7:
Adjusted
Site Work
to Boston,
Cost per Unit
April 1989
Kaiser Prefab.
Kaiser Stick
Chicago Modular
Chicago Open Panel
Chicago Stick
Boston Modular (modular)
Wayland Street (modular)
Bradford Estates (modular)
Franklin Homes (stick)
Nuestra Comunidad (open panel)
Champlain Circle (modular)
Urban Edge (modular)
5000
S79,998
V 8,792
8792
8,278
z
* .- * *~: *..-** ~ ~*a y~> . '~
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26,124
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3,582
14,124
10,982
20,191
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B. Soft Costs
The soft costs include four cost components: predevelopment, financing, marketing, and
management/overhead/general conditions. All three studies show that the soft costs are higher for
stick built construction than for modular or open panel construction. The Kaiser study reports soft
costs for a prefabricated house and for a stick built house as 13% and 24% of the total development
cost respectively.. The Chicago study shows soft costs for a modular house of 11% for an open panel
house 13% and for a stick built house 16%. The data collected in Boston shows soft costs for
modular construction to range from 20% to 38% while soft costs for the open panel and the stick
built construction are 26% and 39% respectively. It is important to note that land and profits,
normally included in soft costs, would increase the influence of soft costs as a percent of total
development cost for all types of construction.
One of the primary reasons soft costs are higher for stick built construction is that many of the
cost components are adversely affected by an increase in the time of construction. Under equivalent
project management experience, stick built construction takes longer than modular construction.
Therefore, the interest charges, project management, overhead, and general conditions expenses are paid
for a longer period of time.
The data collected in Boston had consistently higher soft costs for a type of construction
compared to the other two studies. The following is a comparison among the three studies of the
individual components of soft cost.
1. Predevelopment
The predevelopment fees for both types of construction in the Kaiser report were less than
$2,700. Predevelopment fees in the Chicago study ranged from $4,600 to $6,000, depending on the
type of construction. The Boston case studies had predevelopment fees ranging from $1,500 to
$12,700. The relatively low predevelopment cost of the Kaiser study can be attributed to the fact
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that the study was for a suburban development in 1968. The regulation, legal fees, and architectural
review for this study would not be expected to be significant. Please see Exhibit 5-8 for a
comparison of the predevelopment costs in the different studies.
The predevelopment costs in the Boston Case studies were primarily determined by legal and
architectural costs. In the cases with high predevelopment costs, the architectural and legal fees were
high. Exhibit 5-9 shows the percent contribution of architectural, legal, and other fees to the
predevelopment cost.
Architectural and legal fees comprised in the minimum case 65% of the predevelopment cost.
The two cases with the highest architecture and engineering fees, Franklin Homes and Bradford
Estates, underwent an extensive community approval process. In the Franklin Homes case, the high
architectural costs resulted from the need for two designs, one with the adjacent city parcel and one
without. To obtain the city parcel, the developers needed community support. In the end, Franklin
Homes built as of right without the city parcel.
In the case of Bradford Estates, $1,600 of the $5,500 architecture and engineering costs were
attributed to unexpected underground conditions. The architecture fees, however, were still high,
approximately $3,900 per unit. It is interesting to note that the same contractor built Wayland
Street and Bradford Estates. Bradford Estates, however, had two critical differences: 1) it was part
of a competition for city owned land and 2) the design was not a standard design for the manufacturer.
The developer needed to convince the Public Facilities Department their design was superior.
Franklin Homes had high legal fees. A large portion of the legal cost resulted from litigation
with the first contractor. Also, since this was the developer's first development, he needed more
legal counsel than normally necessary.
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The very low predevelopment costs for Wayland Street $1,500 was the result of several factors
favorable to the developers. The manufacturer provided the architectural services for standard designs.
The legal fees were minimal because the developers were lawyers and did most of the work
themselves. The rest of the predevelopment services were provided by the contractor, Boston
Modular, who acquired all the permits to ensure that there were no complications with permits when
the modules arrived. The cost of the project manager's time during the predevelopment phase is
accounted for in project management.
2. Financing
The per unit financing charges in the Kaiser report are the same for both the stick built and the
prefabricated construction . This would not be expected to be true since the prefabricated unit should
have a shorter construction period, and thus a shorter financing period. The Chicago study does have a
lower per unit financing cost component for modular construction but the projected savings are not
observed in the Boston data. This is most likely attributable to their overly optimistic period for
construction. The Boston data shows the financing component to contribute between $2,900 and
$11,400 to the total cost of the unit. Please see Exhibit 5-10 for a comparison of the financing cost
in the studies. Urban Edge had the highest financing cost per unit of the Boston case studies. It
reflects extraordinary interest payments while modular units were (unexpectedly) stored over 1 year.
Also, both of the developments that had high per unit financing costs, Urban Edge and Bradford
Estates, had difficulty finding families to qualify to buy the units. The next chapter explains impact
of development duration on the financing component.
3. Marketing
The marketing cost was assumed to -be zero in the Chicago study, based on the premise that
there would be no difficulty in selling affordable housing units. It is clear from the Boston case
studies that this is not necessarily the case. Please see Exhibit 5-11 for a summary of the marketing
cost component for the three studies.
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The marketing costs varied widely from development to development. With the exception of
Franklin Homes, developers assumed the responsibility of marketing in the Boston case studies. Only
Wayland Street had no marketing cost, because they presold their units to the Boston Housing
Authority. The developers of Franklin Homes hired brokers to sell the units. This cost contributed
approximately $6,700 to the final cost of each unit. In addition, the developers spent approximately
$1,400 per unit for marketing.
For the cases, that had restrictions on sales, it was difficult to find families that qualified for
to buy the house and qualified for a mortgage. The marketing costs for the cases where the developers
did the marketing in house, the marketing costs are a conservative estimate of marketing costs since
some of the management and overhead costs associated with marketing are captured in the
management/general conditions/overhead category.
4. Management
The management costs vary widely from study to study. The Kaiser report shows all the saving
for prefab reflected in the management cost. The stick built house had a management cost of $9,700
per unit and the modular house had a management cost of $1,900 per unit. The Chicago study showed
the management component less for prefabricated than for stick construction but the savings were less
dramatic. Please see Exhibit 5-12 for a comparison of the management costs for the different studies.
The Boston studies however, varied widely. In general they did not show the management cost
to be s for premanufactured housing than for the stick built construction. This is primarily because
the premanufactured projects did not necessarily take shorter to construct than the stick built case.
The increased time of construction in the modular cases can be attributed to the lack of experience of
the construction managers. In the three cases where there was an experience construction manager,
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Champlain Circle, Wayland Street, and Boston Modular, the management costs were $9,400, $7,500
and $11,000 respectively compared with the $16,300 of the Franklin Homes case.
Summary
Generally, the soft cost to hard cost ration for the Boston case studies was greater than for the
Chicago study and the Kaiser report. Compared with the Boston data, the Chicago study and the
Kaiser report underestimated the financing, marketing and management costs for the development
using modular construction. The management and financing costs were also lower than the Boston
case study for the stick built construction. The soft costs for modular construction were between
21% and 36% of the total development cost in the Boston case studies. They were estimated at 10%
and 13% in the Chicago study and the Kaiser report respectively.
The lowest development cost from the Boston case studies were for Wayland Street, Champlain
Circle, and Boston Modular Homes developments . Each of these used modular construction and had
experienced construction managers. These three cases also had the lowest soft costs. of the seven case
studies
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Exhibit 5-8: Predevelopment Cost per Unit
Adjusted to Boston, April 1989
Kaiser Prefab.
Kaiser Stick
Chicago Modular
Chicago Open Panel
Chicago Stick
Boston Modular (modular)
Wayland Street (modular)
Bradford Estates (modular)
Franklin Homes (stick)
Nuestra Comunidad (open panel)
Champlain Circle (modular)
Urban Edge (modular)
2,603
2,278
4,581
5,991
5,701
3 ,100
p1,490
9,056
12,658
5,069
5,552
S4,890
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000
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EXHIBIT 5-9: DISAGGREGATED PREDEVLOPMENT FEES
Arch./Enoineerinq
Leoal
Other
Arch/Eng
Leqal
Other
Urban Chamolain Nuestra Franklin Bradford Wayland Boston
Edoe Circle Comunidad Hoses Estates Street Modular
1,422 1,904 2,688 5,066 5,543 0 1,667
2,102 2.686 734 5,128 2,392 1,000 500
1.366 962 1,647 2,464 1,121 490 933
4,890 5,552 5,069 12,658 9,056 1,490 3,100
Urban Champlain Nuestra Franklin Bradford Wavland Boston
Edoe Circle Comunidad Homes Estates Street Modular
29% 34% 53% 40% 61% 0% 54%
43% 48% 14% 41% 26% 67% 16%
28% 17% 32% 19% 12% 33% 30%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Exhibit 5-10: Financing Cost
Adjusted to Boston, April
Kaiser Prefab.
Kaiser Stick
Chicago Modular
Chicago Open Panel
Chicago Stick
Boston Modular (modular)
Wayland Street (modular)
Bradford Estates (modular)
Franklin Homes (stick)
Nuestra Comunidad (open panel)
Champlain Circle (modular)
Urban Edge (modular)
0 2000
1302
-E 1302
308
805
2833
3333
5431
9420
8062
4964
2893
17
4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
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per Unit
1989
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Exhibit 5-11: Marketing Cost per Unil
Adjusted to Boston, April 1989
Kaiser Prefab. 868
Kaiser Stick 868
Chicago Modular 0
Chicago Open Panel 0
Chicago Stick 0
Boston Modular (modular) gg j j 2333
Wayland Street (modular) 0
Bradford Estates (modular) ;'@ @ 1583
Franklin Homes (stick) 8070
Nuestra Comunidad (open panel) 180
Champlain Circle (modular) i 1309
Urban Edge (modular) iZ 3346
0 1 I I I 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000
Exhibit 5-12:
Management/Overhead/General Conditions
Cost per Unit
Adjusted to Boston, April 1989
Kaiser Prefab.
Kaiser Stick
Chicago Modular
Chicago Open Panel
Chicago Stick
Boston Modular (modular)
Wayland Street (modular)
Bradford Estates (modular)
Franklin Homes (stick)
Nuestra Comunidad (open panel)
Champlain Circle (modular)
Urban Edge (modular)
5000
t-1931
9720
2465
4731
5169
11033
15201
16293
20213
I-N 2%.X.:9351
1611
10000 15000 20000 25000
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THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT PERIOD ON COSTS
Managing cost requires mitigating the effect of time overruns. There are three periods in
housing development: the predevelopment period, the construction period and the sales period. It is
necessary to control the duration of each period in order to prevent cost overruns. Some of the aspects
that influence the duration of the development are controllable, but others are not.
In the case studies, community opposition, inexperienced construction management and changes
in underwriting guidelines proved to be the three most important factors in increasing costs. These
three factors have an impact on cost due to influence on the duration of development, though not all
their impact on costs is related to period of duration. Community opposition may affect project
management and interest charges through an increase in period, though it also may have adverse affects
on legal fees, architectural and engineering fees. The level of experience in construction management
affects the duration of the construction period impacting the financing and management components.
Changes in underwriting guidelines affect duration. of the sales period, therefore affecting marketing
cost, project management, and interest charges.
The financing and the management costs are the two most strongly affected cost components by
increases in the duration of development. The following sections analyze the impact of development
duration on the financing and management costs.
Financing
The cost of financing developments varied widely. The financing cost is comprised of bank fee,
points, preferred lenders fees etc. but the majority of the cost is determined by the interest charges
paid on the construction loan. The highest average cost of financing was in the Urban Edge
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CHAPTER VI:
development at $11,417 per unit. The lowest cost of financing was $2,893 per unit for the Champlain
Circle development. The following is a model of the major factors affecting the interest charges.
1. Model Description
The financing component can be separated into three categories: the cost of financing land
before construction, the cost of financing the construction period, and the cost of financing after
construction is completed until the unit is sold. The interest payments are most sensitive to the
length of time from construction completion to sale. There are several variables that affect the
interest cost:
1) Cost of land
2) Cost of development
3) Subsidy used to offset development costs
4) Duration of construction
5) Duration of period from construction completion to closing
6) Average interest rate
7) Average percent of loan taken out
Financing Land: In the model, the cost of financing land is the full cost of land times the average
interest rate during the period carried until construction begins.
Financing Construction: As a rule of thumb, the interest payments during construction of housing
built at the site is generally half the cost of development carried for the construction period. The
average percent of the loan taken out during this period is half due to the scheduling of draws from
the bank. For example, a development that takes oneyear from groundbreaking to certificate of
occupancy at a 10% average interest rate will have $5,000 in interest payme,.s ($100,000 x .1 X .5).
For a development using modular construction with experienced contractors such as Champlain
Circle or the Boston Modular Development, the duration of construction is six months, four months
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before the modules arrive and 2 months for button up. The schedule of payments is less evenly
distributed than stick built construction. The schedule of payments used by Boston Modular Homes
is 10% deposit, 5% after excavation, 15% after the concrete is finished, 60% when the modules arrive,
and 10% at completion. Again assuming the development cost is $100,000, the interest payments are a
total of $1000 for the first four months ($30,000 at a yearly interest rate of 10% for four months).
The interest rate for the months subsequent to setting the units is $750 per month ($90,000 at a
yearly interest rate of 10%). The total interest payment in this case, excluding the sales period is
$2,500. This shows the "percent out" to be 50%.
This analysis shows that the savings in interest payments are a result of savings in the
construction period; halving the time (one year to six months) results in half the interest payments
($5,000 to $2,500). If the construction manager is not experienced, then there is a higher risk of an
increase in the button up period. If the duration of the button up time increases to more than 5
months, then the savings in interest payments over conventional construction will not be achieved.
Exhibits 6-1 and 6-2 show the "percent out" of a modular development as button up time increases
assuming two and four months respectively for site work before modules are set.
For developments with subsidies, the portion of the subsidy that can be used to pay off the
construction costs is subtracted from the total development costs for calculation of interest
payments.
Financing During Sales Period: The cost of financing after construction and before sale is the full
construction cost per unit, minus deductible subsidies, carried from- construction completion to
closing. The cost of financing is most sensitive to the duration of this period because the full cost of
development must be carried throughout the period.
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EXHIBIT 6-1:
IMPACT OF BUTTON--LIP DURATION ON AVG. PERCENT OF LOAN TAKEN OUT
Assumpt i r:'ns:
Comnstruc-ticin cost paid before settin 
C:nstruct i. o#n c:cst paid a t sett i n
r:cnstructiin duration before modules set:-
30%
60%
4 months
Duratio:'n of
But t on-up "Percent
(months) Out"
1 0.42
2 0. 50
3 C0. 56
4 0. 60
5 0.63
6 0.66
7 0. 68
8 0.70
9 0.72
10 0. 73
EXHIBIT 6-2:
IMPACT OF BUTTON-UP DURATION ON AVG. F'ERCENT OF LOAN TAKEN OUT
AssLmpt i ons:
Construction cost paid before setting
Construction cost paid at setting
Construction duration before modules set:
30%
60%
2 mcnths
Duration of
Button-up "Percent
(months) Out"
1 0.50
2 (0. 60
3 0.66
4 0.70
5 0.73
6 0.75
7 0.'77
8 0.78
9 0. 79
1. 80
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2. Application of Model to the Seven Case Studies
With these assumptions it is possible to disaggregate the cost of financing to discrete periods of
development. The impact of time overruns on financing cost can be identified with this level of
disaggregation. Exhibit 6-3 is a breakdown of the interest payments by period for each of the case
studies. All costs are in current dollars, (not adjusted to April 1989).
a. Urban Edge:
The most striking impact of increased development duration can be seen in the Urban Edge case.
Urban Edge had the highest finance cost per unit as well as the largest development time overrun. A
combination of factors resulted in the dramatic increase in financing cost for the Urban Edge
development of which two were most critical. The first was the assumption that the community
would support the developments and subsequently the developer would obtain zoning approvals. The
second was a change in underwriting guidelines for permanent mortgages that reduced the window of
eligibility for buyers. Families that previously qualified for permanent mortgages for the Urban
Edge units no longer qualified after the change in underwriting
guidelines.
The interest payments for the Urban Edge development averaged $9,000 per unit, and increase
from the projected $1,400 per unit. The interest payment model in Exhibit 7-1 divides this cost into
three primary categories: 1) storing the modules for two of the structures for 14 and 18 months, 2)
construction of the units, and 3) the sales period. The model shows approximately 23%, $34,000 of
the interest payments financed the storage of the two structures.
The second major factor influencing the cost of interest payments was a change in underwriting
guidelines in the secondary mortgage market in October 1986. The seven of the eight units in the first
two structures were sold before the underwriting guidelines changed. The two bedroom unit at
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Forest Hills took three years to sell; it cost Urban Edge almost $15,000 in interest for this unit
alone. The cost of financing during the sales period at Glen Road, Granada Park and at Boylston
Street was $2,840, $26,800 and $13,500 respectively. If the units had been presold, there would be no
cost during this period. The difficulty in finding families to qualify cost Urban Edge $58,000. The
combination of these two factors cost Urban Edge $92,000, or $5,750 per unit in interest payments
alone.
b. Wayland Street:
The Wayland Street development had over a two fold increase in their interest payments. The
original projection of $1,633 per unit was based upon a four month construction period and no sales
period after that. The actual cost was $5,400 per unit. The construction period increased by one month
but the most significant portion of the financing cost was financing the finished units for three
months while waiting for the zoning approval. This cost approximately $10,000 for the three units
or $3,333 per unit of the interest payments.
c. Bradford Estates:
Bradford Estates also had a very large cost of financing per unit, $9,255. Thirty percent of this
cost was paid in bank fees and points. The remainder of the cost was interest payments split between
the financing the loan during construction period and the financing during the sales period. Although
the underwriting guidelines from the secondary mortgage market had already changed when Bradford
Estates began construction. Their difficulties in finding buyers that qualified cost them
approximately $66,000 or $2,750 per unit. This is based on a cost of approximately $1,000 per unit
per month. It took Bradford Estates over one year to sell some of the units. They averaged 2.75
months per unit.
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d. Franklin Homes:
The cost of financing Franklin Homes was composed of two categories, land financing and
construction financing. The financing of land in this case was significant because of the long period
between buying the land and groundbreaking. The financing of land was approximately 14% of the
financing cost. The interest payments during the construction period cost approximately $5,500 per
unit.
e. Nuestra Comunidad:
The construction of five duplexes developed by Nuestra Comunidad were considerably over
schedule. The subsidy that was used to pay construction costs helped mitigate the effect of increased
term of construction financing. The subsidy did not however mitigate all the effects. The time
overruns of the second and third duplexes cost Nuestra Comunidad approximately $27,400 in interest
payments. The last two duplexes cost $80,000 more to construct than projected. The interest rate
was also increased for the last two duplexes. Timely construction offset these increases resulting in a
financing cost of $2,700 per unit.
f. Champlain Circle:
The financing costs for Champlain Circle were $2,290 per unit. Almost $500 of this cost was
spent on bank fees. Of the interest payments, 68% was spent during construction and 32% was spent
during sales.
g. Boston Modular:
The interest payments for the Boston Modular Homes devtelopment were $3,000 per unit. All
the cost of financing was spent during the construction period. Although the units are not yet sold,
the Public Facilities department will pay any of the interest payments until closing. With a 13%
interest rate, it will cost them approximately $950 per unit per month in interest payments until
closing.
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EXHIBIT 6-3: DISA66RE6ATED INTEREST PAYMENTS BY DEVELOPMENT
Development Deductible Percent Term
Cost Subsidy Out (Months)
Average
Interest
Rate
Cost
Per
Month *
Percent of
Financing
Total Cost
Urban Edge
Storing Period 3rd Structure
Storing Period 4th Structure
Construction Ist Structure
2nd Structure
3rd Structure
4th Structure
Sales First Stucture
Sale Second Structure
Sale Third Structure
Sale Fourth Structure
Champlain Circle
Construction
Sales Cost
Nuestra Comunidad
First Duplex
Second Duplex
Third Duplex
Fourth Duplex
Fifth Duplex
Franklin Homes
Financing Land and Predevel.
Construction
Bradford Estates
Construction Financing
Sales total
Wayland Street
Financing Land
Financing Construction
Waiting for Approval/Sales
Boston Modular
Financing Construction
e Cost per month per unit
127,000
127,000
279,219
282,028
364,624
379,397
276,419
284,757
392,414
373,225
0
0
78,207
78,207
78,207
78,207
78,207
78,207
92,471
92,471
100%
100%
68%
63%
66%
66%
100%
100%
100%
100%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
11.00%
11.00%
11.00%
1,058
1,058
1,139
1,070
1,575
1,657
413
473
687
643
14,817
19,050
12,530
9,631
15,753
16,565
14,866
2,840
26,807
13,511
146,370 100% 146,506 0%
1,243,239 245,700 50% 6 . 11.50% 4,780 28,679 75%
1,243,239 245,700 100% 21 11.50% 455 9,560 25%
38,239 100%
165,229
217,096
234,564
242,465
242,965
215,800
1,912,944
23,626
40,585
38,156
28,737
28,737
11.00%
11. 00%
11.00%
13.00%
13.00%
649
809
900
1,158
1,160
3,245 8%
12,135 29%
15,303 36%
5,788 14%
5,802 14%
42,274 100%
0 100% 9 11.00% 1,978 17,804 14%
0 50% 11 12.00% 9,565 105,212 86%
123,015 100%
2,599,360 360,000 63% 9 10.00% 11,757 105,810 64%
2,683,360 360,000 100% 66 11.00% 887 58,568 36%
164,378 100%
25,000
221,162
231,162
38,087
41,364
118,807
151,087
13.00% 271 0 0%
13.00% 1,198 5,990 37%
13.00% 2,504 10,017 63%
16,007 100% 16,293 -2%
1,277,441 65,000 50% '' 13.00% 6,567 45,972 100% 45,000
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Actual Percent
Cost of Change
Interest
Management/General Conditions/Overhead
This category includes both the developer and contractor project manager salaries, project
administration, liability insurance, contingency, general conditions and security. The cost per unit
(adjusted to April 1989) ranged from an average of $7,500 per unit in the Wayland Street
development to an average of $20,200 per unit in the Nuestra Comunidad development. The duration
of the development period played a role in the cost of management.
The highest management costs were for developments that had a long duration of development.
For example, the first two structures in the Urban Edge development had a per unit management cost
of approximately $11,500. The second two structures had a per unit management cost of $20,700.
Had it not been necessary to store the units, Urban Edge could have saved $9,200 per unit in
management costs.
Another example where time increased the management costs was the Nuestra Comunidad
development. The last two structures cost Nuestra approximately $12,000 per unit in management
costs; they took approximately five months to construct. The first three duplexes cost Nuestra
$25,000 per unit in financing cost, they ranged from 5, 15 and 17 months to construct. The first
duplex although short in duration had very high overhead costs for the contractor. Nuestra could have
saved approximately $13,000 per unit had they had experienced construction managers. The costs
disaggregated by structure and adjusted to April 1989 are in Appendix C.
The Franklin Homes development cost the developer $16,300 in management costs. The
development took two years from start to.finish; the construction period was approximately one year
and the predevelopment and sales period was another year.
130
The lowest costs for the management component were achieved for those projects where an
experienced contractor had primary responsibility for the development as in the case of Champlain
Circle, Wayland Street, and Boston Modular. The Champlain Circle development cost the $9,400 in
management fees; the duration of the construction was six months. The Wayland Street development
and the Boston Modular development took five months and seven months to construct respectively.
The costs for their management components were $7,500 and $11,000 respectively. In all three of
these cases, the contractor had primary responsibility for the project. The management costs incurred
by the developer were minimized.
It would be interesting to see if a reduction in construction period reduced the cost of security
and vandalism. Unfortunately, the data is not sufficiently detailed for this analysis. Although all
developers had a line item for security, many of the overruns for this category were accounted in other
line items such as general conditions.
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CHAPTER VII: Conclusions, Recommendations and Future Work
In this chapter, the key conclusions obtained from the case studies are summarized. Then, both
practical and policy recommendations are presented and possibilities for future work discussed.
Summary of Conclusions
1. The data collected in the seven case studies shows that modular construction provides no
decrease in hard costs, but a potential decrease in soft costs, particularly in the financing and
management components. The savings in financing costs during the construction period can only be
achieved if the on site construction (button up) is completed within five months from the time the
unit is set. The management of construction, general conditions, and overhead costs are related to the
duration of the construction period. The duration of a stick built development of 20 units is
approximately one year. A development of the same size but using modular construction can be
finished in about six months, therefore the management component for the construction period can be
reduced by about 50% using modular construction.
2. The duration of the construction period is most directly related to the experience of the
contractor managing the development. "Experienced" is defined as a contractor who has built new
construction in the area (so that he knows the subcontractors), and has previously built a development
of a comparable scale to that of the proposed development. It is preferable if the contractor used
modular construction before. If not, he should mitigate the risk of a cost overrun by having the
manufacturer set the brelse.
The management cost component, however, is not the result of only the construction period.
The predevelopment and the marketing periods must be included in calculating management costs.
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Both of these periods are independent of the type of construction. In Boston, the predevelopment
period lasts approximately one year. In some of the cases, the sales period lasted over three years.
3. The Kaiser Report and the Chicago study concluded that modular construction provides an
overall savings in development cost. However, when compared with the results from the data
collected in Boston, the soft costs (predevelopment fees, financing, marketing, project management,
overhead, and general conditions) were underestimated in the Kaiser Report and the Chicago study for
the cases with modular construction. The Kaiser Report and the Chicago study showed that soft costs
cost approximately $7,300 and $6,700 per unit respectively. The soft costs for the Boston
developments using modular construction ranged from $13,200 to $36,600 per unit.
4. For the data collected in Boston, the soft costs, excluding land and profit, were at a minimum
20% of the total development cost for the modular and more for the open panel and the stick built
developments, 26% and 39% respectively. With land and profit, the share of soft costs of total
development cost will increase. The total cost of the seven Boston developments ranged from
$68,721 to $114,748 per unit or $66 to $102 per net square foot.
Development Cost for Boston Development
Based on the case studies, Exhibit 7-1 shows is the potential development cost per unit for a
development using modular construction and one using conventional construction in Boston. The
assumptions are as follow:
1. The development has 20 units, 1,000 net square feet each.
2. Based on the case studies, predevelopment costs for developments that did not have excessive
public review or extensive litigation were approximately $5,000 ($2,000 architecture and engineering
services, $1,500 legal fees, $1,500 other fees.). This estimate does not include extensive revisions of
architectural plans
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3. Marketing costs are based on fees, not commissions. Units are presold, therefore there is no
marketing period. Costs during the marketing period after the construction is complete, would be
approximately $900 per unit per month ($750 in interest charges, $100 in marketing staff, and $50 for
security).
4. For five of the seven case studies, predevelopment duration was one year. Assuming management
($40,000 salary) works half time on the project, the cost of management for the predevelopment
period is approximately $1,000 per unit.
5. Based on the case studies, management costs during construction costs approximately $350 per
month during construction; general conditions, overhead and security cost approximately $750 per
month per unit during construction.
6. Construction duration is six months for modular and one year for stick built construction.
7. Interest rate of 12% during construction.
8. No land cost.
9. Site work based on two story, single family townhouses, generally should not be estimated at less
than $10,000 per unit. If the buildings are triple deckers then some savings per unit can be achieved
because the the same amount of site work is divided among three units rather than two..
Exhibit 7-1: Development Costs Per Unit
Modular Conventional
Construction Construction
Predevelopmet $5,000 $5,000
Financing $3,000 $6,000
Marketing $1,000 $1,000
Management $7,600 $14,200
Site Work $10,000 $10,000
Above Ground Const. $45,000 $40,000
$71,600 $76,200
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B. Policy Recommendations
1. How to Use Subsidies
Grant subsidies can be used in three ways: 1) in subsidizing downpayment for the buyer, 2)
reducing the construction loan and 3) assuming interest payments during the marketing period.
The marketing of homes to first time homebuyers below 80% of the SMSA median income has
proven to be a difficult if not impossible task given the underwriting guidelines stated by the
secondary mortgage market. The MHFA has structured a program so they assume some of the
liability for defaulted mortgages. In this way they are also able to relax some of the qualification
guidelines, in particular the downpayment. The mortgages require a 5% downpayment rather than the
conventional 10%. Half of the five percent can be donated, approximately $2,250. This strategy is
presently used in the Buildable Lots Program.
Some of the subsidy should be used to reduce the loan during construction. A $10,000 grant
during construction will decrease the cost of interest payments per unit approximately $2,500. This
grant can be used at sale to reduce the cost of the unit by the grant value and the interest payment.
If the city is imposing restrictions on marketing, then the city should also assume the risk of
the interest payments during the marketing period. Developers are becoming reluctant to build
housing on speculation, especially in a soft market. To mitigate the risk to the developer of slow
sales, the city should assume the interest payments after construction is complete.
2. Developer Team
In order to keep construction costs low, it is important to have an experienced construction
manager on the development team.
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The city of Boston has actively promoted modular construction. The use of modular
construction has been a learning experience for the city as well as the developers. It is important that
one program does not try to combine too many new goals. Some Community Development
Organizations sponsored by under the New Construction Initiative had not built new construction
previously. Because of the negative impact on development costs, particularly soft costs, resulting
from inexperienced management, it is important to have an experienced construction manager on the
development team. Of the three development in the sponsored by the NCI (Urban Edge, Champlain
Circle and Nuestra Comunidad), only the public/private partnership with an experienced construction
manager maintained their schedule and their costs. It is important to also note that a developer
experienced with rehabilitation of existing buildings will not necessarily be able to manage new
construction.
D. Recommendations for Practice
1. Never order modular units before the building permits are issued.
2. Manage the construction only if experienced with new construction. Otherwise get a fixed price
construction contract with a contractor who has previous experience with new construction on the
scale of the proposed development.
3. Do not underestimate the button-up component for modular construction. It requires the same
level of organization as in stick built construction. Have a superintendent on site to organize the
subcontractors.
4. Phase construction so buyers will have a model from which to make their purchase decision.
Presell units in subsequent phases.
136
5. In the city of Boston, most of the "good" sites have been built on; therefore, the developer should
anticipate potential problems. Such problems often arise in the subsurface conditions. Negotiate an
agreement to not be at risk for unusual underground conditions
Future Work
1. As interest rates rise, the cost advantage of a shorter construction period (provided by modular
construction) increases. Likewise, as labor costs rise in an area, modular construction will have more
of an impact Further work is recommended to determine the sensitivity of modular construction costs
to these two parameters.
2. The city created many programs to build new construction -- now they need to reflect on their
successes and failures. To determine the level of success of a given program it is important to collect
information so failures can be traced to particular causes. A possible database of information to keep
track of projects should include costs, time, project management experience,sales data, and marketing
restrictions. If such a database is considered, it may be desirable to expand the categories of cost. The
following are recommended:
A. Land
1. Land Cost
2. Financing of land cost
B. Predevelopment
3. Architecture
4. Legal fees
5. Other Predevelopment Fees
6. Management costs during predevelopment period
7. Overhead Costs during predevelopment period
C. Financing
8. Financing Fees
9. Interest Payments during construction period
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10.
D.
11.
12.
13.
14.
E.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
F.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
G.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
Interest payments paid during sales period
Marketing
Marketing commission
Cost of management attributed to marketing
Marketing fees
Marketing expenses (brochures, advertisements etc.)
Management
Management costs to developer during construction period
Construction management costs
Overhead
General Conditions
Security and Vandalism
Contingency
Site Work/Foundations
Site Clearance
Excavation
Foundations
Utilities
Paving/Driveways
Landscaping
Above Ground Construction
Off Site Construction
Transportation
Crane Costs
Set Crew
On - Site Construction
To effectively evaluate projects, future work should seek to establish a database to track the projects.
3. This study assumed that the cost of a house was a-function of the previous player. For example,
the cost of a house is determined by the cost to the subcontractor plus his profit plus the cost to the
contractor plus his profit plus the cost to the developer.
Some argue, however, that the cost of a house is a function of the cost to the next player rather
than the previous player. This is stating that the price of a house is determined by the market and each
of the players adjust their prices in accordance. The cost of a house becomes a function of its price.
Future work could analyze this relationship through a longitudinal study of contractors and
subcontractors' prices. It would need to include at least two snapshots of contractors',
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Wai Ching Kwan, Public Facilities Department
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Jerry Pachelo, Archdiocese
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APPENDIX A
This appendix explains the various city and state subsidy programs that were used in the cases.
The restrictions associated with each of the subsidies are also included.
LAND SUBSIDY PROGRAMS CITY OF BOSTON
The City of Boston has sponsored many programs over the past few years to increase the housing
stock with new construction. The city has also supported the use of manufactured housing through
their program competitions. The subsidy provided by the city has at a minimum reduces the price of
land. In addition, there are numerous grants and loans that the city will put together to make a
project affordable to families with low and moderate incomes.
New Construction Initiative
The Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency which has since merged into the Public
Facilities Department, sponsored two competitions called the New Construction Initiative. There
were two rounds of this competition. One Request for Proposals was issued in December 1983 and
the other in December 1984. In each round, the city attached a list of City-owned vacant lots that the
applicants could choose for their sites. The city would sell the land to the applicants for $500 per
unit. The goals of the program included:
"provision of affordable homeownership opportunities for moderate income
households, revitalization of NDEA target neighborhoods, development of a
replicable model for constructing affordable manufactured or conventional housing
on vacant lots, provision of opportunities for non-profit sponsors to gain experience
in the use of manufactured housing."
Large Lots Program
The Public Facilities Department has a Large Lots Program. In this program they identify sites
that can be used for housing developments of 8 or more units.
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The PFD "sponsors a program of community participation and review with their development
sites." They hold a community meeting to solicit comments and recommendations from the
community regarding the appropriate use and design requirements for the property. They then draft a
request for proposals reflecting the community concerns. This draft RFP is discussed at the second
community meeting. Only then is the official Request for Proposals issued. The PFD selects
qualified proposals and brings them to a third community meeting. On the basis of community input,
the PFD selects a developer for the parcel.
The designs undergo several design review processes. Depending upon the sources of funding, it
may undergo PFD, MHFA, and/or BRA desing review. If the land is donated or subsidized by the
city, the project must be reviewed by the PFD Design Unit. This design review ensures that the
buildings conform in character to the existing architecture.
Buildable Lots
The Public Facilities Department created the Buildable Lots program in September 1987. It is
part of Project 747, an initiative to build new housing on the 747 buildable parcels that are owned by
the City of Boston. 172 individual development sites are included in the Buildable Lots Program.
The program is designed to
"create housing which is architecturally compatible with other housing in the
neighborhood, will require low maintenance costs, will provide a high quality living
environment, and which is affordable to moderate income families."
The city packages small scattered sites and sends out a Request for Proposal. The program
specifically targets small builders, offering assistance to reduce the "risks costs and tasks" of project
development. If a builder is designated, the city provides the lot at $1, expedites building permits,
zoning and design approvals, and provides marketing assistance to sell the completed condominium
units.
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The Buildable Lots Program has had three rounds of proposals to date. In Round I and Round II
four and six packages were offered respectively. Developers were designated for all six of the Round
II packages; Boston Modular was designated for two of the projects in Round I -- a total of 15 units
on 5 sites. Round RFP was issued in September 1987. The developers were chosen in January of 1988
and construction began in September 1988.
Subsequent to Round I, the Request for Proposals have lots that are grouped by architectural
characteristics so the developer can use the same design for all the lots in the package.
CITY OF BOSTON -- GRANT AND LOAN SUBSIDIES
Community Development Block Grants
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) money has been distributed through several city
programs including the New Construction Initiative, the Neighborhood Development Fund, the Large
Lots Program, Project 747, Loans to Encourage Neighborhood Development (LEND), Neighborhood
Commercial Development Bank, Management Assistance Program (MAP) and the Technical
Assistance Program (TAP). To receive CDBG money there are some standard requirements that are
specified by the federal government. Each of the programs has additional requirements.
The CDBG money must be targeted for low and moderate income families as designated by HUD.
"AHl projects must either benefit low and moderate income Boston residents or prevent or eliminate
slums and blight." Other standard requirements include: (1) at least three vendors submit prices for
any expenditure greater than $2000, (2) at least 10% of the bid price is expended for minority business
enterprise, (3) the wage rates for all contractors and subcontractors are not less than those prevailing
on similar construction in the locality in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act. In addition, the
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general contractor and the subcontractors must have at least 25 percent minority work hours, 10
percent female work hours and 50 percent Boston resident work hours.
The New Construction Initiative
The city had a total of $400,000 of Community Development Block Grant money for each of the
rounds in the New Construction Initiative. They had a goal of two or three developments. There was
a minimum of eight dwelling units per proposal. The maximum was not set, but "applicants
requesting more than $200,000 worth of funds should provide an option for a smaller project
requiring less than $200,000 but including at least eight units." The city stated that preference will
be given to projects where limited equity agreements are proposed by the applicants. This is to ensure
that continues occupancy by low and moderate income households is assured.
The city also specified that "at least 75% of the assisted units must be affordable to and occupied
by households with family incomes below current imoderatei income limits (80% of the median
income)." The rest should be occupied by families with incomes less than the HUD designated median
income.
The payment of funds through the NCI was based on actual development cost. If the
development is reduced, payment is reduced. The unspent contingency was deducted from subsidy
payment. The money was disbursed as a percentage of completed construction. The final payment of
5% is released after a signed purchase and sale agreement and a certificate of occupancy was presented
for all units in the development.
Large Lots Program
The Neighborhood Development Fund distributes CDBG money through the Large Lots Program
on a quarterly basis for housing, commercial and industrial projects. The awards are expected to be in
the form of low interest loans where is can be demonstrated that the project would not be feasible
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without such assistance. The residential real estate development projects must have eight or more
dwelling units and may be carried out by for-profit or non-profit developers.
The CDBG subsidy amount depends upon other financing and the "gap" that the project has. The
Large lots program sets a maximum of $15,000 per unit of direct grant subsidies. The method of
disseminating the monies has changed over time. Before, such as the Bradford Estates, each project
received a certain amount to cover the up front costs, (approximately half). The rest of the money
was released as the sale papers are signed. Now, all the money is paid throughout the construction
process, therefore reducing the amount of the construction loan the developer needs to borrow.
Buildable Lots Program
The Buildable Lots Program disseminates the CDBG money differently from the Large Lots
Program. The program officer retains the money for use at the end of construction. After qualifying
families are identified, their needs are assessed. The money is placed where the family needs it the
most in order to purchase the house. The money may be used to help pay for the downpayment,
closing cost or it may be used to decrease the overall cost of the house, therefore the monthly carrying
cost. The program officer expects to spend no more than an average of $10,000 per unit in CDBG
money.
The marketing assistance includes hiring a non-profit marketing agent and assembling financial
packages for buyers. Financial packages include the state MHFA and HOP programs, CDBG cash
subsidies to write down the prices of units and/or assist with downpayment and closing costs. "With
the available CDBG subsidy and low interest, state-assisted mortgages, units are being sold for as
little as $73,000 with total monthly cost of only $575 - making these units affordable to families
earning $24,000 with at least a 2.5% downpayment. The affordability goal for the Buildable Lots
Program is 50% - 75% low and moderate income, and 25% - 50% for middle income families."
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The LEND Program -- Loans to Encourage Neighborhood Development
The LEND program is a low@interest flexible loan. The maximum loan amount is 50% of
project development costs. The average loan does not exceed $250,000.
"In general, residential new construction is an ineligible activity. However,
neighborhood-based non - profit organizations are eligible to undertake new
construction where PFD deems it necessary or appropriate to meet community
development objectives. In addition, any developer may use LEND funds to acquire
the land on which a new construction project is to be built. In these cases, the
development must provide a minimum of 20% low- and moderate-income housing.
The amount of LEND in a new construction project cannot exceed the percentage of
low- and moderate -income units. For example, if 25% of the units are low and
moderate- income, the LEND loan may be made up to 25% of the total development
costs."
No funds may be used for administrative or operating costs for community development
corporations or non-profit organizations, unless they are mortgageable and direct project expenses,
e.g., for project management or developer fees.
Two types of loans are available through LEND, Real Estate Loans and Small Business Tenant
Loans. Only the Real Estate Loans apply to new housing construction. The Loans offer permanent
mortgages, construction loans, and bridge loans to developers satisfying the LEND project selection
criteria. Eligible uses of LEND funds include real estate acquisition, construction, rehabilitation, and
associated soft costs.
When applying for the loan, details including financial structure, operations, and physical design
are required. The Public Facilities Department will review these aspects as well as development
team experience, project feasibility, marketability, location of project, and its state of readiness for
construction.
Community Based Initiative Programs: Management Assistance Program (MAP)
and Technical Assistance Program (TAP)
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The Public Facilities Department has two financial assistance programs available for nonprofit,
community based development organizations (CDOs). The Management Assistance Program (MAP)
provides financing to CDOs for project managers to implement a specific real estate development
project. The Technical Assistance Program (TAP) provides funding for the initial costs associated
with packaging a specific real estate development project. Eligible costs include appraisals,
architecture, and engineering studies, marketing plans, and options for purchasing land and/or
buildings.
The MAP/TAP Program is funded through CDBG. Site Control/ownership is a prerequisite for
funding for both MAP and TAP except where a CDO is seeking funds to secure an option on the
property. Funding is in the form of a 0% interest loan which is due when permanent financing closes.
The maximum amount available through MAP is $30,000: $28,000 for project management, and
$2,000 for overhead costs. The maximum through the TAP program is $25,000. The maximum
amount available through both programs is $52,000. If the TAP funds are used for contracts of
$10,000 or more, then the service needs to placed out for public bid. Otherwise the regulations
applied to other CDBG funds apply.
The MAP/TAP grants are designed to provide temporary financial assistance to development
projects. If it is determined that the project can support repayment of the grant, then all or a portion
of the MAP/TAP funds will be recaptured at project closeout.
Neighborhood Commercial Development Bank Program
The Neighborhood Commercial Development Bank offers three programs:
1) lower-interest financing
2) loan packaging services
3) limited architectural assistance
to eligible applicants undertaking selected development projects in designated districts.
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The Neighborhood Commercial Development Loan is available for the acquisition and
improvement of commercial, mixed commercial and residential property. The NCDB loans do not as a
general rule exceed $200,000. The interest rate cannot exceed three quarters (3/4) of the bank's prime
rate as of the date of the bank's commitment letter, and can be for a term of 15 years. The interest
rate imayi be readjusted by the lending bank at 3-year intervals. Any increase is limited to three
quarters (3/4) of the increase in the Bank's prime rate.
The PFD's Development Division provides financial counseling to applicants selected for NCDB
loan assistance. PFD's Urban Design Unit, in cooperation with the Development Finance Unit may
provide landscape and architectural assistance to qualifying developers. Architects are available to
prepare floor plans, renderings, bid documents, and other necessary design services to bring the project
to completion. Construction supervision is also provided by the PFD to assure adherence to design
requirements.
An eligible applicants work plan must conform to all aspect of the PFD's established Design
Guidelines. In addition, facade improvements are mandatory for program participation. An applicant
must include exterior improvements in the work plan. If there are any changes to the facade within
two years after project completion, the PFD must issue approval in writing before the work is
started.
MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ENDLOAN PROGRAMS
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) Single Family Division has three programs
developers can apply for to decrease permanent loan interest rates: The Homeownership Opportunity
Program (HOP), General Lending, and New Construction Set-Aside. With the HOP program and the
General Lending program, construction cannot begin prior to MHFA Board approval of the mortgage
application. The Construction Set-Aside Program is for units that have already been built.
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Homeownership Opportunity Program (HOP)
The HOP program has several threshold requirements. A project proposed for HOP financing
must include at least 30 percent of the units affordable to low and moderate income families.
Typically, 25% of the affordable units will be HOP assisted for purchase by eligible first-time
buyers. The HOP assisted units are targeted for households earning 80% or less of the median income
for the area in which the development is located. In addition to the HOP assisted units, 5 to 10% of
the units in the project must be set aside for rental by lower income families. It is expected that
these units will be sold to the local housing authority, which will then rent them out. HOP projects
may contain up to 50% market-priced units as well as up to 20% MHFA financed units.
The interest rate on MHFA-financed units is generally 1% to 2% below conventional rates. The
interest rates on HOP-assisted units generally is 3% below the MHFA rate and 4% - 5% below
conventional rates.
The HOP subsidy lowers the interest rate of the first mortgage by as much as 3% initially. The
subsidy gradually decreases over time until the mortgage interest rate reaches the actual rate of the
MHFA loan at the time the loan was closed. An estimated value of the HOP subsidy is
approximately $13,000 for an average mortgage (ranging 65,000 to 85,000 for a typical HOP unit).
The following is a schedule for the HOP interest rates:
Year 1 to 5 5.4%
Year 6 - 7 6.4%
Year 8 - 9 7.4%
Years 10+ 8.4%
There are certain design restrictions on HOP assisted units. Fifty percent of the HOP assisted
and rental units must have three or more bedrooms. The units must be at least 700 square feet in
order to be considered for HOP funding. Studios and oneTIbedroom units are not eligible for HOP
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assistance. The recommended minimum size for a two bedroom unit is 900 square feet, 3 bedroom
1200 square feet arid 4 bedroom, 1400 square feet.
The MHFA has qualifying guidelines for prospective homebuyers. The homebuyer must be
income eligible, qualify as a first time homebuyer (not have owned a home within the last three
years), have sufficient resources to meet the downpayment and closing cost, and they must be able to
support the carrying cost. The homebuyer must make a downpayment of at least 5% of the purchase
price. They will have to pay the closing costs, usually 4% to 5% of the purchase price. The
homeowner must also meet the underwriting standards of the program.
The standards of the secondary mortgage market are very important to the success of the MHFA
program. In October 1986, the secondary mortgage market changed the maximum percentage of stable
gross monthly income a family could spend on housing from 31% to 28%. (Housing expenses are
defined as principal, interest, property tax, primary mortgage insurance and hazard insurance.
Therefore, for the same priced unit, the developers needed to find a family earning a higher income
than previously -- approximately $3,000 to $4000 in additional family income. This requirement
imposed hardship on many developers who had purchasers that were to pay 31% of their income but
were now disqualified..
There are also resale restrictions of HOP assisted units. If a unit is sold for less than 85% of its
appraised value then the resale will be limited to the same percentage. For units selling between 85
and 100% of their appraised value, the MHFA will waive the resale restriction. Also, at resale, the
HOP subsidy needs to be repaid. The lesser of the actual subsidy or 20% of the allowed appreciation
must be repaid.
151
MHFA General Lending
The HOP financing is a combination of a low interest MHFA loan and a subsidy to reduce the
interest rate carrying cost for the initial years. The MHFA General lending program has the same
requirements as the HOP program except there is no recapture of the subsidy.
The MHFA raises money for its mortgage programs through the periodic sale of mortgage
revenue bonds to private investors. The interest rate on mortgages to borrowers is a reflection of the
interest rate MHFA must pay to investors buying the bonds. The investors don't have to pay taxes on
the income earned on those bonds. This savings will reflect over time the to the returns on mortgage
backed securities and other investments of similar risk.
New Construction Set-Aside Program
Under this program the MHFA finances permanent mortgage loans on newly constructed single
family, owner occupied dwelling units, including condominiums. The New construction Set-Aside
Program has been in existence since 1982 and has provided the permanent financing on more than 1100
single family, newly constructed homes. The builder/developer must apply for financing for a
minimum of 2 units and should , generally, not exceed 25 units in total.
The MHFA will not commit more than 10% of the lendable proceed allocated to the NCSA
Program. In January of 1989 this was 10 million dollars, therefore any one project cannot receive
more than 1 million is subsidy.
The acquisition cost for a unit is limited to $130,000 in the Boston area. In order to qualify for
the program, a family income of a buyer cannot exceed 38,000 for a one person household and 43,000
for two or more people households. For units priced above $110,000, the homeowners will most
often have to pay a downpayment of 10%. The builder must provide a written warranty of one year
on each unit.
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The MHFA has taken steps to "alleviate the lack of an adequate affordability window for
qualified homebuyers. This issue has been identified as one of the major obstacles facing builders
participating in the NCSA Program."
The MHFA has formed a co-insurance program. The MHFA and the insurance company will
assume part of the risk of all loans requiring mortgage insurance (all loans with less than a 25%
downpayment). This will increase the availability of mortgage insurance to homebuyers that have
only a minimum downpayment. The second step the MHFA has implemented as of January 1989, is
that they have relaxed some of the underwriting standards. The first time homebuyer will be allowed
more flexible debt ratios that previously. The advantages of MHFA financing include:
(1) Fixed rate financing of 8.4% for a term of 30 years (conventional rates are now approaching
11%).
(2) Qualifying ratios of 30% (housing) and 36% (total debt) for 95% loan-to-value mortgages
(conventional ratios are 28% and 36% respectively, or lower).
(3) Mortgages with downpayments of as little as 5% to eligible homebuyers (conventional loans
require a minimum of 10% downpayments for condominiums).
(4) Gifts are allowed from family members for half of the required 5% downpayment (conventional
loans do not recognize gifts for the downpayment).
(5) No reserve requirement of 2 to 3 months carrying costs cash on hand after loan closing.
(6) Reduced up-front payment of mortgage insurance premiums.
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APPENDIX
Kaiser Report
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EXHIBIT B-1: KAISER REPORT -- DISAGGREGATED DEVELOPMENT AND
PREFABRICATED SINGLE-FAMILY UNIT (1968)
CONSTRUCTION COSTS FOR
Dollars Dollars Percent of
Per Per Total
Unit Soft Development
1. Land
Broker Offers Land 150 0.15 1.03%
Contract on Land 0 0.00 0.001
Developer Takes Title (Co 1,500 1.50 10.27%
---------------------------------------
1,650 1.65 11.29%
2. Predevelopeent Fees
Mapping 50 0.05 0.34%
Survey and Layout 0 0.00 0.00%
Preliminary Design 0 0.00 0.00%
Buildina Permit 200 0.20 1.37%
Schedule Materials and La 200 0.20 1.37%
Sales Tax 75 0.08 0.51%
Miscellaneous Fees and Ex 75 0.08 0.51%
--------------------------
600 0.60 4.11%
3. Interim Financino
4. Marketinq
5. Overhead/Profit
6. Profit
7. Site Work/Foundations
Clear and Grade
Drainage Lines and Sump
Water Hookup
Roads
Curbs
Sidewalks
Utility Hookup
Excavate
Footing
Septic System
Pavina (Drivevays
Landscaping (Trees)
Foundation
Concrete Work
300 0.30
200 0.20
445 0.45
0 0.00
2.05%
1.37%
3.05%
0.00%
75 0.08 0.51%
300 0.30 2.05%
500 0.50 3.42%
500 0.50 3.42%
500 0.50 3.42%
150 0.15 1.03%
175 0.18 1.20%
530 0.53 3.63%
140 0.14 0.96%
190 0.19 1.30%
120 0.12 0.82%
170 0.17 1.1t6i
575 0.58 3.94%
55 0.06 0.38%
3,980 3.98
8. Off-Site Construction
Framino
Rough Plumbino
Roofing
1,370
900
170
1.37
0.90
0.17
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27.24%
9.38%
6.16%
1.16%
Cleanup 60 0.06 0.41%
Rouqh Electric 340 0.34 2.33%
Wallbaord 685 0.69 4.69%
Insulation 120 0.12 0.82%
Trim 685 0.69 4.69%
Install Appliances 430 0.43 2.94%
Install Kitchen Cabinets 360 0.36 2.46%
Install Vanities 85 0.09 0.58%
Install Ceramic Tile 110 0.11 0.75%
Finish Pluebinq 210 0.21 1.44%
Finish Electrical 120 0.12 0.82%
Paintinq 670 0.67 4.59%
Flooring (linoleum Tile) 350 0.35 2.40%
Cornice 200 0.20 1.37%
Freight 100 0.10 0.68%
Continqency 150 0.15 1.03%
Sidinq 250 0.25 1.71%
Finish Hardware 70 0.07 0.48%
7,435 7.44 50.89%
9. On Site Construction 0 0.00 0.00%
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COST 14,610 14.61 100.00%
Source: U.S. President's Committee on Urban Housinq
Technical Studies, 1968
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EXHIBIT B-2: KAISER REPORT -- DISAGGRE6ATED DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS FOR
SINGLE-FAMILY UNIT (Conventional Construction, 1968)
Dollars Dollars Percent of
Per Per Total
Unit Soft Development
1. Land
Broker Offers Land
Contract on Land
Developer Takes Title (Co
150
0
1,500
0.15
0.00
1.50
0.93%
0.00%
9.28%
1,650 1.65 10.21%
2. Predevelopment Fees
Mapping 50 0.05 0.31%
Survey and Layout 200 0.20 1.24%
Preliminary Desion 50 0.05 0.31%
Building Permit 75 0.08 0.46%
Schedule Materials and La 0 0.00 0.00%
Sales Tax 75 0.08 0.46%
Miscellaneous Fees and Ex 75 0.08 0.46%
525 0.53 3.25%
3. Interim Financing
4. Marketinq
5. Overhead
6. Profits
300 0.30
200 0.20
2,240 2.24
0 0.00
1.86%
1.24%
13.86%
0.00%
7. Site Work/Foundations
Clear and Grade
Drainage Lines and Sump
Water Hookup
Roads
Curbs
Sidewalks
Utility Hookup
Excavate
Footing
Septic System
Paving (Driveways
Land .4ping (Trees)
Foundation
Concrete Work
300 0.30 1.86%
500 0.50 3.09%
500 0.50 3.09%
500 0.50 3.09%
150 0.15 0.93%
200 0.20 1.24%
175 0.18 1.08%
530 0.53 3.28%
140 0.14 0.87%
190 0.19 1.18%
120 0.12 0.74%
170 0.17 1.05%
575 0.58 3.56%
55 0.06 0.34%
4,105 4.11
8. Off Site Construction
9. On Site Construction
Frasina
0 0.00
1,535 1.54
25.39%
0.00%
9.50%
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Rough Hardware 145 0.15 0.90%
Rough Plumbing 835 0.84 5.17%
Rough Heating 1,120 1.12 6.93%
Roofing 480 0.48 2.97%
Cleanup 75 0.08 0.46%
Rough Electric 190 0.19 1.18%
Wallbaord 480 0.48 2.97%
Insulation 95 0.10 0.59%
Window Frame and Exterior 180 0.18 1.11%
Spackle and Tape 190 0.19 1.18%
Trim 385 0.39 2.38%
Install Appliances 190 0.19 1.18%
Install Kitchen Cabinets 290 0.29 1.79%
Install Vanities 40 0.04 0.25%
Install Ceramic Tile 70 0.07 0.43%
Finish Plumbing 190 0.19 1.18%
Finish Electrical 100 0.10 0.62%
Painting 315 0.32 1.95%
Flooring (Linoleum Tile) 240 0.24 1.48%
7,145 7.15 44.20%
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COST 16,165 16.17 100.00%
Source: U.S. President's Committee on Urban Housing
Technical Studies, 1968
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DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS 1968
Conventional Prefabricated
Dollars Dollars Percent of
Per Per Total
Unit Soft Development
Land
Predevelopment Fees
Financing
Marketing
Overhead
Profits
Site Work/Foundations ff
Off-Site Construction
On Site Construction
1,650
525
300
200
2,240
0
3,255
0
7,145
1.65
0.53
0.30
0.20
2.24
0.00
3.26
0.00
7.15
15,315 15.32
10.77%
3.43%
1.96%
1.31%
14.63%
0.00%
21.25%
0.00%
46.65%
Dollars Dollars Percent of
Per Per Total
Unit Soft Development
1,650 1.65 11.99%
600 0.60 4.36%
300 0.30 2.18%
200 0.20 1.45%
445 0.45 3.23%
0 0.00 0.00%
3,130 3.13 22.75%
7,435 7.44 54.03%
0 0.00 0.00%
100.00% 13,760 13.76 100.00%
xcludes roads, curbs and sidewalks
ce: McGraw Hill Information Systems Company
President's Committee on Urban Housing -- 1968
BIT B-4: KAISER REPORT -- AGGREGATED DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS
Adjusted to Boston, April 1989
Adjustment Factor: 4.34
Conventional Prefabricated
Dollars Dollars Percent of
Per Per Total
Unit Sqft Development
Land
Predevelopment Fees
Financinq
Marketinq
Overhead
Profits
Site Work/Foundations *#
Of f-Site Construction
On Site Conshuction
7.160
2,278
1,302
868
9,720
0
14,124
0
31,003
7.16
2.28
1.30
0.87
9.72
0.00
14.12
0.00
31.00
10.77%
3.43%
1.96%
1.31%
14.63%
0.00%
21.25%
0.00%
46.65%
Dollars Dollars Percent of
Per Per Total
Unit Sqft Development
7,160 7.16 11.99%
2,603 2.60 4.36%
1,302 1.30 2.18%
868 0.87 1.45%
1,931 1.93 3.23%
0 0.00 0.00%
13,582 13.58 22.75%
32,262 32.26 54.03%
0 0.00 0.00%
66,454 66.45 100.00% 59,707 59.71 100.00%
xcludes roads, curbs and sidewalks
ce: McGraw Hill Information Systems Company
President's Committee on Urban Housing -- 1968
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BIT 8-3: KAISER REPORT:
EXHIBIT 8-5: CHICAGO MANUFACTURED HOUSING COST STUDY --
TOTAL REPLACEMENT COSTS BY TYPE OF MANUFACTURER
SINGLE FAMILY ATTACHED UNITS (1985)
NON-CHICAGO PLANT , NON-UNION LABOR IN PLANT, UNION LABOR ON SITE
Standard
General Open Closed
Contractor Precut Panel Panel Modular Concrete
Factory cost 0 22,718 11,172 21,437 26,895 34,300
Site Costs 49,021 29,701 41,797 15,019 16,043 10,849
Overhead/Profit 7,353 4,455 6,270 2,253 2,399 1,627
Persits and Fees 1,127 1,137 1,185 774 906 936
Arch/Leoal/Accountina 2,819 2,844 2,962 1,935 2,265 2,339
Sponsor Fee 1,127 1,137 1,185 774 906 936
Financing 1,961 396 557 200 213 145
Contingency 2,451 1,485 2,090 751 800 542
65,859 63,873 67,218 43,143 50,427 51,674
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EXHIBIT B-6: CHICA60 MANUFACTURED HOUSING COST STUDY --
TOTAL REPLACEME SINGLE FAMILY ATTACHED UNITS
SINGLE FAMILY ATTACHED UNITS (Adjusted to Boston, April 1985)
NON-CHICAGO PLANT , NON-UNION LABOR IN PLANT, UNION LABOR ON SITE
Chicaoo Location Factor
Boston Location Factor
Marshall -Swift October 1983
Marshall -Swift April 1989
Adjustement Factor
1256.7
1323.2
1323.2
1815.5
1.444656
Cost per unit
Standard
General Open Closed
Contractor Precut Panel Panel Modular Concrete
Land
Predevelopment Fees
Financinq
Marketinq
Manaoement/General Condit
Profits
Site Work/Foundations
Off Site Construction
On Site Construction
0 0
5,701 5,751
2,833 572
0 0
5,169 3,788
10,623 6,436
8,792 8,789
0 32,820
62,027 34,119
95,144 92,275 97,107 62,327 72,849 74,651
0
5,991
805
0
4,731
9,058
8,792
16,140
51,590
0
3,914
289
0
2,203
3,255
3,461
30,969
18,236
0
4,581
308
0
2,465
3,466
9,998
38,854
13,178
0
4,731
209
0
2,135
2,350
3,317
49,552
12,356
APPENDIX C
Marchall and Swift Cost Indices
Urban Edge, Adjusted to April 1989
Champlain Circle, Adjusted to April 1989
Nuestra Comunidad, Adjusted to April 1989
Bradford Estates, Adjusted to April 1989
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EXHIBIT C-1:
MARSHALL AND SWIFT CONSTRUCTION COST INDICES
Boston -- Class D data
April 1989
Month Year Index Multiplier
December 1982 1145.0 1.585589
April. 1983 1223.1 1.484343
July 1983 1286.6 1.411083
October 1983 1323.2 1.372052
Januarv 1984 1354.8 1.340050
April 1.984 1369.9 1.325279
July 1984 1389.6 1.306491
October 1984 1414.7 1.283310
January 1985 1437.2 1.263220
April 1985 1453.4 1.249139
July 1985 1481.1 1.225778
October 1985 1520.3 1.194172
January 1986 1549.7 1.171517
April 1986 1586.4 1.144415
July 1986 1635.6 1.109990
October 1986 1644.9 1.103714
January 1987 1684.) 1.078087
April 1987 1676.3 1.083040
July 1987 1695.8 1.070586
October 1987 1672.5 1.085500
January 1988 1687.1 1.076106
April 1988 1759.2 1.032003
July 1988 1783.7 1.017828
October 1988 1757.8 1.032825
January 1989 1782.9 1.018284
April 1989 1815.5 1
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EXHIBIT C-2: URBAN EDGE DISAG6REGATED COST DATA, ADJUSTED TO APRIL 1989
Actual Actual
Proiected Actual Actual Actual Actual Variance Dollars Dollars Actual
Per Forest 6ln Granada Boylston Actual Projected (Actual - per per Percent
Structurp Park SuN Pro jected Unit Soft of Total
(4 units)(4 Units)(4 Unit;)(4 Units)(4 Units)(16 Units)(16 Units)(16 Units (16) (15322) Develop.
8/84 3/85 R/85 3/87 6/87
1.306131 1.24R795 1.22544A 1.082741 1.070291
1. Land 2,612 2,498 2.451 1,083 2,141 8,172 10,449 (2,277) 511 0.53 0.52%
2. Predevelooment Fee
Desian 653 3.497 3,431 3,032 2.997 12,956 2.612 10,344 810 0.85 0.83%
Enqineerina 261 150 929 3.672 5,050 9.800 1,045 8,755 612 0.64 0.631
Survey 980 3,247 2.941 3,915 1,762 11,865 3,918 7,946 742 0.77 0.76%
Leqal/Title 2.1.55 6,050 6.550 9,058 11,973 33,632 8,620 25,011 2,102 2.20 2.151
Accountina 287 275 270 238 235 1,018 1,149 (131) 64 0.07 0.06%
Insurance 1.110 1,374 1,461 1,299 1,284 5,418 4,441 977 339 0.35 0.35%
Real Estate Taxes 0 0 0 0 40 40 0 40 2 0.00 0.00%
Appraisal 744 225 1,777 758 749 3,509 2.978 531 219 0.23 0.22%
6,191 14,817 17,358 21,972 24,090 78,238 24,764 53.473 4,890 5 5.00%
3. Financinq
Interest Payments 7.771 27.196 15,200 65,412 55,159 162,967 31,086 131,881 10,185 10.64 10.40%
Financinq fee 0 2,510 2,463 2,176 2.151 9,301 0 9,301 581 0.61 0.59%
Subtotal 7,771 29.706 17,664 67,588 57,310 172,268 31,086 141.182 10,767 11 11.00%
4. Marketina 5.938 13,709 13.709 13,061 13,061 53.541 23,751 29,790 3,346 3.49 3.42%
5. Manaaement/General
Project Most. 8.686 31.350 30.763 76,170 44.273 182.556 34,743 147,813 11.410 11.91 11.66%
Insurance (Liab.) 0 9.296 13,639 12,161 8,298 43,395 0 43,395 2,712 2.83 2.771
Continoency 11.531 0 0 0 0 0 46,122 (46,122) 0 0.00 0.00%
Security Fences 522 3,359 1,379 4,502 6,716 15,956 2,090 13,866 997 1.04 1.021
Storace 0 0 0 4.264 4,680 8,944 0 8,944 559 0.58 0.57%
Interim Operation 0 2,298 123 4,341 213 6,974 0 6,974 436 0.46 0.451
20,739 46,303 45.904 101,438 64,180 257,824 82,955 174,869 16,114 17 16.46%
6. Site Work/Foundati
Demolition 914 1.093 797 352 0 2.241 3,657 (1,416) 140 0.15 0.14%
Excavation/Found. 24,190 28,913 45,395 26,868 40,514 141,691 96,758 44,932 8.856 9.25 9.05%
Driveway 3,542 11,799 1,838 2,707 6,383 22,727 14,169 8,558 1,420 1.48 1.45%
Landscaoinq 653 3,122 3,064 5,551 6,422 18,159 2,612 15,546 1,135 1.19 1.161
Util./Trenchina 5,225 5.245 5.514 8,121 10,810 29,690 20,898 8,792 1,856 1.94 1.90%
Subtotal 34,524 50,172 56,608 43,599 64,129 214,507 138,095 76,412 13,407 14 0
7. Off Site. Construct
Structures 166.426 164.926 156.410 138,197 136,608 596,141 665,704 (69,563) 37.259 38.91 38.06%
Crane Fees 1,567 3.239 3.480 3,790 2,141 12,650 6.269 6,380 791 0.83 0.81%
167,993 168.165 159.891 141,986 138.748 608,791 671,973 (63,183) 38,049 40 38.871
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EXHIBIT C-2: URBAN EDGE DISAGGREGATED COST ATA. ADJUSTED TO APRIL 1989
Actual Actual
Proiected Actual Actual Actual Actual Variance Dollars Dollars Actual
Per Forest Glen Granada Boylston Actual Projected (Actual - per per Percent
Structure Park SuN Projected Unit Soft of Total
(4 units)(4 lnits)(4 Units)(4 Units)(4 Units)(16 Units)(16 Units)(16 Units (16) (15322) Develop.
8/84 3/85 8/85 3/87 6/87
1.306131 1.248795 1.225440 1.082741 1.070291
8. On Site Constructi
Finish Work 23.772 27.710 21.280 20.273 34,530 103,792 95,086 8,706 6,487 6.77 6.63%
Fire Escapes 4,180 3.228 3,186 2.923 3,211 12,549 16,718 (4,170) 784 0.82 0.80%
Plumbina 2.42 5.404 4.902 4,666 5,887 20,857 9,927 10,931 1,304 1.36 1.33%
Paintina 0 0 0 0 5,244 5.244 0 5,244 328 0.34 0.33%
Electrical 653 3.437 5,514 6,442 6,240 21,633 2.612 19,021 1,352 1.41 1.38%
Aooliances 1.633 1.319 1.333 2,085 4.121 8,858 6,531 2,327 554 0.58 0.57%
Subtotal 32,719 41.097 36,215 36.390 59,232 172,934 130,874 42,060 10,808 11.29 11.04%
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COS  278.487 366.467 349,800 427,117 422,891 1,566,274 1,113,947 452,327 97,892 102.22 100.00%
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EXHIBIT C-4: NUESTRA COMINInAD -- DISA66RE6ATED COST DATA, ADJUSTED TO APRIL 1989
Prniecttd Cost Cost
Per 47 - 44 49 - 51
Duolex Harlow Howard
4/1986 1/1987 4/1988
Actual
Cost
Dean
4/1988
41 - 43 45 - 47
Harlow Harlow
(Proiected 3/89)
3/19R9 3/1989
Total
Five
Duo lexes
Proi. Variance Dollars Dollars Percent.
Five (Actual -Per Unit Per Soft of Total
DuolexesProiected 12150 Cost
1.144415 1,078087 1.083040 1.083040 1 1
1. Land Acauisition 1.144 1.078 1,083 1.083 1,000 1.000 5,244 5,722 (478) 524 0.43 0.45%
2. Predevelooment F
Architectural 7R6 270 5.415 5.41.9 3.000 3,000 17.100 1,431 15.669 1.710 1.41 1.48%
Survey and Enn. 1.373 1.294 2.166 2.166 2.075 2,075 9,776 6.866 2,909 978 0.80 0.85%
Leoal and Account. 916 95 1.625 1.A25 2,000 2.000 7.344 4.578 2,766 734 0.60 0.64%
Insurance 987 647 1.625 1.625 2.500 2.500 8.896 3,433 5,463 890 0.73 0.77%
Taxes 0 0 q91 961 1.500 1.500 4.921 0 4,921 492 0.41 0.43%
Aooraisal 0 0 325 325 1,000 1.000 2,650 0 2,650 265 0.22 0.23%
Subtotal 3,262 2.305 12.116 12.116 12.075 12.075 50,687 16.308 34,379 5,069 4.17 4.40%
3. Financino
Interest 5,264 3,195 10,830 10,830 9.200 9,200 43.256 26,322 16,935 4,326 3.56 3.75%
Points 1,820 571 1,657 1,657 1,250 1,250 6.385 9,098 (2,713) 639 0.53 0.55%
Subtotal 7.084 3,767 12.487 12.487 10,450 10.450. 49,642 35,420 14,222 4,964 4.09 4.31%
4. Marketino 687 647 0 650 0 500 1,797 3,433 (1,637) I80 0.15 0.16%
5. Manaoesent/Overh
Momnt/Overhead 5.722 27.148 26.134 25.841 12.000 12,000 103.124 28,610 74.513 10,312 8.49 8.95%
Contingency 9.728 0 0 0 0 0 0 48,638 (48,638) 0 0.00 0.00%
Contr. Overhead 9.728 13.746 19.201 19.201 9,968 9,968 72,084 48,638 23,446 7,208 5.93 6.25%
Trash Removal 0 0 2.437 2.437 0 0 4,874 0 4,874 487 0.40 0.42%
Board Up 0 0 747 747 0 0 1,495 0 1,495 149 0.12 0.13%
Vandalism 0 0 975 975 400 400 2.749 0 2,749 275 0.23 0.24%
Security 0 0 2.708 2.708 3,500 3,500 12,415 0 12.415 1,242 1.02 1.08%
Tesoorary Power 2.289 2.156 2.166 542 262 262 5,388 11,444 (6,056) 539 0.44 0.47%
Subtotal 27.466 49.090 54,368 52,451 26.130 26.130 202.128 137,330 64,798 20,213 16.64 17.53%
6. Site Work/Founda
Landscanino 0 0 5.415 5,415 7,500 7.500 25.830 0 25,830 2,583 2.13 2.24%
Site Dev./Util. 7.301 7.739 22.202 22.202 25.600 25.600 103,343 36,507 66,836 10,334 8.51 8.97%
Foundation 13,962 13.153 13.213 13,213 12,200 12.200 63,979 69.809 (5,830) 6,398 5.27 5.55%
Waterproof/Backfil 1.373 1.294 1.300 3.249 4,000 4,000 13,842 6.866 6,976 1,384 1.14 1.20%
Sills and Platform 7.553 7.115 7.148 7.148 7.500 7.500 36,412 37,766 (1,354) 3,641 3.00 3.16%
Subtotal 30.190 29,300 49.278 51,228 56,800 56,800 243.406 150,948 92,458 24,341 20.03 21.12%
7. Off Site Constru
Pond Hill Kit 28.496 26.844 26.968 26.968 24,900 24.900 130,580 142,480 (11,900) 13,058 10.75 11.33%
Doors and Windows 5.104 4.808 4.830 4,830 4,460 4,460 23.389 25.520 (2,131) 2,339 1.93 2.03%
12.67 13.36%
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Subtotal 33.600 31.653 31.798 31.798 29,360 29.360 153,969 168.000 (14,031) ,397
FNIU57 r-3: CHAMPLATN CIRCLF -- DiAd usted to Aori
Vr; rra Arnn V r p nc nDllars nla.;Y Percent
:e, -43 Ian 1985 (Actuai- Per init Ppr Soft f Total
I..i011 1.7 0150 Proierted) ?c it 90. Csts
1, Land 401 7.2(78 60 ,7 ,76h
2, Predevelopm~ent Fee;
EnninPerinn 6. 4,i?9J .1 1.21 1,491
F Permits 2 .44: ,21 (1,229) 2 14)7 1,22%
F Land PlAnninn 9,:R0 4(38 2 -47 0,53%
F Len.al 174.1647 (99 9 (07 ,997
F Fninpprian ,70. h.i .. : 0,8A
Sabtotai A05.24 ii6.587 10,73 9.57 . 7.01%
3. Financino
Bank Fe 2401 12,632 (768) 602 0,67 u.76%
Interpst 2,8 R6A1 48,113 9.25! 2, 21 229%
SubtotAl 52,762 60,745 W.48 2.893 3.2 1 ,65
4. Marketina
In House ECenqe 6700 2,228 (4,477) 106 0.12
Marketina Salarv 26,801 25,264 t1,537) 1,203 1,34 1,52%
23.501 27,493 (6.009) 1,309 1,45 1.65%
5, Manaaement/General Condition/Frpp
io inn10504 4. 74 (5.762) 4,5 , 2. .o r. r 70%
F Project Cordination 16.01 15.159 (2 72 0.20 0,91
Contiro;nenv /-pn, Crin:. 14,74 61.452 , 2 2.75 3,70
Insuirance 4. 0 6,125 ,10 29 (,32 .,371
747.549 196,3Ri (4h. 9,2. 1.9 11.1 
6, .Sit Work/Fonda4ons
Situ 314. 917 209, 3 (5,774, 14,721 16,36 18,59%
Foundation 71,022 64,970 (6,052) 1,094 3,44 3,91%
tanisraninn 0R,141 29,154 1.013 i,388 1,54 -. 752
Subtntal 414,076 403,267 (10.813) 19,203 2134 24,.25%
7. Off Site ronstrucion
8. On Site Construction
754.448 708, 741 (45,M707) 3,750 37,50 42, 63
Pution n -945 17 .700 (44) 5,75 7
Etro.7 156,259n 4 6 72 , ,
TOTAL DFVFLOPMENT CrfT (90, 06) 79,176 +7,97 100. C
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EXHIBIT C-4! NUFTRA CfMUNIDA0 -- DI6AARF6ATED COST DATA. ADJUSTED TO APRIL 1989
Projected Cnst Cost Actual 41 - 43 4 - 47
Per 42 - 44 49 - 51 Cost Harlov Harlow
unlex Harlow Howard Dean (Projected 3/89)
986 1/1987 4/1988 4/1988 3/1999 3/1989
1.144415 1.078087 1.083040 1.083040
Total Proj. Variance Dollars Dollirs Percent.
Five Five (Actual -Per Unit Per Saft of Total
Duolexes DuolexesProjected 12150 Cost
I t
8. On Site Construc
Panel Erection
Rouqh Carpentry
Roofino
Doors and Windows
Exterior Trim
Rouqh Pluabinq
Rouah Electrical
Sheetrock
Doors and Trim
Paint
Cabinetrv
Finish Pluabino
Finish Flectrical
Floors
Porches
Finish Details
Subtotal
2.060
4.177
2.060
784
4.921
3.204
4.578
11.444
3.433
3.319
2.299
2.?R9
5.035
3.62
2,844
1.941
3.962
4.274
738
4.966
3,019
6.404
10.781
8.193
4.851
3.l7f
4.744
3.450
1.901
,94q
3.980
1.354
3.125
13.105
11.155
2.231
10.830
4.332
5.957
7.599
3.520
3.791
7.708
1.300
1.949
16,308
1.354
3.249
8.448
13.538
5.415
15.704
4.332
5.957
7.9sqq
3.520
2.05
3.791
2.708
1,300
2.500
22.450
2.000
3.000
7.800
12.500
5.500
14.500
9.500
7,000
7.400
2.000
2.000
7,000
6.500
0
2.500
22,450
2.000
3,000
7.800
12.500
5,500
14,500
9,500
7.000
2.400
2,000
2.000
7.000
f6.500
0.
10.840
69. 151
10.981
13.112
41.788
52,712
25.050
66.315
35.858
30.765
13.125
13.196
10.272
26,325
21.865
4,500
10.300
20.886
10,300
3,920
24.605
16.022
22,888
57.221
43,488
17.166
16.594
11.444
11.444
25,177
18,311
14,219
540
48,265
681
9i193
17183
36,690
2.162
9.095
(7.630)
13.599
(3,469)
1,752
(1.172)
1,148
3,554
(9,719)
1.084
6,915
1,098
1,311
4,179
5,271
2,505
6,632
3.586
3,076
1.313
1,320
1,027
2.632
2.187
450
64,797 66.332 73,993 92.230 106.650 106.650 445,854 323,984 121,870 44,585
TOTAL DEVELOP. COST 168.229 178.131 235.124 254.042 242.465 242.965 1,152.727 841,145 311,582 115,273
0.89
5.69
0.90
1.08
3.44
4.34
2.06
5.46
2.95
2.53
1.08
1.09
0.85
2.17
1.80
0.37
36.70 38.68%
94.87 100.00%
168
D
4/
0.94%
6.00%
0.95%
1.14%
3.63%
4.57%
2.17%
5.75%
3.11%
2.67%
1.14%
1.14%
0.89%
2.28%
1.90%
0.39%
--------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT C-5: BRADFORD FSTATES -- DISAGGREGATED COST DATA,
ADJUSTED TO APRIL 1989
Projectpd Actual Variance Dollars Dollars Percent
Dec. 1985 July 1988 (Actual- Per Unit Per Sqft of Total
1.194172202 1.017828110 Proiected) 24 22800 Costs
1. Land 1 1 (0) 0 0.00 0.00%
2. Predevelopment Fees
D Architectural 93,420 89,654 (3,766) 3,736 2.80 3.28%
D Enaineerino 0 38.474 38,474 1,603 1.20 1.41%
D Real Estate Taxes 9,524 1,323 (8.200) 55 0.04 0.05%
D Insurance 4,777 4,071 (705) 170 0.13 0.15%
D Lenal Fees 22,689 52,509 29,819 2,188 1.64 1.92%
D Acct./Cost Certif 4,777 4,071 (705) 170 0.13 0.15%
D Title and Recordino 7,135 6,082 (1,054) 253 0.19 0.22%
D Aporaisal 2,388 2,036 (353) 85 0.06 0.07%
D Insnection Enainper 2,388 2,036 (353) 85 0.06 0.07%
C Insurance 8,598 7,328 (1.270) 305 0.23 0.27%
C Desion Services 5,732 4,886 (846) 204 0.15 0.18%
C Surveyor 5,732 4,886 (846) 204 0.15 0.18%
Subtotal 167,160 217,355 50,195 9,056 6.78 7.96%
3. Financino
D Const. Loan(6 mo 10%) 77.914 153,781 75,867 6,408 4.80 5.63%
D Commitment Fee (Points) 47,767 40,713 (7,054) 1,696 1.27 1.49%
0 Preferred Lender Fee 28,660 24,428 (4,232) 1,018 0.76 0.89%
D Credit Correction 0 3.910 3.910 163 0.12 0.14%
0 Proaram Processino Fee 3,821 3.257 (564) 136 0.10 0.12%
158.162 226,089 67.927 9.420 7.06 8.28%
4. Marketing
D In House Marketino 11.942 13,563 1,621 565 0.42 0.50%
D Sales Fee 0 24,428 24,428 1,018 0.76 0.89%
Subtotal 11,942 37,990 26,049 1.583 1.19 1.39%
5. Manaaement/General Conditions/Fe
D Construction Manacer 41,796 35,624 (6,172) 1,484 1.11 1.30%
0 Continoencv (Developer) 109,258 0 (109.258) 0 0.00 0.00%
D Develonment Administratio 51.349 93.999 42,650 3,917 2.93 3.44%
D Builder's Risk/Liability 32.481 28.255 (4,227) 1,177 0.88 1.03%
C Overhead @7% 173,155 173,031 (124) 7,210 5.40 6.34%
C Temn Fence 8,598 7,328 (1.270) 305 0.23 0.27%
D Security (Develoner) 0 22.642 22.642 943 0.71 0.83%
C Security 4.627 3.944 (683) 164 0.12 0.14%
421,266 364,823 (56,443) 15,201 11.39 13,36%
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EXHIBIT C-5: BRADFORD ESTATES -- DISAGGREGATED COST DATA,
ADJUSTED TO APRIL 1989
Projected Actual Variance Dollars Dollars Percent
Dec. 1985 Julv 1988 (Actual- Per Unit Per Sqft of Total
1.194172202 1.017828110 Projected) 24 22800 Costs
6. Site Work/Foundations
C Excavatino 372,582 317.562 (55.019) 13.232 9.91 11.63%
C Concrete 143.301 122.139 (21.161) 5,089 3.81 4.47%
C Water Proofino 14,330 12,214 (2,116) 509 0.38 0.45%
C Rubbish Removal 11.464 9,771 (1,693) 407 0.30 0.36%
D Landscaoinn 0 14,759 14.759 615 0.46 0.54%
C Landscaoino 9,553 8,143 (1,411) 339 0.25 0.30%
Subtotal 551,230 484.588 (66,642) 20,191 15.12 17.74%
7. Off Site Construction
C Crane 14,330 12,214 (2,116) 509 0.38 0.45%
M transoortation 34,392 29,313 (5,079) 1,221 0.91 1.07%
M Base Unit 998,118 850,725 (147.393) 35,447 26.55 31.15%
M Bay Window 32.386 27,603 (4,782) 1,150 0.86 1.01%
M Phone Jack 1,605 1.368 (237) 57 0.04 0.05%
M T.V. Jack 1,605 1.368 (237) 57 0.04 0.05X
M Dormer 15.763 13,435 (2,328) 560 0.42 0.49%
M Disposal 3.009 2,565 (444) 107 0.08 0.09%
M Dormer Window 6.449 5,496 (952) 229 0.17 0.20%
M Two-ten 15,104 12,873 (2.230) 536 0.40 0.47%
M two hour senaration wall 6,592 5,618 (973) 234 0.18 0.21%
M Unit Credit (57,320) (48,856) 8.465 (2,036) -1.52 -1.79%
M Discount 7% (73,485) (62,633) 10.852 (2,610) -1.95 -2.29%
Subtotal 998.548 851.092 (147,456) 35,462 26.56 31.16%
8. On Site Construction
C Front Stens 12.037 10,260 (1.778) 427 0.32 0.38%
C Doors 11.464 9,771 (1,693) 407 0.30 0.36%
C Cedar Claoboard 60,186 51,299 (8,888) 2,137 1.60 1.88%
C Rear Porch 23.931 20,397 (3.534) 850 0.64 0.75%
C Sills 2.866 2,443 (423) 102 0.08 0.09%
C Sill Sealer 1,433 1,221 (212) 51 0.04 0.04%
C Carpenter 143,301 173.031 29,730 7,210 5.40 6.34%
C Electrical 28,660 34,606 5,946 1,442 1.08 1.27%
C Plumbino 42,990 36.642 (6,348) 1,527 1.14 1.34%
C Heatinq 11,464 9,771 (1,693) 407 0.30 0.36%
C Caroet 14,330 12,214 (2,116) 509 0.38 0.45%
C Kneewall Overhana 28,660 78,169 49,509 3,257 2.44 2.86%
C Sales Tax 42.990 24,428 (18,562) 1,018 0.76 0.89%
C Basement Bedroom Mat 91.712 78,169 (13,543) 3.257 2.44 2.86%
C Gutters 8.025 6,840 (1,185) 285 0.21 0.25%
Subtotal 524.051 549,261 25,210 22,886 17.14 20.11%
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COST 2,832,359 2,731,199 (101.160) 113,800 85.24 100.00%
170
